Story Rated for Viewers 18 Years and Older: Washington versus Tehran

Let’s try to piece together some elements of the mosaic from the escalating tension between Iran and the United States. We are far from claiming that we can see the whole picture, because we do not have all the pieces of the puzzle. But in any case, what we can gradually see through the contours does not look like a calm pastoral landscape, but rather resembles a foggy picture with an additional effect: the smell of smoke. If you are concerned about the ashes that will remain on your fingers, then this mosaic is not for you, it is recommended for people 18 years and older.

Over the past six weeks, a number of high-risk circumstances have occurred in and around the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Six tankers were hit or attacked in two stages along the busiest sea route for the transportation of oil, a route which accounts for about 40% of the black gold trade. After the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran said it would respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz. (However, Iran did not seal the closure even though it militarized the region around the Strait.) In response, the U.S increased its military presence in the above-mentioned Strait, consisting of a strike group led by the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, along with a Patriot anti-aircraft system and another 2,000 American soldiers.

The tankers which were targeted flew different flags: Saudi Arabia, Norway, Japan and others. Some of them were hit by mines carefully located above the water surface so that the mines would cause damage to the vessels but not destroy them. Designed and implemented in this way, the action suggested that its perpetrator wanted to make a political, not military, statement.

At the same time, beyond the Strait of Hormuz, Katyusha rocket launchers began sending missiles in different directions above the skies of Iraq like a birthday fireworks display for a Bulgarian mobster. But the direction of the rockets had something in common: they were aimed at places where there was an American presence.

This was the case with Camp Taji situated north of Baghdad, where the U.S. military was deployed. Two missiles also hit an oil production site in the southern part of the Shiite city of Basra, where American officials from the Texan company ExxonMobil were located. The same type of missile landed near a military base in Mosul where there are U.S. military personnel. One of the largest air bases in Iraq, located in Balad, Saladin province, where many American troops are based, was also hit by a missile. Before that, in the so-called green zone in Baghdad, where Iran’s official institutions and the representatives of foreign states are located, a rocket hit near the American Embassy.

Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen periodically launch missiles at various targets in southern and southeastern Saudi Arabia, aimed most often at the kingdom’s oil facilities. (Recently, however civilian sites were also targeted, among which there are also desalination plants.) Unlike the case with the tankers and missiles in Iraq, where there was no claim of responsibility, the Houthis in Yemen publicly admitted their involvement.

And, of course, there is the latest episode of tension in the region—the American drone that was shot down by Iranian forces over the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides are disputing whether the drone was shot down while over international waters or over Iranian territorial waters, and this matters.

All these episodes have a common denominator, the Iranian signature. This includes planting mines in the coastal waters around Iran in the Persian Gulf, and transferring missiles from Iran to Iraq that will be used either by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq, like Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. The Houthis in Yemen are no exception. They are being trained by the Lebanese Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy, and also receive missiles and drones from Tehran—although, of course, this logistical cooperation between them and the Ayatollahs’ regime does not necessarily mean they depend on the movement of Iran.

Against this background, Tehran has announced that it will cease to comply with the provisions of the nuclear deal related to restricting the quantity and quality of enriched uranium that the country has the right to possess. Israel also began to conduct military exercises this week, simulating a conflict with the Lebanese Hezbollah, generally located in southern Beirut, the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon.

Separately, each of the above episodes can be described as a provocation against Iran aimed at compromising Tehran’s regime, and consequently justifying the need to use military countermeasures against it. But this interpretation becomes much more difficult to articulate when we talk about all these elements assembled together in a jigsaw.

So for example, if you see a dumb wooden figure, it could be any curmudgeonly figure from the social biosphere. But if the character’s nose grows longer with every other sentence it utters, it must be Pinocchio.

When we watch an entire movie and not just specific scenes, you can easily recognize the director’s signature. If you see Woody Allen asking an African American woman if she knows what a black hole is, and she says yes, because that’s how she makes her living, then you can’t really believe that Steven Spielberg was the film director.

In other words, in one form or another, Iran seems to be involved in everything mentioned above, regardless of the fact that Tehran will not appear on stage to pick up the best director’s statuette.

Let me emphasize profoundly that this does not mean Iran’s official institutions want a military conflict with the United States. Although in Iran’s case, we are talking about a political system that is strongly indoctrinated, meaning its representatives do not always act rationally, certainly there is no logical explanation for Tehran’s interest in provoking the U.S. with sudden and extreme actions. (One such red line, understood very well by Iran, is shooting down an American drone in international waters.) This is definitely not what President Hassan Rouhani or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wish.

If the information Tehran shares is true, that along with the drone that was shot down, it had the opportunity to target the U.S. military P-8 aircraft which had entered Iran’s airspace as well, carrying 35 crew members on board, but apparently refrained from opening fire, then this indicates that Iran’s official institutions—and not the institutions operating parallel to Iran’s official institutions—are reluctant to engage in any further military confrontation with the U.S.

However, the big risk for Tehran is that it is likely other key factors in the country, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, may engage in provocation in order to suspend any possible dialogue between Tehran and the United States. If this is the case, it would mean that certain elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could benefit from a physically deteriorating ayatollah and seek more political and economic space. Tension with the U.S. works in their favor, because this way, they gain even more authority and influence over the country’s processes. When you live under the threat of war, military budgets grow dramatically, and politics are led by the generals—something that has already happened in Iran.

But the current story belongs to a new generation; there are not necessarily good and bad characters in it, but instead there are more complex ones. No one denies the main role “Sleeping Beauty” plays, but the question remains, who will wake her up?

The situation in the U.S. is the same. President Donald Trump, himself, who does not want to participate in a new Middle East conflict especially against the backdrop of his impending reelection campaign in 2020, has little appetite for any face-to-face confrontation with Iran. It was no coincidence that Trump said he doubted Tehran’s leadership deliberately shot down the American drone, meaning that once again we encounter the interests of parallel institutions in the Persian state.

Trump’s position was further supported by the fact that, in his opinion, any planned military strike on Iran in response to the downed drone would be disproportional to the loss incurred by the demolished drone. Trump’s statement (or rather his tweet) coincides with the release of information that the U.S has put forward a new proposal to Iran through Oman to resume negotiations. Similar attempts were made earlier in May and June with mediation help from Japan, but they were carelessly rejected by the Shiite elite.

But the president’s placatory approach is not shared by National Security Advisor John Bolton. If the Americans had their version of the bearded Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, it would be exactly the mustachioed Bolton who would be their ayatollah. The aggressive stance of the latter is shared by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and CIA Director Gina Haspel.

And so, both the U.S. and Iran radiate similar risks. There are factors in both countries that influence those who make the decisions, and these factors are working to escalate tensions between the two countries. As we know, extremes attract .

If we can sum it up, the blame for the growing escalation between the U.S. and Iran lies with both countries. Washington clearly bears the blame for the events of the last two years, because it withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, even though the ayatollahs were going along with it, and then Washington imposed fierce sanctions against Tehran, which have strangled the country’s economy.

Iran bears a reactive blame, as it did not learn its lesson and it continues to pursue an expansionist policy against its neighbors. It wants to renegotiate compliance with its nuclear deal obligations, and is trying to make poorly considered, even utterly ridiculous, ultimatums—against the European Union, for instance.

Generally speaking, we are watching an Iranian motion picture, but with an American English voiceover. But the question about the age of the viewers watching this remains, as does the type of film it is. Will it be only a crime drama, or will it be a war drama?