Can the US Continue Its Saber Rattling Toward Syria?
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 27 March 2014
by Lu Wen (link to original)
(China) on 27 March 2014
by Lu Wen (link to original)
Translated from
by Nathan Hsu.
Edited by Brent Landon.
The eyes of the world are fixed upon events in Ukraine. Crimea's decision to ultimately secede and become part of the Russian Federation has come as an embarrassment to the U.S. and other Western powers. But in spite of this, it would seem that Obama has not entirely forgotten about the other thorn in his side, namely that of Syria.
Last week, the U.S. requested that Syria close its embassy in Washington D.C. and placed travel restrictions on Syria's long-time ambassador to the U.N., chastising the Syrian government for its failure to fully implement the stipulations of Security Council Resolution 2139 regarding the humanitarian crisis in Syria, as well as taking exploratory steps to unite other Western countries for further action within the Security Council.
As problems between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine come to a head, people cannot help but ask whether the U.S. will be able to continue its saber rattling toward Syria.
The country is already entering its fourth year since the crisis broke out. Recently, the Syrian government has continued to make gains on the battlefield, while efforts to help the opposition have remained fruitless and a crushing disappointment to the West. However, what truly grates on the more sensitive nerves of the U.S. are the various signs pointing to Bashar al-Assad actively preparing to participate in presidential elections in May.
Assad trumpeting another "landslide victory" would be the ultimate display of thumb biting in the face of U.S. efforts to topple his regime. Consequently, foreign media has speculated that if events in Syria continue to develop along a course detrimental to the West, the possibility of the U.S. becoming more hardline or even electing to use a military intervention cannot be ruled out. But in this author's opinion, for a time at least, the U.S. will be unable to continue its saber rattling due to four fears on the part the Obama administration.
First is the fear of a new Cold War with Russia. At present, the U.S. and Russia are engaged in a contest over Ukraine that has caused a rapid deterioration in the relationship between the two powers. This makes any hope for negotiation and cooperation on the Syrian issue rather remote, and has also cemented Russia's resolve to prop up the Assad regime. If the U.S. uses force in Syria, an escalation in its confrontation with Russia, perhaps even to the extent of a new Cold War, would be inevitable.
Second is the fear of influencing the larger strategic picture in the Middle East. Obama's Middle Eastern strategy during his second term has been to push strongly for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, make a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with Iran, and stabilize the overall situation in the Middle East in order to facilitate shifting the strategic focus of the U.S. eastward. Accordingly, it becomes far less likely that Washington will adopt the use of force in Syria. If the situation devolves into all-out war, it will inevitably throw a wrench into U.S. strategic plans in the Middle East. This includes negotiations toward an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, which now sit at a crucial stage.
Third is the fear of being unable to surmount the hurdle of domestic opinion. This is a midterm election year in the U.S., but Obama's approval ratings are currently hovering around a low of 41 percent, the federal government remains plagued by financial woes, domestic politics grow more polarized by the day, and the air at home is thick with anti-war sentiment. The start of another war abroad would without question be an irrational and highly unpopular move.
Fourth is the fear of stirring the "hornet's nest." After more than three years of civil war, every brand of extremist, jihadist and terrorist organization has had time to entrench itself in Syria. The prevailing opinion within the U.S. is that until the Syrian opposition is truly capable of grasping authority, an armed overthrow of Assad would only serve to upset the current balance of power and allow the consolidation and proliferation of terrorist elements within the country.
The author is an observer of international affairs.
Last week, the U.S. requested that Syria close its embassy in Washington D.C. and placed travel restrictions on Syria's long-time ambassador to the U.N., chastising the Syrian government for its failure to fully implement the stipulations of Security Council Resolution 2139 regarding the humanitarian crisis in Syria, as well as taking exploratory steps to unite other Western countries for further action within the Security Council.
As problems between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine come to a head, people cannot help but ask whether the U.S. will be able to continue its saber rattling toward Syria.
The country is already entering its fourth year since the crisis broke out. Recently, the Syrian government has continued to make gains on the battlefield, while efforts to help the opposition have remained fruitless and a crushing disappointment to the West. However, what truly grates on the more sensitive nerves of the U.S. are the various signs pointing to Bashar al-Assad actively preparing to participate in presidential elections in May.
Assad trumpeting another "landslide victory" would be the ultimate display of thumb biting in the face of U.S. efforts to topple his regime. Consequently, foreign media has speculated that if events in Syria continue to develop along a course detrimental to the West, the possibility of the U.S. becoming more hardline or even electing to use a military intervention cannot be ruled out. But in this author's opinion, for a time at least, the U.S. will be unable to continue its saber rattling due to four fears on the part the Obama administration.
First is the fear of a new Cold War with Russia. At present, the U.S. and Russia are engaged in a contest over Ukraine that has caused a rapid deterioration in the relationship between the two powers. This makes any hope for negotiation and cooperation on the Syrian issue rather remote, and has also cemented Russia's resolve to prop up the Assad regime. If the U.S. uses force in Syria, an escalation in its confrontation with Russia, perhaps even to the extent of a new Cold War, would be inevitable.
Second is the fear of influencing the larger strategic picture in the Middle East. Obama's Middle Eastern strategy during his second term has been to push strongly for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, make a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with Iran, and stabilize the overall situation in the Middle East in order to facilitate shifting the strategic focus of the U.S. eastward. Accordingly, it becomes far less likely that Washington will adopt the use of force in Syria. If the situation devolves into all-out war, it will inevitably throw a wrench into U.S. strategic plans in the Middle East. This includes negotiations toward an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, which now sit at a crucial stage.
Third is the fear of being unable to surmount the hurdle of domestic opinion. This is a midterm election year in the U.S., but Obama's approval ratings are currently hovering around a low of 41 percent, the federal government remains plagued by financial woes, domestic politics grow more polarized by the day, and the air at home is thick with anti-war sentiment. The start of another war abroad would without question be an irrational and highly unpopular move.
Fourth is the fear of stirring the "hornet's nest." After more than three years of civil war, every brand of extremist, jihadist and terrorist organization has had time to entrench itself in Syria. The prevailing opinion within the U.S. is that until the Syrian opposition is truly capable of grasping authority, an armed overthrow of Assad would only serve to upset the current balance of power and allow the consolidation and proliferation of terrorist elements within the country.
The author is an observer of international affairs.