The Man in the White House Has Few Options Left To Pressure Russia
Published in Vzglyad
(Russia) on 29 September 2020
by Andrey Sushentsov (link to original)
(Russia) on 29 September 2020
by Andrey Sushentsov (link to original)
Translated from
by Irina Martin.
Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.
The 2020 election campaign in the United States has become a crisis. Both sides made claims about external forces intervening in internal U.S. affairs. Democrats, supported by the FBI, accuse Russia of meddling. Allegedly, Russian hackers posted data online about registered voters in numerous states. Advertisements offering voters a choice between voting or studying Russian have gone viral, hinting that if President Donald Trump wins again, Russian will become the national language of the United States. In one of his statements, Joe Biden described Russia as an “opponent” of the United States, while China is only a “serious competitor.”
In response, Republicans, Trump and his staff talk about China's attempts to influence the presidential election. However, Trump is trying to make his foreign policy accomplishments as a key focus of his campaign. Just a few weeks before the election, the White House released a joint statement agreeing to the normalization of relations between Israel on one hand, and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on the other. Trump has recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and is now encouraging his allies to move their embassies to that city.
In addition, the White House signed a memorandum to eliminate some of the conflicts between Serbia and Kosovo. Trump is not shy about heralding a new political era in the Middle East. While this sounds like a significant exaggeration, he is the first American president in nearly 30 years to not start a new war in the region. Along with this, Trump is intensifying pressure on China, in a way increasingly reminiscent of the Cold War, and is trying to suppress Iran with a series of provocations and attacks on military and political leaders. The combination of military-political pressure and local missile strikes against targets in the Middle East, while avoiding a campaign to invade the region, are characteristics of the Trump administration's foreign policy.
The relations with Russia also lack clarity. Top U.S. politicians are lobbying to end the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In response to the success of the Russian missile program, the United States is intensifying its own developments in this area.
With the election around the corner, the Democrats' foreign policy is still not clear, especially in regard to relations with Russia. There are calls to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III,* but at the same time they talk about the need to restrain Russia’s influence in Europe. Biden is showing a willingness to soften the stance on China and Iran, but his team is unlikely to try to reverse Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
What does the victory of each candidate mean for the future interests of Russia? In the event of Trump's victory, most likely we will see the preservation of current affairs. In the National Security Strategy, adopted under the Trump administration, Russia is identified as one of the key rivals of the United States.
Personal chemistry and good relations between the leaders of our countries do not play a decisive role in this matter. The rest will depend on the persuasiveness of Trump's victory. If it turns out to be a underwhelming, as in 2016, the stalemate will remain. Democrats in Congress will try to torpedo any initiatives by President Trump. In the event of a convincing victory, Trump’s goal with regard to relations with Russia will remain the same: to lessen the controversies through tactical concessions in order to pull Russia away from China, such as the extension of START III, and lifting some of the sanctions and trade restrictions.
However, the main process that Trump will be focused on is the revision of the treaties and obligations that restrict the United States, while maintaining a privileged position with allies. The United States will not allow the EU (primarily France and Germany) to revise the provisions of trans-Atlantic relations, even while continuing to pressure them to increase defense spending. At the same time, the bureaucratic inertia of the United States toward spreading democracy and suppressing Russia in Eurasia, especially in Eastern Europe, will continue. The CIA's innovative operations will continue in coordination with the Department of State, which happens to be headed by former CIA director Mike Pompeo. The stories of Russian mercenaries in Belarus or the poisoning of Alexei Navalny are some of the latest examples of the ongoing provocations.
If Biden wins, there will be noticeable changes and the bureaucrats in Washington will calm down and stop looking for enemies and traitors inside the country. Symptomatic in this regard is the appearance of an open letter from American experts signed by many former officials of the Trump administration. The authors of the letter call for a serious reassessment of American interests in Russia, and above all call for a better understanding of what the United States wants from Moscow. This letter clearly states that politics between the U.S. and Russia have been driven by emotions rather than calculated decisions.
It can be concluded that if Biden wins, the era of Trump’s administration will be presented as a temporary failure of the U.S. political system. This might stabilize relations between Russian and the U.S. without losing the character of the competition between them.
The Democrats will begin to repair the damage they believe Trump has done to the European allies. This may be accompanied by rhetorical pressure on Russia, but there are not many options left; that is, if the U.S. doesn’t cross the line and lead matters to a final break. The climate change and human rights agenda will receive a new impetus. The Biden administration will focus on the issue of Crimea and the Ukrainian conflict in general. Most likely, the Biden administration will also decide to extend START III, but will not rush to end the sanctions established under the Trump administration, which will be used as a resource for a possible deal.
However, the structural limitations affecting U.S. foreign policy behavior will remain. The lack of resources will prevent the new administration from pursuing a vigorous campaign too far from American borders. China will remain a key rival partner, with whom relations will be complex and contradictory. The disunity among European allies will not be neutralized with a new political tone from Washington. Ultimately, the new U.S. administration will face an increasingly diverse and decentralized world in which rivals are competing for power and influence.
