Dangerous Recalibration: The US Strategy Against IS

Washington cannot decide if it should lead the fight against the Islamic terrorist militia or if it should steer the battle from behind. As a result, the government is coming under increasing pressure, especially with regard to a potential alliance with Iran in the fight against the Islamic State.

While militias from the Islamic State are keeping their massacres within the Middle East and beyond, the United States finds itself stuck fast between two radically different responses to terrorism. On the one hand, Washington is asking its allies within the coalition to contribute more to the heavy military work, with the aim of meeting a tight deadline, namely, “to degrade and ultimately destroy” the capabilities of the Islamic State group. On the other hand, the U.S. government is rapidly moving toward a much more aggressive approach: It is taking charge in the battle against the Islamic State group.

In such a strategic wasteland, allies can only wonder about the motives of the U.S.: Is America now steering from behind or is it leading the way? What is driving this change in strategy?

The latter is being determined by growing tension. With the strengthening of the U.S. economy, President Barack Obama is stepping into the limelight of foreign policy once again. This will be examined and put to the test by the militant, Republican-led Congress and especially by those seeking presidential candidacy (including Hillary Clinton).

Relations with allies are strained. We have recently seen a vicious showdown with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, Qatari emissaries traveled to Washington in order to complain that the coalition is doing too little in the fight against the Islamic State group. The bottom line is that people do not doubt Obama, but rather everyone’s patience is exhausted.

Meanwhile, the threat from the Islamic State group is growing. The Islamic State group is attracting an ever-increasing number of supporters, thereby maintaining its brand and increasing its capabilities outside of its immediate sovereign territories. The weakness of governments who have neither legitimacy nor the capacity to create stability in their countries provides a fertile ground for the Islamic State group to be allowed to grow their al-Qaida-like cells. The Islamic State group has quickly achieved a significant presence in Libya, Sinai, Egypt and Yemen.

All of this is leading the Obama government to adopt a stricter approach and make sudden changes in an attempt to convince the critics that it is doing everything in its power to destroy the Islamic State group. This was evident in Syria when the United States signed an agreement with Turkey to train and arm Syria’s rebel forces. The political challenge for the U.S. — whether to collaborate with President Bashar al-Assad (and his allies Iran, Russia and Hezbollah) or whether to overthrow him — has weakened military strategy for the U.S. more than for Iraq. There are major drawbacks to arming the Syrian rebels: they lack cohesion, and their weapons have the potential to land in the hands of the Islamic State group and thereby strengthen its ability in the fight against the firmly-rooted Assad.

What Is the Agenda?

Washington’s disjointed strategy is also having an effect upon Iraq. Finally, the action plan was presented which should have overpowered the Islamic State group at its operational base in Mosul. Contrary to the predictions of a year or two ago, it was said that the Islamic State group would collapse within only three months. Then the government had to backtrack. It was clear that the three-month plan was implausible; the Iraqi army was chased away from there half a year ago and no one was interested in counterinsurgency in a city in the heart of Sunni territory.

Baghdad has decided to dictate the schedule — and for good reason; the two biggest supporters of the Iraqis refuse to work together. The Iranian military is increasingly instrumental in the battle against the Islamic State group and is leading the way in recapturing Tikrit. The U.S. is completely excluded from this initiative (they cannot risk an incident of “friendly fire” or other similar difficulties where the Iranians are involved). Given this setback, the Americans were hardly in the position to put forward agendas. The fact that they did this anyway has created problems, rather than solved them.

At a Crossroads

Obama’s government is at a crossroads. If its main message is that the allies should contribute more (as was the American point of view when the bombing began), the government should send very clear messages that the Americans’ efforts are being highly restricted.

However, if the message is that the United States is planning to lead an aggressive and accelerated campaign against the Islamic State group, then it must show that all options are on the table. This may mean more confidence among America’s enemies who wish to collaborate against the Islamic State group — even if these enemies are ridiculed by key Sunni partners.

The more short-sighted and blurred U.S. strategy becomes, the greater the chance that the crisis will deepen. However, there is a glimmer of hope: In the face of impending disaster, a more coherent and viable solution may be found — whether it is induced or imposed by the United States.