Japan-US Relations Reach a Crossroads

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s diplomatic war with the U.S. finally ended in late February. There are gains and losses [for Japan] as seen from Abe’s trip. The gains mostly include an overstatement of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan’s affiliation with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, making the Japanese people feel Japan is accomplishing something. The losses primarily center on the problem of the Diaoyu Islands, on which the U.S. kept silent, failing to fulfill Japan’s expectations.

First of all, following his talks with President Obama, Abe said: “I think I can declare with confidence that the trust and the bond in our alliance is back.” This statement shows that Abe pretty much expects he can manage U.S.-Japan relations more effectively than the former Democratic Party; however, this euphemistic sentiment actually embodies Abe’s deep distrust. The meeting did not fully accomplish Japan’s strategic objectives. As the media criticized, Abe’s U.S. visit was like a “one-day tour” this time. It did not herald a new upsurge in Japan-U.S. relations as Japan had expected. The U.S. media generally kept reporting on the meeting low-key. It follows that the Obama administration’s policies are definitely not what Abe expected them to be. The U.S. is unwilling to be hijacked by Japan: Instead, it sticks up for its own interests and has the power to influence Japan’s policy trends.

The U.S. had worries and doubts about the Democratic Party of Japan because it feared that Japan might break away from the U.S. and turn toward Asia. The Liberal Democratic Party’s return to political power decreased the U.S.’ worries on the issue. Nevertheless, Abe deliberately built a high-profile atmosphere surrounding his U.S. visit. Prior to the visit, he showed his loyalty to the U.S. by blasting China, decreasing U.S. worries — particularly about Japan’s potential to turn its focus back to Asia. The U.S. even felt relieved by Abe’s visit. This is one of the surest effects his visit generated.

Second, worried that Abe might frantically veer to the right, the U.S. made a conscious effort to suppress him during the meeting. Assuming Japan exercises the option of constitutional amendment, it will veer out of control and eventually pose a threat to the U.S. Japan’s re-explanation of its constitution would result in the expansion of armaments and war preparations once again. Once Japan achieves powerful army strength, its next goal is probably to ask the U.S. to withdraw troops from Japan, which is why Obama does not fully support Abe’s considerations. Therefore, based on the general orientation of Japanese demands, we can see that there will be a serious rift in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Contrary to Abe’s statement, the U.S. and Japan do not have a firm and very active political relationship. Abe merely needs this kind of exaggeration to prove his diplomatic accomplishments.

Nonetheless, the international situation has changed dramatically. China is playing a more significant role [globally], so the U.S. is unwilling to fight with China over Japan. In other words, the U.S. does not want to fall into Japan’s trap. However, maintaining a stable U.S.-Japan alliance fits U.S. interests and is beneficial to the U.S.’s dealings with China. Accordingly, Obama is willing to pacify Abe and project a positive image of Japan-U.S. relations to the outside world.

Third, the important economic problem Abe wanted to discuss during his U.S. visit was the lowest standard the U.S. holds on Japan joining the TPP. Although Abe personally favors joining the TPP, he became unduly reticent on the issue after taking office. Below are two issues he must consider:

Japan hopes that bargaining with the U.S. on the TPP will lead to a lower criteria threshold, garnering the maximum benefit for Japan. For example, the TPP regulates 100 percent of duty-free items without exception, but Abe hopes the U.S. will set up an exception, permitting produce such as rice and other weak Japanese industries to impose partial tariffs and not keeping Japan’s insurance market too open.

The second concerns the prime minister’s election in July. Abe is unwilling to take a clear-cut stand on the [TPP] matter too early because he fears losing the rural vote. The U.S. has not completely disappointed Abe. The two countries issued a joint statement, saying that “prior commitment to unilaterally eliminate all tariffs” is not a requirement for joining TPP talks. As for Japan, it gets what it wants: The Japanese think this [agreement] creates the conditions for Japan to join the TPP. Japanese public opinion universally converges on the significance of this result Abe reaped from his U.S. visit. Yet, in fact, this promise is merely a kind of intentional expression. When the time comes for Japan to really enter negotiations, it is still uncertain whether Japan will get the final allowance in customs. It will all depend on the international situation, as well as the balance of power and strategic evolution between the U.S. and other TPP member states.

Fourth, other matters of concern include how Japan coordinates with the U.S. on the issues of the Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea and its policies towards China. Prior to his U.S. talks, Abe flung charges at China during an interview, calling on Asian countries to reduce economic and trade exchanges with China and thereby attack China. As a leader of a country who has common relations with China, Abe’s public call on Asian countries to oppose China shows he has lost his basic sense of diplomatic protocol as well as his common sense. He has lost the intellectuality to correctly judge global relations as well. Perhaps Abe’s original intention is to win the favor of the U.S. by catering to the U.S.’s mentality of containment toward China. Still, in effect, American policy toward China is not just about restraint but also cooperation and harmony. Abe’s “rampageous” remarks and foreign policy did not receive the desired response from the U.S.; rather, they came under fire.

Japan hopes to confirm President Obama’s will to agree that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is applicable to the Diaoyu Islands. The article states that the U.S. is bound to protect the territories under the administration of Japan. However, during public appearances in press conferences, Obama did not mention this issue at all. Also, it is not entirely clear whether Obama made promises to Abe in closed door meetings. During a joint press conference, Abe stated that Obama reaffirmed the U.S.’ defense duty to Japan and emphasized that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers the Diaoyu Islands. However, it seems suspicious that the Japanese government and media did not play up this declaration.

It should be said that Japan-U.S. relations made some progress during Abe’s visit to U.S. However, the visit still falls far short of Japan’s expectations. Both countries, Japan and the U.S., will need each other for a fairly long time — the dominant factor here being the two countries’ intense military alliance.

Through Abe’s recent U.S. visit, we can conclude that Japan-U.S. relations have reached a crossroads: The more dependent Japan is on the U.S., the less Japan means to the U.S. Meanwhile, the gap in military and political strength between China and Japan is increasingly widening. Plus, China does not want to enforce strategies that defy the U.S. U.S.-China relations will get stronger, and U.S.-Japan relations will get weaker.