Can China Replace America as a World Leader?

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 21 November 2016
by Editorial (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Jake Eberts. Edited by Alexandra Mullin.
On the eve of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Lima, Western public discourse saw much discussion of world governance. Due to Trump’s election and his campaign platform positions on withdrawal from the TPP and the Paris Climate Accords, some in the Western media believe that America is now abandoning its global leadership position, and perhaps with a bit of spite, they hold that the “new superpower,” China, will replace the United States as a global leader.

Trump’s campaign rhetoric indeed revealed that he is willing to downsize America’s worldwide battlefront; it seems that he would rather expend more energy and resources on revitalizing the American economy and social infrastructure. But America already globalized long ago, and there is no way for Trump to change the structure of American national interests itself and to redirect sources of American power to other ends for the creation of a “new America”; for this, he cannot rely on traditional notions of isolationism, either.

The West is fond of using the word “leadership” to describe the role of great powers. We must first recognize that because of the variation in national power among countries, on the international stage, practical authority and responsibilities are also respectively disparate. Such authority and responsibility is not bestowed on just the spur of the moment; they are formed from the utilization of comprehensive power both as relics from history and products of real ability. The post-Cold War world is fiercely branded with “American governance.” Many grand [international] frameworks were established and are protected by America, from the global trade and financial systems to the internet and world security.

America has invested and expended much for this leadership, but it has ultimately gained more from it. The status of the U.S. dollar, for instance, is a source of significant wealth from the world market, and domestic financial instability can be pushed to others for shared responsibility. If in the near future America discards its global leadership and becomes a “simplified” America that does not rely on long-term [political] leverage, it would simply cease to be truly American. Such an affair is impossible.

Today, American “leadership” means leading from behind; its power has limits. For the past several years, America has overextended itself and sought to move from a mere “leader” to a true, ultimate authority whose word is final and incontrovertible on the world stage. Its overall global power is still far from that strong because such a goal seeks to move instantly from a position of significant to absolute strength. It seems as if Trump will take a few steps back from the pointless games of “leadership,” planning to trim down some bits of American power.

This could win China space to wield its own leadership power. The problem is—is China willing? Is it ready?

It must be pointed out that there is a fairly large discrepancy between Chinese and American power; China does not have the ability to completely guide the world, as neither China nor the world have made the necessary conceptual [ideological] preparations. It is unimaginable that China could replace America as the leader of the world.

It is a fact that China’s overall power is growing at a rapid rate, and global power structures are subsequently undergoing gradual change. It is only natural that China will begin step-by-step participation in global governance in the long run. This process does not need to be aggravated, avoided or suppressed. China should neither step out prematurely nor dodge the process.

If America does withdraw from the Paris Climate Accords, China can persevere in upholding its own end of the deal, but how could China make up for the damages caused by America so dropping the ball? If America not only throws out the TPP but also moves on to fight free trade [in general], would China really benefit from such a mess? Besides, if America were to disregard the Middle East, how could even China have the power to fill the void?

And moreover, if under Trump’s administration America seeks to wholly constrain and exclude China, such as by secluding it from the international trade system or causing nations on the borders to sway toward Washington and check China, what could China do?

As the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative has developed, the Obama administration has sought to undermine it covertly; has this not been effective?

So for sake of future global governance, China and America must cooperate. There is simply no alternative. Perhaps in the long run America’s leadership role cannot be replaced, and China’s continued rise and growth cannot be curbed. To manage such a feat in relations will certainly be a major victory for the U.S., China and every great power, if not the entire world.


