Politico, Ergo Sum: Who Is To Blame for Trump’s Return? – Part 1

Published in Hong Kong Economic Journal
(Hong Kong) on 29 January 2024
by Brian Wong (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew McKay. Edited by Michelle Bisson.

 

 

Suppose former U.S. President Donald Trump wins the election in November …

If such a hypothesis had been put forward just over three years ago, the U.S. would have laughed it off as inconceivable, reeling as it still was from the shock of the Jan. 6 Capitol attack in 2021. Back then, Trump supporters — who one could classify as far-right (although we cannot sum up the left-right distinction in American politics purely in economic terms) and who had fully bought into the conspiracy theory that Trump had won the 2020 election but fallen victim to election fraud — were apoplectic over Biden “usurping” the White House.

Conversely, the American left, which includes some Democrats and many emerging voices that have lost faith in the mainstream Democratic Party, and which considers itself the champion of democratic values and institutions, sees the Capitol attack as proof positive of Trumpian ideology having led to moral turpitude within the Republican Party. On Jan. 13, 2021, the House of Representatives voted 232-197 to impeach Trump, but with 57 members of the Senate voting to convict and 43 voting to acquit a month later, the necessary two-thirds majority was not reached, resulting in a failure to find Trump guilty. Some Republican members of Congress later distanced themselves from Trump or responded to him evasively to divert attention. At the time, it looked like it was game over for Trump.

Why Has Support for Trump Risen Rather than Fallen over the Past Few Years?

More than two years ago, polls by Reuters/Ipsos and others showed that President Joe Biden’s disapproval ratings were beginning to outstrip his approval ratings. This was not because of Republican supporters, among whom anti-Biden sentiment had always been high; rather, it was because Biden was gradually losing the support of swing voters and those who otherwise leaned Democratic.

A Gallup poll early last December showed that Biden’s approval rating was hovering near the lowest level it had reached since he took office, at about 39% — the worst performance early in an election year in recent memory of any incumbent U.S. president seeking reelection. A New York Times poll at the end of last year showed that out of the six major battleground states, five (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania) favored Trump, with Biden ahead of his rival only in Wisconsin, by 2%.

With the support of minorities, conservative white males, and other groups, Biden defeated Trump in these six states in 2020. The 2024 election, however, could see these voters switch to supporting Trump or a third-party independent candidate.

Turning again to the Republican caucuses, Trump won more than half the votes in the state of Iowa, forcing Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, once regarded as “more Trump than Trump,” to drop out of the race. A week later, Trump won the New Hampshire primary with 55% of the vote compared to his sole remaining opponent, Nikki Haley, who took 43%, making Trump the nonincumbent president with the highest number of votes in a Republican primary in that state in the last 70 years.

South Carolina, where Haley served as governor for six years, will hold its primaries on Feb. 24, and if Trump wins more votes than Haley, it will basically mean Haley’s 2024 presidential aspirations will have fizzled out.

Trump’s return to the White House is no longer a distant dream, but a real possibility: His victory in the Republican primaries is almost beyond doubt, and he is more likely to win this year’s election than Biden. This commentator puts the odds at between 55% and 45%.

To the great surprise of many a political commentator, the assorted trials, media ridicule, social media bans and post-Jan. 6 loss of supporters Trump has faced do not seem to have overly fazed him. But it is the surprise evinced by these “experts” that is perhaps the most surprising. After establishment elite Hillary Clinton’s 2016 defeat at the hands of Trump, surely the American system’s mainstream cannot still be oblivious to the bare facts of psychological truth, as reflected in the bipolar “parallel universes” being torn apart today.

In 2020, I wrote an article titled “Who’s Afraid of Trump?” Looking back at it more than three years later, it confirmed that we should not underestimate the stubbornness of human nature, nor ignore the power of anger.

Manufactured Contradictions between Ourselves and the Enemy Are at the Heart of Politics

As renowned psychologist Joshua Greene has pointed out in his book, “Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them,” humans are always trying to establish the internal solidarity of “Us” by setting up and competing with an imaginary enemy, “Them,” and it is only in this way, through “crisis discourse,” that we can promote intragroup cooperation. Without the existential contradictions brought about by this external enemy, there would be no need for internal consistency.

In his analysis of the relationship between the regime and the people, German political theorist Carl Schmitt emphasized the “state of exception” and defined the “sovereign” as the one with the absolute power to decide on it. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s book “State of Exception” argues that seemingly democratic and mature regimes like those of the U.S., the U.K. and European countries govern by “states of exception” — both in their infinite expansion and amplification of the definition of terrorism, and in using the war on terror as justification for the suppression of dissent, for digital surveillance and regulation, and for the exploitation of people in body and in mind.

