American Options in Ukraine
Published in L'actualité
(Canada) on 24 February 2022
by Rafael Jacob (link to original)
(Canada) on 24 February 2022
by Rafael Jacob (link to original)
Translated from
by Reg Moss.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
With the start of the war in Ukraine, Washington has several options with regard to Moscow. But none of them guarantees anything, least of all a happy ending.
Russia has officially launched an invasion of Ukraine. As the White House has already made it known that such a hostile gesture would trigger a series of severe measures targeting Moscow, a fundamental question arises: What are the options for the United States at this moment?
There are four.
Sanctions
President Joe Biden’s administration could continue, as it has since Monday after the recognition by Moscow of pro-Russian separatist regions in Eastern Ukraine, to impose financial sanctions on the Russian regime. The plan is to begin gradually before progressing to harsher penalties. This was announced on Wednesday, with four more Russian banks penalized and more than half of technology imports halted. Russian President Vladimir Putin could himself be personally sanctioned.
However, this path is strewn with internal obstacles for the Democratic president because it is not just the degree of severity that is likely to gradually increase, but the degree of difficulty in getting lawmakers to approve these measures. Constitutionally, the strongest sanctions are generally those that require approval by Congress, where reaching a consensus is an arduous task, especially in these times of great division.
Within NATO, sooner or later there will be resistance, particularly from European countries who fear Russia or are dependent on it. For example, even though the Biden administration seems to have won a major diplomatic achievement by getting Germany, after weeks of discussions, to suspend the vaunted Nord Stream 2 pipeline linking it to Russia, other countries, like Italy, already appear to be wary of further alienating their primary source of gas supply.
Moreover, sanctions have limited power, quite simply because for Russia, when it comes to Ukraine, economic considerations may have very relative weight in relation to geopolitical concerns. As long as the Kremlin feels threatened by the rapprochement of its neighbor with Europe and NATO, punishing a few oligarchs will not bring about miracles.
Insurrection
If Putin is looking to occupy Ukrainian territory for any length of time, the U.S. could, openly or covertly, support and finance an on-the-ground insurrection against Russian troops. This is what Republican Sen. Mitt Romney, a former presidential candidate, suggested in January on American television. Romney, who 10 years ago called Russia the “No. 1 geopolitical foe” of the U.S., sees in a potential uprising the possibility of bleeding Russia, both literally and figuratively.
Putin, sensitive as he is to the history of his country, must remember the military quagmires abroad that were at the heart of the fall of the tsarist regime during World War I and the Soviet regime during the Cold War. The risks associated with an occupation of Ukraine, and the fact of being responsible for a country of 40 million people — the clear majority of whom, particularly in its Western region, want nothing to do with a Russian presence — are very real for Putin. The prospect of complications and military losses could hang in the balance.
Still, the cost of such an approach, if only in Ukrainian lives, would be considerable, and the outcome would remain uncertain. Ultimately, the U.S. could contribute to creating or arming the equivalent of a civil conflict, which would result in unimaginable damage to Ukraine and practically diminish the chances of it becoming a NATO member, which is where this crisis began. Putin, ironically, could come out of it a winner.
Militarization
In addition to financing an insurrection, the U.S. could, in principle, actively come to the defense of Ukraine by sending in its own troops. It would obviously be the clearest, and the most dangerous, option. As Biden himself recently said, “That’s a world war when Americans and Russia start shooting at one another.” This option, for the moment, has been categorically rejected by the White House.
However, the Biden administration has not ruled out lending support to forces from Baltic states such as Estonia and Latvia, which are former Soviet territories like Ukraine, that are Russian neighbors and NATO members. In a context in which Article 5 of the NATO Charter stipulates mutual defense of NATO members, and where Biden explicitly promised to defend “every inch” of NATO territory while Russia opposes the membership of those countries in the military alliance, this is not a decision without risks. He reiterated this pledge on Thursday during a press conference after a meeting with NATO leaders.
Acquiescence
The simplest option, immediately ruled out by the U.S. from the start of the crisis, is to seriously consider, or even accept, the initial demand by Russia to commit to not allowing Ukraine to join NATO. If this option was not acceptable to the Americans and their allies before Putin ordered the invasion, it seems entirely unthinkable now.
