Clinton, Benghazi and the Future of Libya

Thinking in the present — in support of an Obama under attack for his supposed weakness as commander in chief — and in the future — as a possible presidential candidate within four years — Hillary Clinton has assumed full responsibility for the management of the Benghazi attack last September 11 that cost U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans their lives. It is a matter that makes clear the lack of control Libya has been submerged in since the death of Moammar Gadhafi a year ago.

For the time being the Libyan authorities have not managed to gain a monopoly on the use of force, challenged by innumerable militias that strive for their slice of the power that still remains to be shared out. Although the first stage, managed by the National Transitional Council, was formally closed with the celebration of the election that gave birth to the General National Congress last June and designated its 200 representatives, we are still waiting for the formation of a ministerial cabinet worthy of the name.

Mustafa Abushagur, the first of the candidates for the position of prime minister, has given up the task, incapable of gaining the necessary support for his list of 24 ministers — an impossible task given the decision of the majority National Forces Alliance, led by former Prime Minister Mahmud Jibril, to not cooperate with somebody they perceived as too close to the Muslim Brotherhood. Nor did Mahamed al Hariri, preferred candidate of the Justice and Construction Party, which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood, manage it. It remains to be seen if Ali Zidan — expert human rights lawyer and former member of the dissident National Front for the Salvation of Libya — will have better luck.

In parallel with this political agenda, the debate continues over the identity of those responsible for the Benghazi attack, an infinite list that goes from members of Ansar al Sharia — the most probable option — to local associates of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb or even al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, without forgetting those loyal to Gadhafi. While this mystery is resolved, it does seem clear that both the Libyan authorities — who have already detained some suspects and encouraged the population to demonstrate its sympathy with Washington — and their American counterparts — who have preferred to lower the tone of the response in order to avoid a negative overreaction against their interests in the country and increased pressure on local governments that need to establish themselves — seem interested in turning the page immediately.

But none of this points to a substantial improvement in the Libyan situation. It is true that it cannot yet be said that the process has come off the rails once and for all and that the country has even begun to pump petroleum at similar levels to those of two years ago; thousands of armed men have decided to join the armed forces and police of the new regime. But it is also true that security is, today, the principal unresolved task on the national agenda. Given current conditions it is very difficult to imagine how national reconciliation could be produced, with fractures such as those that exist between Tripoli and Benghazi, to which are added others of a tribal nature and those created out of the different alignments formed during the crisis that culminated in the fall of Gadhafi.

Neither are these the best conditions to overcome the enormous obstacles that currently impede the configuration of a new government accepted by all actors involved and the writing of a new constitution. Without a doubt, and while the violence and the weight of political Islam remain so present in national life, it would be very bold to declare that the future of Libya is clear.