Why Has the Spread of Democracy in the Middle East Stalled?

As violence in the Arab world increases, sharp criticisms are directed toward NATO member states’ policies. These criticisms are particularly focused on America, as it is the biggest player in this area of the world, and on Washington’s policies toward Egypt, given the nation’s importance in the Arab world and international community. Washington’s policy in this respect seems like a difficult attempt to walk two lines: taking into account the electoral legitimacy of the deposed Egyptian president while realizing the political reality of the popular uprising and military intervention against Muslim Brotherhood rule. Washington followed the former when it announced that it would suspend military aid after the change in leadership and the latter when it refused to describe the military intervention against Morsi’s government as a coup and repeated its previous criticisms of Morsi.

Commentators and authors from different political backgrounds have found unacceptable flaws in this policy. BBC News North America editor Mark Mardell criticized what he considered to be a new chapter in an old story: extreme enthusiasm in the West for democracy but a fear of rulers with ideas that the West finds distasteful, such as communism previously and Islam today. Mardell warned Western leaders against such a position that would be crippling and not serve democracy. The Economist expressed a similar position when it called on the West to stop military and material aid to the Egyptian government and on other nations to take similar positions in order to show the Egyptian armed forces their determination to stand against the use of violence against the opposition and their commitment to democratic progress.

In general, these comments express an interest in spreading democracy and the demand that the position of the ruling elites in Arab nations be the primary criterion upon which NATO determines its policies regarding these nations. Perhaps what is meant here is following a policy similar to that taken by the European Economic Community, and later the European Union, in expanding the EEC with the precondition that European nations transition to democratic systems in order to gain membership in the EEC. To prevent nations seeking admittance into the EEC or EU from hiding behind any ambiguity in the conditions for transition, the EU established a detailed list called the Copenhagen criteria, which included the conditions and the procedures that nations must implement to gain membership. These criteria were an effective tool in spreading democracy beyond the member states.

Of course this does not apply to Arab states, as they are not applying for admittance into the European Union. However, NATO states could use economic leverage, such as the partnership agreements between them and Arab states, to convince the ruling elite to follow democratic transitions. The problem here, especially with America, is that the criteria that will be applied to us will not be the same criteria applied there. In Europe, the focus was on democratic transition. If NATO wanted to create criteria for Arab states hoping to enter into partnerships with them, then the focus would not be on democracy alone. There would be other conditions. These conditions are clear at every juncture in Arab-NATO relations and in the positions taken by the U.S. administration, independent leaders and lobbyists.

Among these lobbyists, the supporters of Israel have taken this opportunity to highlight the failure of others, primarily of the American president, to understand what is happening in the Middle East. Furthermore, this is an opportunity to strengthen the conviction in American minds that those sympathetic to Israel are the only ones who understand Arabs and their mindset. Eric Trager, a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote in The Wall Street Journal that Obama has been concerning himself with the intellectual aspects of the conflict in Egypt when it has become necessary to consider the ideological dimension. Trager is one of those specialists on the region who believe in clear incentives, so he paints the conflict as merely a competition over power between the military and the Brotherhood. Accordingly, Trager called on Obama to consider the conflict from an angle of American interests and nothing more. But what are these interests? In Commentary magazine, one of the most important pro-Israel publications in the U.S., Jonathan Tobin emphasized that these interests are supporting Israel, while criticizing Obama for forgetting this priority in Washington’s Middle East policy.

The truth is that no American president, Obama included, has had a different opinion in this matter. Arab leaders know the extent of America’s desire to please Israel. This is not the issue. The issue is: What is the price that the American administration must pay to satisfy Israel? The price rises and rises with every concession presented by the Arabs or forced upon them by the U.S. under Israeli pressure. These concessions not only violate the rights of the Palestinians but their dignity. The Israelis work to achieve these concessions in a way that is insulting to the Palestinians, Arabs and Americans themselves, as they did when they announced increasing settlement construction after the Palestinians abandoned connecting the end of settlements to a return to negotiations.

In addition to what Israel does to the Arabs, it pressures the U.S. to keep confusing the situation with its position regarding democratic transition on the one hand and its position toward Israel on the other. In other words, if the U.S. and NATO wanted to apply the Copenhagen criteria to the Arab world, the goal would not be to ensure democracy and an adherence to democratic principles in the region. Rather, the goal would be twofold: spreading democracy and opening the door for Israeli expansion as well. According to these standards, spreading democracy in Egypt is important but maintaining Camp David is more important. These two goals are not complimentary but rather antithetical. Everything NATO gains in terms of empathy and cooperation from the Arabs when they help spread democratic principles and human rights in these nations will come to naught when they find NATO giving Israel support and allowing them to seize Arab lands and rights. Thus the barriers of animosity between NATO and the Arabs continue, while Israel is content and able to prey on the Arab world day after day.