The author is an assistant professor at the University of Hong Kong’s Department of Philosophy and a research fellow at its Centre on Contemporary China and the World.

Editor’s note: This article concludes with Part 2 tomorrow.


政思故我在:特朗普回歸,是誰的責任?

2024年1月29日
黃裕舜

假若美國前總統特朗普勝出11月舉行的美國大選……

這一道假設,若是在3年多前提出,對於剛經歷了2021年1月6日國會山莊暴動事件而驚魂未定的美國,自然無法想像,大可一笑置之。當時,深信「特朗普勝出2020年大選卻遭受拜登選舉舞弊」陰謀論的特朗普支持者(可被歸納為「極右翼」分子,但美國政治左右之分不能單純以經濟視角作歸納),對特朗普被「篡奪」白宮之位悲憤莫名。

反之,自認為是民主價值與體制衞道士的美國「左翼」(當中包括一部分民主黨員,以及不少對主流民主黨體制失去信心的新崛起聲音),則把國會山莊暴動事件視為特朗普思潮導致共和黨內部道德敗壞的最佳佐證。2021年1月13日,眾議院以232比197通過對特朗普的彈劾議案,然而參議院一個月後的表決結果卻是57票支持、43票反對,因未到三分之二比數門檻,否決此一議案。部分共和黨國會議員事後與特朗普劃清界線,又或是對其支吾以對,以模糊言詞轉移視線。當時特朗普看似大勢已去。

一、為何過去數年,特朗普支持度不跌反升?

兩年多前,Reuters/Ipsos等民調結果顯示總統拜登的反對率開始超越支持率。這並非出於反拜登情緒一向高企的共和黨支持者,而是因為拜登正在逐漸失去相對游離或本來偏向民主黨的選民支持。

根據Gallup民調,2023年12月初,拜登支持度徘徊在接近上任以來的最低位,只有約39%,此乃近代美國任何一位有意角逐連任的現屆總統,在選舉年初的最差表現。去年底《紐約時報》民調顯示,六大搖擺州份當中,有5個(亞利桑那州、佐治亞州、密歇根州、內華達州與賓夕法尼亞州)皆偏向特朗普,僅於威斯康星州拜登才以2%領先其勁敵。

拜登曾於2020年在這六大州憑着少數族裔與保守白人男性等群體的支持而擊敗特朗普。然而2024年的大選,有可能見證這些選民轉為支持特朗普或第三方獨立候選人。

再看共和黨初選,特朗普於艾奧瓦州選舉中拿下過半票數,並驅使曾被視為「比特朗普更特朗普」的佛羅里達州州長德桑蒂斯(Ron DeSantis)黯然退出競逐。一周後,其在新罕布什爾州初選以55%壓倒僅存對手黑利(Nikki Haley)的43%,成為過去70年來共和黨初選在該州得票率最高的非現任總統。

黑利曾經擔任州長6年的南卡羅萊納州將於2月24日舉行初選,屆時特朗普若能取得比其更多票數,基本上意味着黑利的2024年總統夢正式告吹。

「特朗普回朝」再也不是渺茫的夢,而是一個確實的可能。特朗普勝出共和黨初選已幾近毫無懸念;相對於拜登,特朗普更有可能贏得今年大選。筆者預測概率比例為55%對45%。

經歷了司法制度審判、媒體冷嘲熱諷、社交媒體禁言、不少支持者在暴動事件後與特朗普割席……種種消極負面因素對他來說似乎並沒有產生太大影響,令一眾政治評論員大跌眼鏡。然而,這些「專家」表現出的驚訝,也許才是最令人驚奇的地方。經歷了2016年體制菁英表表者希拉莉敗在特朗普手上的一幕,難道美國體制主流依然對現今兩極「平行宇宙」撕裂所反映出的基本心理現實(the bare facts of psychological truth)視若無睹嗎?

