Internationalism vs. Isolationism

If Obama is re-elected, it will remind Germany that although America is wounded and in decline, it remains the world’s superpower. Meanwhile, Mitt Romney will give the impression that the U.S. has been adjusted to the German economic model.

Obama’s re-election is of crucial importance for the political developments in the eurozone – as crucial as Wilson’s re-election in 1916 was for the outcome of the First World War. As for the Second World War, Roosevelt’s third re-election in a row, in 1940, was also equally important. The “fluctuations” seem dramatic: first, the outcome of Germany’s dispute with the other European forces, and second, the hegemonic influence of the U.S. as a sole superpower.

So far, the policy Germany has imposed on the eurozone is not only threatening America’s fragile economic recovery, but also global economic balance.

Washington’s inability to force Berlin’s retreat is undermining, if not cancelling the hegemonic role of the U.S. in trans-Atlantic relations. It is depriving NATO of any dissuasive power and intervention tactics. It is weakening the U.S. worldwide posture in the face of China and Russia. Finally, it is undermining the attempt of the U.S. to influence general developments in the broader Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The picture has dramatic shades: Any accident happening in the EU summit in October may have a negative impact on Obama’s attempt to be re-elected and the current president’s potential defeat will intensify Germany’s intransigence. Meanwhile, Mitt Romney, at least through his election campaign rhetoric, committed himself to giving priority to reducing the deficit through an austere and restrictive budgetary policy.

In other words, if Obama is re-elected, it will remind Germany that although America is wounded and in decline, it remains the world’s superpower. Meanwhile, Mitt Romney will give the impression that the U.S. has adjusted to the German economic model.

It is more than evident that the Obama-Romney debate is a debate between internationalism and isolationism. In fact, according to many analysts, the post-American, multipolar world has already emerged in a transitional era.

If Washington sends the message that Berlin’s budgetary rigor is justified, then whatever is left of the American influence on the Old Continent will be lost.

Not only France but also the U.K. will stop counting on American intervention and corrective action in European associations, while the former Atlanticists in Central and East Europe are already on a different level, under the hegemonic protection of Berlin.

Without Washington’s involvement in the eurozone, its powerful influence on Southern European countries will be lost, without which there will not be any intervention policy causing a deterring effect or a preventive intervention strategy; thus, the U.S. will lose credibility in the broader Middle East and North Africa.

Without its weighty influence in Europe, Washington will be a superpower only by name with dramatically negative consequences from Iran to Afghanistan and the South China Sea, and without the U.S. presence there is literally no real obstacle for German Europe.

If Washington sends the message that Berlin’s guidelines are justifiable, any influence left will be lost.