America’s Display of Enthusiasm

Mario Monti’s trip to the U.S. went well. Perhaps too well. Indeed, there was an undeniable element of exaggeration in the American reception of the Italian prime minister. If some reticence in the public discourse and a series of embarrassed smiles can be called a statement, the prime minister seems to have noticed. Although Mario Monti has headed the government for only three months, he has taken strong action on the path to balancing the budget and pension reform (“and only with a strike of three hours” he told his audience at the White House, who listened “with great surprise”).

As for the other reforms, whether those in the labor market (a theme very comprehensible to the Americans) or those in the changing of relations between Merkel and Italy (a theme more subtle for this audience) — all remain to be tested. The question, therefore, is what the Americans are trying to tell us with this unprecedented show of enthusiasm.

The most malicious interpretation is that the new tone has to do with the transition of the Italian government — and there is no doubt that the difference between Washington’s awkward relations with Silvio Berlusconi in recent years and those of today with Mario Monti is indescribable. In fact, it’s incredible that the last government was never mentioned in these meetings, and that the only one to speak the name of Silvio Berlusconi was of course Monti (speaking well, as is usual in institutional routine, to establish the formal continuity between the executives). However, the United States, occupied with so many and so very complex problems, would not have wasted much energy in that moment only to underline different diplomatic tones.

The key to this hospitality is written in reality in the news reported by the prime minister’s agenda these days. Unlike what has happened in the past under other prime ministers, Monti has indeed spent much less time with political institutions — Congress, the executive branch, the U.N. — to invest the major part of his energy in communicating directly with other centers of power: think tanks like the Peterson, major media outlets, like Maria Bartiromo’s CNBC, Time Magazine, the New York Times and with Wall Street investors, who have the capacity to directly influence the opinions of the broader market. Not by chance was the longest “political” meeting delegated to the ministry of Foreign Affairs, which spent more time with Hillary Clinton than Monti spent with Obama. Just as it was not by chance that he visited an Italian professor in New York, where the big names of finance, from Bloomberg to Soros, take to the field.

Mario Monti’s true mission in America, given in a manner a little uncharitable, was from the beginning that of a “seller,” of a man that until the end was trying to convince them of the reliability of our markets, the same markets we ourselves had condemned.

This also explains the profuse enthusiasm in making sure that the mission succeeded: With a little exaggeration, we wished to clearly understand all the various points of influence of American power, media, politics and investors, things which were re-accepted. The phrase “Italy is back” was, in this sense, as enthusiastic to our ears as it was condescending. But it was also the echo of some kind of self-criticism from the most arrogant country in the world.

“Europe is a slippery slope for Americans, especially in this electoral campaign. If he had not seen an improvement, I don’t think that Obama would have been so busy,” said a Washington insider, a lawyer who works for the defense industry, a few nights ago. With the typical pragmatic spirit, the markets and U.S. policy have made a rapid march backwards recently after realizing that, for the America of the next few years, Europe is still more of a benefit than a ball and chain, as it was described in the worst times of the crisis.

Not only, as is repeated, could the American mini-recovery be sunk by any deterioriation in the economy of the EU, but Europe still looks very important in the future, and also in interweaving the costs and security of the Empire.

The economic crisis is carrying the U.S. to an adjustment in its military spending. Less money from Washington will be more and more focused in the Asian theater, to keep an eye on the rivals of tomorrow, China above all.

The consequence is that the price of watching over Russia (including nuclear weapons) and the management of the Middle East will increasingly fall once again on Europe: The Libyan model — in which NATO operates and the United States supports — is the model that the U.S. today would like to see extended to the whole zone of European influence. To this end, much was said between Monti and Obama in their conference on the new NATO that is to be held in May in Chicago. Much of this was spoken of, and little has been reported about it. The issue is indeed a hot one in European public opinion.

The lesson to be drawn from all this is that U.S. enthusiasm is like a breeze — it can change direction quickly according to the needs (or utility?) of the country. He has puffed very well on Monti’s visit, but we should not let ourselves be heavily reliant. In addition, as demonstrated by the NATO dossier, it surely brings with it a price tag with the usual salty price.