The European Union, Post Pandemic

Before it is too late, in the context of the new international order that has been focusing less and less on cooperation, the EU must integrate the use of power into its foreign policy.

There was a time when the European Union was quite comfortable in terms of international relations. Since its founding, it has lived protected under an umbrella of security provided by the United States or NATO, and has relied on the frameworks of multilateral institutions created under U.S. leadership to safeguard its interests. The EU observed with satisfaction how ideas that formed the foundations of its political project – liberal democracy, market economy, and transnational cooperation – became ever more hegemonic, especially after the end of the Cold War. In that context, European strategists were convinced that the Union should not aspire to be a traditional political power. It should not exert hard power (military force) as its member nations had done in the past as imperial states. Rather, it should take advantage of its ability to persuade and attract by example in a world that was becoming increasingly more interdependent, and in a world where war would be increasingly less common.

And so a foreign policy based on principles and values (and not on interests) took form, defending international rights, cooperation and “effective multilateralism.” The European Union boasted of grappling with issues like the defense of human rights and fighting climate change. Gifted with immense soft power, the EU saw itself as a “normative power” that aspired to exporting its model of government to the rest of the world while it also imposed its rules and standards on others, especially in terms of economics (through growth and expansion). In fact, the EU became a prime example of the constructivist approach to international relations, which links power with the ability to project ideas that form dominant narratives. But it hasn’t escaped our attention that this construction of the success story also served to hide the fundamental weakness of the Union’s foreign policy: the need to make decisions based on unanimity, which leaves the EU defending watered down decisions that never incorporate elements of hard power.

In any case, beginning in the first decade of the 21st century, structural changes in the international system began taking place. These changes would substitute the liberal order based on law for geostrategic rivalry among the powerful nations. The progressive de-westernizing of the world and the growth of China, widening inequality generated by the rapid acceleration of economic interdependence, automation and the harsh financial crisis brought both a questioning of hyperglobalization and an ever increasing rejection of the free market and immigration. In this climate, the anti-establishment parties blossomed. Political earthquakes occurring along these political fault lines included Brexit, the rise of europhobic parties, and the election of Donald Trump , the first U.S. president to consider the EU a trade rival rather than a geopolitical ally.

But wait, there’s more. The pandemic, in addition to dealing a tough blow to European economies, has accelerated these global changes, reinforcing the rivalry between China and the United States, aggravating the crisis of cooperative international institutions, and in some regions, even eroding support for liberal democracy. The comfortable world in which the EU used to reside is disappearing. With an upsurge of nationalism and the return of realpolitik, the EU must reposition itself and consolidate its autonomy on the international stage. Additionally, it should work to sustain and lead a restored kind of multilateralism that can prevent the sudden reversion of globalization, and it should rewrite the regulations which are essential to the spheres where global direction is necessary: health, trade, economy, sustainability and the fight against fiscal paradises.

As European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell stressed, the Union needs “to learn to use the language of power,” showing its teeth when necessary and being prepared to adopt measures that others will not like (something the EU is not accustomed to doing). For example, taxing high tech companies (from the U.S.) or imposing tariffs on imports produced with high carbon content (China). To do this, the EU must become more internally coherent, closing the fractures between member states and defining clearly what “European interests” means. (The term is currently too nebulous.) In addition, the EU needs to strengthen its united voice in the world (as opposed to a “common voice,” which is how it expresses itself today). But most importantly, it must protect its sovereignty and develop strategic autonomy. In other words, it has to have instruments in place to strengthen itself so it does not submit to the demands of other powers before projecting its own power.

Strategic autonomy happens when the economy, trade, finance and technology are explicitly linked to geopolitics (which is what other powers do), and by learning to confront threats related to cybersecurity and disinformation. The internal ability to confront threats related to security, defense and energy is necessary in order to become independent of the U.S. and Russia, as well as to exert greater control over external investment (especially from China), with the goals of ensuring an equal playing field and of avoiding dumping. Finally, the EU must be willing to use the euro and trade policy as geoeconomic tools, developing new industrial policy that is muscular enough to create businesses that will be leaders in cutting-edge industries, in particular those related to digitalization and sustainability. This development is especially important now that the pandemic and the recession have increased the influence of national governments, reshuffled the list of strategic industries, modified global supply chains, made natural competition more difficult due to business bailouts and accelerated digitalization and the race to control 5G cellular networks. We might see a worsening of trade conflicts and currency wars, fed by a new economic nationalism. The ambitious recovery plan recently approved by the European Council will finance significant investment and inaugurate eurobonds, thereby generating growth and employment. It should also be used to increase strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, the EU has to prevent international relations from turning to neoimperial logic in which countries feel obliged to choose a side between the U.S. and China (and be subject to the influence of either power). The key is to substitute the Group of Two for a Group of Three, in which Europe is at the same level as these two superpowers, leading initiatives of cooperation that can be supported by medium-sized powers like Japan, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The European Union’s position is not midway between the U.S. and China; after all, it still shares more values and interests with the United States than it does with China. But it needs to understand that no matter who in the White House, the traditional “American friend” no longer exists as before, and the international order is likely to continue to be less cooperative. Before it is too late, the EU needs to take up the power of a renewed foreign policy. If it doesn’t, it runs the risk of being on the international menu, instead of being one of its guests.