Steps that Build Up Weakness
Published in Israel Hayom
(Israel) on 13 August 2013
by Avraham Ben Tzvi (link to original)
(Israel) on 13 August 2013
by Avraham Ben Tzvi (link to original)
Translated from
by Maya Ehrmann.
Edited by Kyrstie Lane.
Fate struck last Wednesday. President Barack Obama decided to cancel a scheduled meeting with his Russian counterpart following the decision of Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, to provide temporary political asylum to Edward Snowden, accused of leaking secret information about a wide-range National Security Agency system of tracking and wiretapping. The summit was supposed to take place in Moscow in September following a meeting of the G-20 leaders in Saint Petersburg.
At first sight, this decision may be perceived as an expression of decisive American conduct, which, in turn, reflects an image of strength and aggression; however, a thorough examination of the complex relations between Washington and Moscow in Obama’s era suggests a totally different conclusion. Contrary to the decision of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to destroy the May 1960 Paris summit in attendance by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower — a decision that conveyed defiance and readiness to “walk on the edge” — the current situation actually reveals incessant U.S. weakness on a global level. In this context, Obama’s decision to cancel his meeting with Putin is more reminiscent of the squeal of the mouse than the war cry of the king of the jungle. This decision was inevitably necessary as over the past month, the White House has endured a series of public humiliation incidents at the hands of the Kremlin. The Americans found themselves as poor men at the door, begging the Russian president to return the American citizen, wanted for serious allegations of espionage, to their hands.
Since the Moscow summit (for which only one day of discussion was allocated) was not meant to bring about a breakthrough in the various controversial issues between the sides, it is difficult to assume that the American decision had much practical global significance. Moreover, considering Putin’s regularly cold, and even degrading, attitude toward America’s 44th president (demonstrated through the icy atmosphere that characterized the previous summit meetings between them), one may assume that the definitive cancellation of the future Moscow summit could save Obama a return to the frost (whereas the spy, or leaker in this case, is actually enjoying some very warm Russian hospitality). Indeed, Putin naturally learned his lesson from the exaggerated caution exhibited by the great American power in Libya, Syria and, of course, Iran, and it appears that the pattern of his shielded activity in the Snowden affair is an inevitable derivative of this.
If we refocus our attention to Jerusalem, we shall see that in at least two contexts, the growing and accumulating signs pointing to the downfall of the American era undoubtedly hold clear and instant implications for Israel as well.
Foremost, the continuous deterioration of relations between Obama and Putin and the perception by the Kremlin that America’s president is a “paper tiger” can further diminish the capability of the U.S. to influence the Kremlin and convince it to cooperate with the U.S. to establish common policies toward Iran and Syria. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at least temporarily succeeded in training the Russian bear and guiding him toward a path of more restrained activity from a position of power. Today, the situation is quite different on the surface, a factor that conveys a clear message to Israel — that there is an even lower likelihood that Washington will succeed in harnessing Moscow for an effective process of deterrence to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
Second, in light of the recommencement of the negotiation process between Israelis and Palestinians, the role of the American liaison — who initiated the renewal of talks — is extremely significant for the advancement of the agreement process. Therefore, it will be very difficult for America, which projects an image of weakness and helplessness on the global level, to provide credible guarantees as part of the agreement package, guarantees that would reduce the risks and uncertainty Israel faces with this agreement. Likewise, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s invested efforts in the talks, it is still totally and primarily unclear if these efforts will include the benefits, incentives and compensation vital to the success of this agreement.
At first sight, this decision may be perceived as an expression of decisive American conduct, which, in turn, reflects an image of strength and aggression; however, a thorough examination of the complex relations between Washington and Moscow in Obama’s era suggests a totally different conclusion. Contrary to the decision of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to destroy the May 1960 Paris summit in attendance by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower — a decision that conveyed defiance and readiness to “walk on the edge” — the current situation actually reveals incessant U.S. weakness on a global level. In this context, Obama’s decision to cancel his meeting with Putin is more reminiscent of the squeal of the mouse than the war cry of the king of the jungle. This decision was inevitably necessary as over the past month, the White House has endured a series of public humiliation incidents at the hands of the Kremlin. The Americans found themselves as poor men at the door, begging the Russian president to return the American citizen, wanted for serious allegations of espionage, to their hands.
Since the Moscow summit (for which only one day of discussion was allocated) was not meant to bring about a breakthrough in the various controversial issues between the sides, it is difficult to assume that the American decision had much practical global significance. Moreover, considering Putin’s regularly cold, and even degrading, attitude toward America’s 44th president (demonstrated through the icy atmosphere that characterized the previous summit meetings between them), one may assume that the definitive cancellation of the future Moscow summit could save Obama a return to the frost (whereas the spy, or leaker in this case, is actually enjoying some very warm Russian hospitality). Indeed, Putin naturally learned his lesson from the exaggerated caution exhibited by the great American power in Libya, Syria and, of course, Iran, and it appears that the pattern of his shielded activity in the Snowden affair is an inevitable derivative of this.
If we refocus our attention to Jerusalem, we shall see that in at least two contexts, the growing and accumulating signs pointing to the downfall of the American era undoubtedly hold clear and instant implications for Israel as well.
Foremost, the continuous deterioration of relations between Obama and Putin and the perception by the Kremlin that America’s president is a “paper tiger” can further diminish the capability of the U.S. to influence the Kremlin and convince it to cooperate with the U.S. to establish common policies toward Iran and Syria. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at least temporarily succeeded in training the Russian bear and guiding him toward a path of more restrained activity from a position of power. Today, the situation is quite different on the surface, a factor that conveys a clear message to Israel — that there is an even lower likelihood that Washington will succeed in harnessing Moscow for an effective process of deterrence to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
Second, in light of the recommencement of the negotiation process between Israelis and Palestinians, the role of the American liaison — who initiated the renewal of talks — is extremely significant for the advancement of the agreement process. Therefore, it will be very difficult for America, which projects an image of weakness and helplessness on the global level, to provide credible guarantees as part of the agreement package, guarantees that would reduce the risks and uncertainty Israel faces with this agreement. Likewise, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s invested efforts in the talks, it is still totally and primarily unclear if these efforts will include the benefits, incentives and compensation vital to the success of this agreement.