Obama and Xi Seek Mutual Assurance

The American and Chinese presidents, who recently met at Sunnylands, have more in common than they would like. They must both solve internal dysfunctions in their countries.

In 1972 there was the meeting between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong, then again in 1979 between Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping. Will the Sunnylands summit in California become another date that goes down in history? We will not know for at least another year. Beyond the symbols of amity, if not complicity, actions are required. We will only know with time whether or not China has modified its international behavior. Will China exercise more control over its cyberattacks, its protégés and, in particular, the nuclear program in North Korea?

It has been 41 years since 1972, when opening up to China was, for Richard Nixon’s America, a way of isolating the USSR as well as a means of ingloriously withdrawing from Vietnam.

In June of 2013 it’s no longer a question of the U.S. forcing China out of its isolation but rather of building a relationship based on mutual trust between the leaders of the two most prominent global economic powers. Contrary to Ronald Reagan, however, Barack Obama is a very “cerebral” president, the most intellectual since Wilson. We don’t really perceive Xi Jinping as Reagan viewed Gorbachev in his time: “a man we can have confidence in.” And is the new Chinese president really another Deng Xiaoping as the leaders of Beijing would have us believe?

Diplomacy is certainly, at least in part, a matter of personalities, but beyond these men and their mutual empathy, there are real issues. What is important today in Sino-American relations is to understand to what point the question of status matters between these two countries. On the one hand, there is China: a power that is slowly becoming again what it once was. On the other hand, there is the United States: a power that is not quite what it once was. For China, the youngest empire in the world must be treated as an equal to the most ancient empire still in existence in the world. For Americans, China has certainly become an indispensable regional power in Asia, but it is not yet a truly global power, unlike America. Alone in its power class, America is a legitimate Asian power, as it is still — marginally — a European power. Don’t China’s neighbors demand its presence in Asia?

Nothing irritates the United States more than China’s tendency to avoid its global responsibilities. “Don’t forget that we’re a developing power!” But when China becomes too involved in global affairs, the United States does not hesitate to remind it of its limitations.

In other words, because of the strength of its economic success, the historical presence of its civilization and its newfound confidence in itself in general, China expects to be treated as an absolute equal by Washington. And this at a time when America is only prepared to allow Beijing the status of “number two power” in the world. For the United States, to recognize China as an equal would effectively be to resign itself to accepting its relative decline. America is not politically, intellectually or even ideologically ready to do so. How could the premier democratic power in the world symbolically recognize as an equal a power that not only ignores democracy but the rule of law as well?

The Chinese have highlighted the shortcomings of Western democratic systems; they are about to be on the defensive. Would a Chinese scholar not summarize his country’s recent dilemma as the following: “If China does not seriously deal with corruption, the country is doomed.” But he would hasten to add: “If China seriously addresses corruption, the party is doomed.” This is the paradox of the meeting that just took place in somewhat artificial amity between Obama and Xi Jinping. The two leaders certainly need each other. Between them, they have to find new rules, which exclude the risk of unintended escalation and uncontrolled cyberattacks.

In reality, on either side the priorities are internal. What Beijing and Washington really expect from one another is the freedom to separately undertake indispensable internal reforms. Each would be willing to say to the other: “Let me devote myself to myself; I have so much to do.” And on that front, the two presidents have many commonalities that may be more negative than positive. The priority of the United States must be to find a remedy to the dysfunction of its democratic model; that of China is to gradually, but unavoidably, introduce the rule of law to its political and economic system. To achieve his goals, Obama must persuade. For Xi Jinping, on the other hand, it’s about restraining and thus making enemies within the small group of leaders who brought him to power. Obama and Xi Jinping may have more in common with each other than they would like.