Readers who have made it this far will have understood one thing: At this point in the crisis, there is no longer a miracle exit that can be orchestrated by the U.S.
What comes next does not look good.
Russia has officially launched an invasion of Ukraine. As the White House has already made it known that such a hostile gesture would trigger a series of severe measures targeting Moscow, a fundamental question arises: What are the options for the United States at this moment?
There are four.
Sanctions
President Joe Biden’s administration could continue, as it has since Monday after the recognition by Moscow of pro-Russian separatist regions in Eastern Ukraine, to impose financial sanctions on the Russian regime. The plan is to begin gradually before progressing to harsher penalties. This was announced on Wednesday, with four more Russian banks penalized and more than half of technology imports halted. Russian President Vladimir Putin could himself be personally sanctioned.
However, this path is strewn with internal obstacles for the Democratic president because it is not just the degree of severity that is likely to gradually increase, but the degree of difficulty in getting lawmakers to approve these measures. Constitutionally, the strongest sanctions are generally those that require approval by Congress, where reaching a consensus is an arduous task, especially in these times of great division.
Within NATO, sooner or later there will be resistance, particularly from European countries who fear Russia or are dependent on it. For example, even though the Biden administration seems to have won a major diplomatic achievement by getting Germany, after weeks of discussions, to suspend the vaunted Nord Stream 2 pipeline linking it to Russia, other countries, like Italy, already appear to be wary of further alienating their primary source of gas supply.
Moreover, sanctions have limited power, quite simply because for Russia, when it comes to Ukraine, economic considerations may have very relative weight in relation to geopolitical concerns. As long as the Kremlin feels threatened by the rapprochement of its neighbor with Europe and NATO, punishing a few oligarchs will not bring about miracles.
Insurrection
If Putin is looking to occupy Ukrainian territory for any length of time, the U.S. could, openly or covertly, support and finance an on-the-ground insurrection against Russian troops. This is what Republican Sen. Mitt Romney, a former presidential candidate, suggested in January on American television. Romney, who 10 years ago called Russia the “No. 1 geopolitical foe” of the U.S., sees in a potential uprising the possibility of bleeding Russia, both literally and figuratively.
Putin, sensitive as he is to the history of his country, must remember the military quagmires abroad that were at the heart of the fall of the tsarist regime during World War I and the Soviet regime during the Cold War. The risks associated with an occupation of Ukraine, and the fact of being responsible for a country of 40 million people — the clear majority of whom, particularly in its Western region, want nothing to do with a Russian presence — are very real for Putin. The prospect of complications and military losses could hang in the balance.
Still, the cost of such an approach, if only in Ukrainian lives, would be considerable, and the outcome would remain uncertain. Ultimately, the U.S. could contribute to creating or arming the equivalent of a civil conflict, which would result in unimaginable damage to Ukraine and practically diminish the chances of it becoming a NATO member, which is where this crisis began. Putin, ironically, could come out of it a winner.
Militarization
In addition to financing an insurrection, the U.S. could, in principle, actively come to the defense of Ukraine by sending in its own troops. It would obviously be the clearest, and the most dangerous, option. As Biden himself recently said, “That’s a world war when Americans and Russia start shooting at one another.” This option, for the moment, has been categorically rejected by the White House.
However, the Biden administration has not ruled out lending support to forces from Baltic states such as Estonia and Latvia, which are former Soviet territories like Ukraine, that are Russian neighbors and NATO members. In a context in which Article 5 of the NATO Charter stipulates mutual defense of NATO members, and where Biden explicitly promised to defend “every inch” of NATO territory while Russia opposes the membership of those countries in the military alliance, this is not a decision without risks. He reiterated this pledge on Thursday during a press conference after a meeting with NATO leaders.
Acquiescence
The simplest option, immediately ruled out by the U.S. from the start of the crisis, is to seriously consider, or even accept, the initial demand by Russia to commit to not allowing Ukraine to join NATO. If this option was not acceptable to the Americans and their allies before Putin ordered the invasion, it seems entirely unthinkable now.
Readers who have made it this far will have understood one thing: At this point in the crisis, there is no longer a miracle exit that can be orchestrated by the U.S.
What comes next does not look good.
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