2020年,我曾撰寫了《誰害怕特朗普?》一文,3年多後回頭再看,正印證了:不要低估人性的固執,更不要忽略憤怒的威力。

二、 政治本質,乃是各種被製造出來的「敵我矛盾」

正如著名心理學家葛林(Joshua Greene)曾經在Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them一書中提出,人類總是嘗試透過樹立並抗衡一個假想敵「他們」(Them),從而確立「我們」(Us)的內部團結,方能以所謂的危機論述促進群體內部合作。沒有這個外在敵人帶來的存在性矛盾,便沒有內部保持一致的必要性。

在剖析政權與人民的關係時,理論家施密特(Carl Schmitt)強調「例外狀態」(State of Exception),並將「主權者」設定為具備定奪「例外狀態」的絕對權力者。哲學家阿甘本(Giorgio Agamben)的State of Exception一書指出,看似民主的發達英美歐政權,正透過「例外狀態」進行管治──通過把恐怖主義的定義無限擴充與放大,以反恐戰爭作為打壓異己、數碼監察與調控、魚肉民眾身體與思想的手段。

主權政權與潛在敵對政權之間的對立,為政權對民眾行使統治提供了論證;而民眾內部的對立,則為行使統治提供了極大的便利。在美國,政黨的二元對立、社交與主流媒體立場壁壘分明、宗教傳統與進步改革的對抗、科學與信仰、富庶與貧窮、所謂的「原住民」與真正的「土著」與外來的「移民」、東西岸與內陸,這些種種看似迥異,實際辯證統一的衝突,正塑造了當代美國複雜而撕裂的社會意識。即使這些身份與立場並沒有科學化的基礎,但在主觀尋覓「所屬之地」的情感下,敵人被設定為基本的他者(Other),朋友則被定格為所謂的「我者」,他者與我者之間的互動則受「社會」的「象徵大他者」(Big Other)(可參見拉岡與齊澤克的論說)所約束與充斥。我們無法逃離創造對立、賦予意義的社會秩序與體制。在各種各樣內部分裂下,民眾唯有向掌權的統治者妥協,接受現實。

由是觀之,美國選民的態度分野不難理解。有不少美國自由派、進步派、新保守主義(包括為數不多的溫和共和黨員)至今仍認為,特朗普的支持者都是沒受過教育、被保守迷信與內向民族主義所騎劫的白人至上分子。

至於特朗普絕大多數的支持者(集中在共和黨新主流與政治主流以外的「邊緣輿論」)皆認定所謂的「自由派菁英」(Liberal Elite)是所謂「深層政府」(Deep State)壟斷下的無知羔羊,又或是其從屬的經濟金融權貴(Power Elite)透過摧毀美國「傳統價值」去建立新的「全球主義」(Globalist)霸權。

在這兩大立場之間搖擺的少數「中間派」,則更傾向於以個人經濟狀況、對當權者的不滿與投訴,作為投票意向基礎──他們並沒有兩端的意識形態綑綁,卻也因而在立場上具備更大的不穩定性。

支持與反對特朗普兩大陣營之間最大的分別,在於他們對「我者」與「他者」的分野與研判。2020年,民主黨內的進步派、自由派、相對保守派,以及游離的中間派及傳統共和黨員,在同仇敵愾的前提下,搭建了粗疏的政治聯盟與平台,放下內部矛盾與撕裂,讓白宮易主。

然而這數年以來,除了「不支持特朗普」以外,此陣營內至今仍未出現一個能團結各方面、讓成員真誠而熱中地接納的論述。反特朗普者並沒有一個統一而貫徹的身份,能讓他們說清楚「我們都是自己人」。

反之,特朗普的支持者則因強大頑強的「抵抗」論述與「受迫害」幻想,選擇生活在一個統一(雖然不符現實)的平行時空之中,繼續深信特朗普確是2020年大選的真正贏家、有關新冠病毒與疫苗的陰謀論、奧巴馬「不是在美國出生」等虛假論述,並通過法國社會心理學家勒龐(Gustave le Bon)所說的群體「磁性影響」與「催眠」,讓他們活在自信的憤怒及對現狀無限放大恐懼之中。特朗普支持者的內部團結並沒有隨着時間流逝而減弱,更在他們「領主」面對重重障礙下不斷加強。每一道針對特朗普的控罪、每一次社交平台對其審查,皆有助鞏固這些支持者的鬥志。

三、管治者與菁英的作為與不作為

平心而論,筆者認為拜登國內外經濟政策與管治手段有其可讚可觀一面。拜登在處理新冠疫情時相對合乎科學的手法、於2022年引入的《降低通脹法》(Inflation Reduction Act)、對立法幫助弱勢社群及言詞關注、應對氣候變化的積極態度,甚至在拉攏美歐關係等外交範疇(從美國角度出發),皆有其貢獻。相對於其前任,拜登對美國體制秩序的尊重更為誠摯。可是,美國選舉制度的「閱卷人」不是智庫或學者專家、不是國際社會或氣候變化倡議者、不是我,而是美國民眾──更準確地說,是幾個搖擺州份裏數十個搖擺郡的游離選民。