Source: Valdai International Discussion Club
*Editor’s Note: START III was a proposed but unsigned bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty between the U.S. and Russia; what the article seems to be referring to is the only remaining major U.S.-Russia arms control treaty, New START, signed in 2010.
In response, Republicans, Trump and his staff talk about China's attempts to influence the presidential election. However, Trump is trying to make his foreign policy accomplishments as a key focus of his campaign. Just a few weeks before the election, the White House released a joint statement agreeing to the normalization of relations between Israel on one hand, and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on the other. Trump has recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and is now encouraging his allies to move their embassies to that city.
In addition, the White House signed a memorandum to eliminate some of the conflicts between Serbia and Kosovo. Trump is not shy about heralding a new political era in the Middle East. While this sounds like a significant exaggeration, he is the first American president in nearly 30 years to not start a new war in the region. Along with this, Trump is intensifying pressure on China, in a way increasingly reminiscent of the Cold War, and is trying to suppress Iran with a series of provocations and attacks on military and political leaders. The combination of military-political pressure and local missile strikes against targets in the Middle East, while avoiding a campaign to invade the region, are characteristics of the Trump administration's foreign policy.
The relations with Russia also lack clarity. Top U.S. politicians are lobbying to end the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In response to the success of the Russian missile program, the United States is intensifying its own developments in this area.
With the election around the corner, the Democrats' foreign policy is still not clear, especially in regard to relations with Russia. There are calls to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III,* but at the same time they talk about the need to restrain Russia’s influence in Europe. Biden is showing a willingness to soften the stance on China and Iran, but his team is unlikely to try to reverse Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
What does the victory of each candidate mean for the future interests of Russia? In the event of Trump's victory, most likely we will see the preservation of current affairs. In the National Security Strategy, adopted under the Trump administration, Russia is identified as one of the key rivals of the United States.
Personal chemistry and good relations between the leaders of our countries do not play a decisive role in this matter. The rest will depend on the persuasiveness of Trump's victory. If it turns out to be a underwhelming, as in 2016, the stalemate will remain. Democrats in Congress will try to torpedo any initiatives by President Trump. In the event of a convincing victory, Trump’s goal with regard to relations with Russia will remain the same: to lessen the controversies through tactical concessions in order to pull Russia away from China, such as the extension of START III, and lifting some of the sanctions and trade restrictions.
However, the main process that Trump will be focused on is the revision of the treaties and obligations that restrict the United States, while maintaining a privileged position with allies. The United States will not allow the EU (primarily France and Germany) to revise the provisions of trans-Atlantic relations, even while continuing to pressure them to increase defense spending. At the same time, the bureaucratic inertia of the United States toward spreading democracy and suppressing Russia in Eurasia, especially in Eastern Europe, will continue. The CIA's innovative operations will continue in coordination with the Department of State, which happens to be headed by former CIA director Mike Pompeo. The stories of Russian mercenaries in Belarus or the poisoning of Alexei Navalny are some of the latest examples of the ongoing provocations.
If Biden wins, there will be noticeable changes and the bureaucrats in Washington will calm down and stop looking for enemies and traitors inside the country. Symptomatic in this regard is the appearance of an open letter from American experts signed by many former officials of the Trump administration. The authors of the letter call for a serious reassessment of American interests in Russia, and above all call for a better understanding of what the United States wants from Moscow. This letter clearly states that politics between the U.S. and Russia have been driven by emotions rather than calculated decisions.
It can be concluded that if Biden wins, the era of Trump’s administration will be presented as a temporary failure of the U.S. political system. This might stabilize relations between Russian and the U.S. without losing the character of the competition between them.
The Democrats will begin to repair the damage they believe Trump has done to the European allies. This may be accompanied by rhetorical pressure on Russia, but there are not many options left; that is, if the U.S. doesn’t cross the line and lead matters to a final break. The climate change and human rights agenda will receive a new impetus. The Biden administration will focus on the issue of Crimea and the Ukrainian conflict in general. Most likely, the Biden administration will also decide to extend START III, but will not rush to end the sanctions established under the Trump administration, which will be used as a resource for a possible deal.
However, the structural limitations affecting U.S. foreign policy behavior will remain. The lack of resources will prevent the new administration from pursuing a vigorous campaign too far from American borders. China will remain a key rival partner, with whom relations will be complex and contradictory. The disunity among European allies will not be neutralized with a new political tone from Washington. Ultimately, the new U.S. administration will face an increasingly diverse and decentralized world in which rivals are competing for power and influence.
Source: Valdai International Discussion Club
*Editor’s Note: START III was a proposed but unsigned bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty between the U.S. and Russia; what the article seems to be referring to is the only remaining major U.S.-Russia arms control treaty, New START, signed in 2010.
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