The US in the Syrian Bazaar

The worst thing about the Friends of Syria conference in Tunisia is that it is an effort to invoke the American role that was lost to handle the Syrian crisis. This role is supposed to drive the Arabs far away and push the Europeans aside; it sets up Syria to be the hostage to dreams that inspire American officials and the American public, dreams with vicissitudes that no one can predict and perils no one can define.

The Tunis conference was a declaration that Arab mediation had ended and that the Americans were charged with solving the crisis in Syria. The supporters of the Syrian regime can now put this mandate in the context of it being proof that their firm theory is sound: that the popular opposition movement that has endured for nearly a year is nothing but a secret U.S. conspiracy, the aim of which is the political option of resistance and opposition.

The United States has just gotten involved in the Syrian crisis. Throughout the past months, President Barack Obama’s administration kept dealing with this crisis as if it were a social or economic problem until it acknowledged its political nature and immediately turned it over to Turkey. Turkey made diplomatic efforts that stretched out for eight months before getting advice from Washington to leave the matter to the Arab League and test its ability to bring about a solution from within the Arab community that is based on supervision and conciliation. This failed to achieve any progress because the regime responded with unprecedented force to the plan for President Assad to step down in favor of Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa.

Until now, Washington was confused and hesitant, despite the appeals for help it was getting from the Arab Gulf states and the calls for action it received from the Turks and Europeans. This confusion was the reason why Russia and China, and before them India, Brazil and South Africa, rushed forth to provide a safety net for the Syrian regime — as a prelude to bringing about balance in the regional and global order that would force the United States and the West in general to recognize the vital interests of Russia and China.

The Israelis’ biding time was not the only motive for this American hesitation; this can be explained by the Libyan experience, in which the Americans played a marginal role compared with the active role of the Europeans. The domestic factor was decisive in crystallizing the policy of self-distancing employed by the Obama administration, which had been charged originally by the American voters to extract the United States and its economy from military adventures.

There are those who think that the Tunis conference is just a test of the extent to which the U.S. is willing to abandon its hesitation and directly intervene in the Syrian crisis. The indicator will not be in the final resolutions of the conference but rather in the Turkish position, which up to now has adhered to U.S. advice: first to mediate, then to bide its time and then to wait for the Arab solution, all the while remaining prepared to alter the Syrian balance of power.

It is by no means glad tidings that the Americans are advancing to the front line, especially if the most salient motive is to respond to the Russians and Chinese. That would mean that Washington has decided to enter the bazaar that Moscow and Beijing have set up around Syria, in accordance with political calculations and electoral volatility. This cannot put any Syrian at ease — whether a supporter or an opponent of the regime.