從管治層面來說,拜登選情嚴峻,原因有幾個。正如1992年大選時,民主黨幕僚卡維爾(James Carville)曾就克林頓的選舉策略拋下一句「It's the economy, stupid」,可見經濟絕對重要。Reuters/Ipsos最近調查顯示,多達63%受訪者把「經濟狀況/我的經濟狀況」置於投票議題基礎首位,其中11%人更明言這是他們所關注的「唯一議題」;排在第二位的是犯罪率(55%);第三位是「菁英對你自由的侵犯」(51%);墮胎與槍械管制,則緊挨彼此地排在第四與第五位。此排名反映出來的,正是對部分人提倡「後物質主義(Post-materialist Values)已成為主導二十一世紀西方政治聲音」的間接批判。人民在「物質」(財富、安全)與「非物質」(社會公義、自由)之間的選擇,並非必然會隨着時間推進而變得更傾向「非物質」而遠離「物質」。在大氣候不穩、個人經濟條件緊絀之時,「物質」很大可能比「後物質」來得關鍵。

CNBC早前進行的All-America Economic Survey顯示,多達62%受訪者不滿拜登的經濟政策。在去年聯儲局緊縮貨幣政策下,通貨膨脹雖然有所遏制,但依然為美國絕大多數基層及中產家庭帶來龐大財政壓力。

當進一步自動化與結構性調整,藍領工人在疫情下的談判條件雖有所提升,但低級白領與服務行業勞工則面臨工資下跌與工作不穩定化的雙重噩夢。2021年始出現的「大辭職潮」,正彰顯了工資增長停滯與生活成本增加之際,在服務行業人員(尤其是年輕人)眼中,勞工市場已經乏善足陳。人民追求的並非單純就業,而是具備成長空間與充分薪酬條件的職位。服務行業在疫情封鎖措施與消費習慣改變下遭受嚴重衝擊。儘管拜登有意透過「大政府」主導產業政策,推高國內就業,然而此做法引來不少資本家詬病,可謂魚與熊掌,不可兼得。

當然,管治問題並不局限於政策路線的分歧,也包含價值觀的矛盾。民主黨內部的外交政策道德有「兩難」與「糾結」,令基層支持者與體制之間的距離愈走愈遠。就拿以巴衝突和俄烏戰爭作例子:拜登一邊廂必須套牢同情巴勒斯坦人民的年輕進步派,以及阿拉伯裔、穆斯林選民,另一邊廂則要討好對以色列政府持有鮮明親近態度的傳統商界金主,更要擺平派系鬥爭(包括8人「進步小隊」與黨內主流);民主黨支持者當中,有接近三分之二認為美國應當繼續向烏克蘭提供援助,然而在俄烏及以巴議題上,年輕左翼圈子及游離選民之中正崛起一股「反戰」聲音。這種「反戰主義」及其所延伸出的「反體制主義」(Anti-Establishment Ideology),間接促使羅伯特.甘迺迪(Robert Kennedy Jr.)及哲學家韋斯特(Cornel West)等候選人冒起。

特朗普如今氣勢如虹,也與共和黨菁英內部潰散息息相關。自從黨內初選開始以來,共和黨候選人大致可被劃分成「反特朗普」與「親特朗普」兩派;「反特朗普」陣營之中又冒起數股分庭抗禮、各不相讓的勢力,包括毫無魅力的彭斯、缺乏獨特性而過度溫和的克里斯蒂(Chris Christie)、自負非常但與特朗普分別不大的德桑蒂斯,以及截稿時仍在堅持鬥爭的黑利。黑利背後代表着根深柢固的共和黨「建制派」財團、金融界人士及士紳家族,惟他們無法統一戰線地對抗特朗普,況且黑利也無法取得共和黨普遍民眾的信任。

另一邊廂,「親特朗普」勢力包括代表南卡的參議員斯科特(Tim Scott)與富豪拉馬斯瓦米(Vivek Ramaswamy),他們本來就是想透過初選表現而博得特朗普歡心。無論是「反特營」的各懷鬼胎,還是「親特營」的推波助瀾,種種因素皆意味着共和黨建制派將再一次把候選人之位拱手相讓予特朗普。美國這一年,絕不太平。

香港大學哲學系助理教授、當代中國與世界研究中心研究員
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