APEC利马峰会前夕,西方舆论针对世界治理出现大量议论。由于特朗普当选美国总统,以及他在竞选期间关于一旦当选就废弃TPP、退出巴黎气候协定的政纲宣示,一些西方媒体认为美国正在放弃对世界的领导权,或许是说气话,他们认为“新超级大国”中国将取代美国“领导世界”。
  特朗普的竞选言论确实透露出他有收缩美国全球战线的意愿,他似乎想把更多精力和资源用于重振美国经济和社会建设。但是美国早已彻底“全球化了”,特朗普不可能改变美国的国家利益结构,把美国国家力量的来源也迅速重新规划,搞出一个“新美国”来,特朗普不可能走传统意义上的“孤立主义路线”。
西方喜欢用“leadership”这个词来指称大国的作用,它被翻译成汉语的“领导”或“领导力”。首先应当承认,国家因其国力的大小不一,在国际上实际的权力和责任是不一样的,而且这些权力和责任也不是被一次性赋予的。它们在综合力量作用下形成,既是历史的遗产,也是现实的结果。冷战后的世界有很强“美国治下”的烙印,一些大框架是美国设计并维护的,比如世界贸易体系、金融体系、互联网体系,还有安全格局等等。
 为了这个“领导权”,美国的投入、付出很大,但它从中也收获了更多。比如美元的世界货币地位,就为美国赢得了从全世界搜刮财富、随时可以把美国国内经济危机让全球帮着分担的特权。在可预见的将来,美国如果放弃“领导世界”,重新变成一个不再借助诸多长期杠杆的“简约版美国”,那美国就不是美国了。这一幕不可能发生。
  现在的情况是,“leadership”的含义是“领头干”,它的“领导权”是有限的。前些年美国战线太长,想从“领头”变成真正的“领导”,在世界上说一不二,唯我独尊。它的综合国力远没有那么强,因为这个不现实的目标从力量宽裕一下子变成力有不逮和鞭长莫及。特朗普似乎是要从他所认为的那些瞎折腾的“领导位置”上往后退一退,对美国的领导力新做一些“挑肥拣瘦”的规划。
  这有可能使中国发挥“领导力”获得一些新空间,问题是,中国愿意吗,做好准备了吗?
  必须指出,中国的综合实力尚与美国有较大差距,中国没有能力全面引领世界,无论中国还是世界也都没做好这样的思想准备。由中国取代美国“领导世界”,这是不可思议的。
  另一方面,中国的国力快速强劲增长是事实,世界的权力结构因此而逐渐变化,中国将一步步参与全球治理会是个长期自然过程。这个过程不需夸张,也不必回避、压制,中国既不应冒进,也躲闪不了。
  如果美国真退出巴黎气候协定,中国可以坚持履行自己的承诺,但是中国如何有能力弥补美国“放水”造成的损失?如果美国不单是放弃TPP,干脆从此对抗自由贸易,那样的乱局中国如何应对得了?还有,一旦美国“不管”中东了,中国岂有力量“填补真空”?
  从另一个角度说,如果特朗普领导下的美国处处限制、排挤中国,比如把中国从世界自贸体系中“孤立出去”,让中国周边国家都朝着华盛顿一边倒,向它效忠,帮它一起遏制中国,又怎么能做得到?
  亚投行搞起来了,“一带一路”开展起来了,奥巴马政府对它们都搞过“暗中拆台”,不是没奏效吗?
  所以说,未来的世界治理,中美一定是要合作的,根本就没第二种选择。在很长时间里,恐怕美国的“领导作用”不可取代,中国进一步崛起和扩大影响力不可阻挡。把这一重大关系处理好了,必将是中美和各大国,以及整个世界在21世纪的多赢。

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1 COMMENT

  1. There seems to be an assumption here that there is only one model of leadership and it is exercised by a single, global hegemon. And if it’s not the US, then it will be China, which is not quite ready to take over. The only assumption I want to make is that the US, already in decline, will fall. Has the desire for a multipolar world disappeared as an alternative?

    Certainly China is quickly becoming a local hegemon. If only anxiety-driven Washington would get out of its way, China could more easily and gracefully grow into a leadership role within its sphere of influence, where Japan and South Korea, if not exactly equal in weight, are potential partners in leadership. Washington only needs to abandon the notion that no country except the US is allowed a sphere of influence — certainly not Russia and China. A lot will depend upon how skilfully China manages OBOR, a very long-term project with different phases, each of which will be a reminder that leadership is always a work in progress.

    The future is in Eurasia, a place where there are plenty of contenders for leadership: in addition to Japan and South Korea to the east, there’s Russia to the north, Germany to the distant west in central Europe, and India to the southwest of China. Where Britain will be in ten years’ time is anyone’s guess, but it’s a substantial Eurasian presence too. Eurasia is a perfect training-ground for the idea of multipolarism — and a potential battleground for yet another world war. China’s diplomatic skills will definitely need work.