Google, Huawei and the War To Come

For some time, the real world wars, the ones that define which power will be hegemonic, are settled in places far from the battlefields. Local wars, which continue to cost thousands of lives, are only tactical skirmishes.

After the Cold War, we lived through a kind of financial currency war, in which the dollar wound up as the winner, despite European efforts to make the Euro its rival. Now it is time for the technological war that — in the neo-protectionist environment of recent years — threatens to take us back to a world that is divided. A Virtual Curtain.

This virtual curtain can affect the economics and daily lives of hundreds of millions of people in many countries.

On May 15, President of the United States Donald Trump issued an executive order that prohibited United States businesses from using the services of foreign telecommunications firms that “pose … [a] risk to national security.”* The message is principally aimed at Chinese telecommunications firms, led by the gigantic Huawei.

The idea behind Trump’s decree is that, experts say, since it is relatively easy for a third party to access the functioning of the Huawei equipment and software, the Chinese government could do so. And if the Beijing government asks a Chinese firm for help in an intelligence operation, it is very unlikely that it will say no. That is just the everyday reality of cyber-espionage.

If information is power, it will be even more so in the coming era of 5G technology; security and defense systems will depend more and more on software connected to the web, so the paranoia is understandable. Above all, if we take this into account: Huawei is the most advanced firm of the 5G generation.

The strange thing is that Trump’s executive order, which prohibits any purchase of foreign technology that could be considered a threat to U.S. national security, is very similar to the Chinese cybersecurity law. In fact, any non-U.S. firm could be considered a potential enemy.

And it is also strange that, as Snowden revealed some time ago, the espionage agencies of the United States pirated information from the web and from the principal technology companies of their own country.

Under these conditions, one of the questions is: Who do you want to watch you?

What can come out of this confrontation? One easy answer would be the virtual wall. In the West, everyone with Google, Twitter and WhatsApp; in the East, with Baidu, Youku and WeChat. In some countries, telephones and applications for each one of them. But it isn’t that easy.

We now have decades of an accelerated process of globalization of work methods, and this has generated an interwoven web from which it is not easy to get free. The same company has programmers in distinct parts of the world; the hardware components are generally international; the interdependence of production, consumption and technological development is enormous. To break all this up for the sake of national defense, to force separate systems into the supply chain, is a decision with grave consequences. For starters, it will make everything more expensive.

The response of the Chinese consortium, Ren Zhengfei, is clear: “The United States cannot run the whole world. The rest of the world will decide if it should work with us, according to its own commercial interests and its position* … The current practice of U.S. politicians underestimates our strength.”

[TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: I have been unable to verify the first part of this statement; the comment about underestimating strength has been verified.”]

Meanwhile, every day a number of firms warn they will cut relations with Huawei (in addition to Google, there are Qualcomm, Intel, the Japanese Panasonic, the British ARM, a chip manufacturer, the British telephone companies EE and Vodafone, among others). The Chinese company affirms that it has the technology to replace the cut-off supplies. If it does not have it, it will develop it. For that purpose, it can count on an army of geeks from China, itself ,and other countries. It is even moving forward with the creation of its own operating system.

As can be seen, it is not just a problem of the U.S. versus China. It is the risk of living in a world in which governments can decide (or be seen as pressured to do it) which supply network to have for their own functioning and for the populace, or in which parallel networks run.

If Trump believes that he is going to soften the Chinese government with his decree, he is using his “art of the deal” on the wrong rival. Dictatorships do not change so easily. And if he thinks that it will be easy to back away, he has to think about the political repercussions that would have in an election year.

In other words, in this war, Trump crossed the Rubicon, and it is very possible that he is underestimating the capacity of a rival that has inserted itself, like humidity, in various parts of the world, from Europe to Africa and Latin America.

In Mexico, we would do well to follow this war a little more closely. Right now, because it affects thousands of our consumers. In the medium term, because the strategic decisions will determine the path of one of the central economic sectors of the 21st century’s economy. Let us remember that our country has important players in the world of global telecommunication and can play an active role.

To start, it would not be bad for someone to notify President López Obrador that the axis of the world economy is no longer oil. Nor will it ever be again.

*Editor’s note: This quote, although accurately translated, could not be verified.