Russian-American Interests

The U.S. has decided on a role for Russia in the Middle East. This alone was enough to make Israel cross its limits and express its anger by launching strikes on locations close to Damascus. The goal was to push the region into a full-on confrontation, which would blow up the peaceful understanding between Washington and Moscow. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry insisted on visiting the Kremlin and made three trips for difficult negotiations with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and President Vladimir Putin before strolling around the Red Square and leaving with hopes of more trips and agreements — namely, the expected summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and Putin, around which revolves the diplomatic action.

Its most prominent title is still “Syria and the Middle East,” while the practical push is on the China Sea, the Koreas and the Asian “super economy” — as it faces the challenges of the European and American financial and economic crisis — and on how to create new, adjusted balances while taking into account the scale of the threats mentioned. The powerful have their worries; the Arabs and Muslims have their own, though of a different kind. We are seeing the wedding of the Arab Spring in bloom with freedom and democracy, radiant in deep red, and it is not a lot to ask that Syria should concern the Arab world, which has been concerned for more than two years. It is riveted to the satellite broadcasts following the soap opera of violence and destruction: people lying in wait for oil and “watching” for means of assistance or of making a secret profit. It keeps close track of the fate and future of the region’s economy and is always fixated on the Syrian scene, watching for a clear sign of who supports the regime and who supports the opposition.

This duality appears to be necessary, one of many of Washington’s tasks in supporting the shared international-regional-Arab effort. The goal is to enable the opposition and help it reach its aims, whereas Moscow is working toward the immoral goal of supporting the regime. The Arabs are concerned about the course of events, while Moscow and Washington are each concerned with splitting the gains and the loot. The form is different, but they are in agreement on the content: They have opposing views on the regime and its future, but come together at the core on how to split up the spoils in the region — and also in many other parts of the world. They exchange accusations and parry each other in the media, but practically speaking, they come together, discuss and agree; this scenario will likely remain the same until they reach a final agreement on the size of the “deal” and the details on the regional and international levels.

What Kerry put into motion in Moscow is big and dangerous: an understanding of Russia’s role in the Middle East and the end of its input on fixing the current complicated issues; also, an understanding on a geopolitical oil map, which Moscow would benefit from because it would result in delineating “quotas” and locations of resources. There would also be an understanding of what roles would be left for Turkey, Iran and Israel in the region and of how to approach the complicated issues and find the compromises that are convenient for them.

What about the Arabs? What about their affairs and issues, and the future and fate of their petroleum? Nothing at all — and Kerry came out of the exam he was subjected to in Moscow making a lot of noise about Syria and the regime, compromise and the international conference to implement the Geneva Communiqué, while the Syrian issue only appeared in limited details in the American-Russian talks. All this widespread clamor of publicity surrounding the decisions and the statements about these events are a kind of media propaganda, necessary so that people will say that the shared concern was Syria, while in truth it was something else: the Chinese-Japanese-Korean “super economy” and how to tame it.

Israel’s entry into the crisis through the airstrikes on targets near Damascus took place far away from the partisan entry of Hezbollah into the ongoing slaughter in the Qusayr area. They are two sides of one operation — each singing its own tune, while there is only one plan. Hezbollah wants a strategic line between Tehran and its positions in the Beqaa and the south: going through Syria and including Damascus, Sayyidah Zeinab and the Shiite community in the Qusayr region, then Hormel, etc. Israel wants to push Syria into sectarian and intercommunity killings so it will rip itself apart, smoothing the way for a power play for the Golan Heights and keeping the Shabaa Farms, so that Israel can extricate itself from international contention and thwart Beirut’s diplomatic activities in the U.N. and U.N. Security Council to establish its sovereignty and Lebanese identity.

Remarkable is not just the surprising fact that Moscow did not intervene to repel Israel when it attacked Syria with its war planes, despite its relationship with the regime and strong support for it: Washington also did not intervene to repel Hezbollah when it got involved in the Qusayr region, even though it warned and threatened Hezbollah in the media. It is as though the two capitals understand each other and have agreed on how the scene will be produced, and there is nothing to keep it from going forward as long as their interests are secure. The situation is convenient because it denies the opposition coalition any room for discussion unless Assad is gone, while the regime responds by continuing to kill until the “plot and the plotters” are defeated.

The way things are going, Syria’s fate will be no better than Iraq’s. There it was U.S.-British interference; here in Syria, it is not inconceivable that there will be a “cocktail” of interference from Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida, on top of Hezbollah and Israel, Iran and Turkey, and more Arab entanglements from the revolutions and intifadas. Meanwhile, the international priority is still on drawing the borders of the oil entities connected to the big countries that are extending their long, grasping octopus tentacles, which are very capable of sapping their strength through justification and persuasion.