We Have a Signal*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

Konstantin Sukhoverkhov, program coordinator at the Russian International Affairs Council, on the ability of Russia and the U.S. to find ways out of difficult situations.

Throughout history, Russia-U.S. relations have experienced various phases of improvement and deterioration. Now, many experts warn that the world is essentially on the brink of World War III. Indeed, the situation is alarming because relations between Russia and the West have not been characterized by such hostility in a long time.

So of course, all eyes are currently focused on the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, as the U.S. remains the leader of the collective West. However, the history of relations between Russia and the U.S. demonstrates that both powers know how to read each other’s signals on security issues without crossing any red lines. Russian and American politicians learned this during the Cold War of the 20th century.

The main lesson on reading signals was the Cuban Missile Crisis. As you recall, the United States deployed nuclear warheads in Turkey in 1961, which did not suit the Soviet Union. In response, Moscow installed nuclear warheads in Cuba as a signal to the U.S. that any American threat would provoke an equivalent response. Fortunately, the escalation halted when the countries realized the world was closer than ever to a nuclear war. The U.S. administration and the Soviet leadership listened to each other, reversed their decisions and began a policy of détente.

Moreover, Russia and the U.S. continued to successfully read each other’s signals into the 21st century. For instance, in 2008, when relations between Moscow and Tbilisi were worsening in 2008, the U.S. repeatedly asserted that Georgia should have the right to join NATO. Notably, CIA Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns wrote in his book that the U.S. had correctly assessed Moscow’s red lines concerning Georgia and had no intention of escalating the situation to a critical level. However, it was Tbilisi that failed to read Washington’s signals, not Moscow. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared her willingness to support Georgia, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili took it as a green light from the U.S. to start the fight. As a result, a five-day war began, ending with a Russian peace enforcement operation.

It is also worth noting how signals were read in the 2010s when the Syrian civil war raised the issue of eliminating Syrian chemical weapons. In 2012, Barack Obama said the U.S. would be ready to intervene if Damascus used such weapons, thus immediately raising the question of their destruction. Russian diplomacy entered the picture in time, and Russia understood the American red lines. Besides, Moscow was not interested in the presence of a large number of American troops in Syria, which would the U.S. would have deployed there in the event of a full-blown intervention. In the end, Moscow and Washington agreed to the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, which was approved by the U.N. and the entire international community.

Additionally, when Russia launched an anti-terrorist operation in Syria at the request of President Bashar Assad in 2015, reading signals between Moscow and Washington was also crucial, as Washington had conducted military operations against terrorists, but mostly on Iraqi territory. However, the U.S. conducted a number of airstrikes and limited operations over Syria. Thus, when Russian and American planes nearly collided in the skies over Syria in 2016, the countries decided to coordinate their actions from then on. This coordination helped avoid possible further incidents in the sky and on the ground.

Furthermore, Russia and the U.S. extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2021. This was possible because the parties understood (and continue to understand) the importance of nuclear arms control. Yes, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ceased to exist when the U.S. withdrew in 2019. Nevertheless, this was due to several factors, particularly American interest in developing low-yield nuclear weapons that cruise missiles can carry.

However, in 2019, Washington sent Moscow a signal that it was ready to consider a new Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty if China were included in the agreement. In other words, the Americans actively sought a consensus, but in a different form. In the opinion of the U.S. establishment, this readiness to negotiate was meant to encourage Moscow to find ways to conclude a new treaty, perhaps through cooperation or even pressure on Beijing. Furthermore, the U.S. sent the same signal to Russia regarding the New START Treaty, which will need to be renegotiated after 2026 and in which the U.S. wants to involve China.

Of course, there is a more recent example of reading signals. On Feb. 27, 2022, Vladimir Putin put Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces on high alert. The Russian president justified this decision by asserting that senior officials in leading NATO countries had made aggressive statements about Russia. This was another signal that demonstrated when Russia feels threatened by the West, it would be ready to deploy any measures to defend itself.

The U.S. quickly got the message. On March 2, 2022, the U.S. announced that it would postpone the launch of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Pentagon delayed the launch “in an effort to demonstrate that we have no intention of engaging in any actions that can be misunderstood or misconstrued.” Accordingly, the U.S. showed it did not wish to engage in military escalation with Russia.

Moreover, the media repeatedly spread information throughout 2022 that Russia was allegedly readying its nuclear weapons for launch despite Russian denials. Still, the U.S. frequently called for calm noting it did not see signs that Moscow intended to take such steps any time soon.

Such behavior from Moscow and Washington demonstrates that, despite the deplorable state of bilateral relations and confrontational rhetoric from politicians and media, those in charge of strategic security and military cooperation are capable of reasonably and adequately assessing the situation, and making decisions that both sides will eventually accept.

The author is the program coordinator of the Russian International Affairs Council. The author’s opinion may not necessarily reflect the views of Izvestia’s editorial board.