Ukraine, a Country Sold Off on the Diplomatic Market?

With Russia as a key actor in international negotiations, the United States has agreed to make concessions with Ukraine in order to have an ally in other sensitive issues, notably in the Middle East.

We all remember the image of Victoria Nuland, the United States’ deputy secretary of state, in Maidan distributing sandwiches to courageous protesters revolted by the policies of the president at the time, Viktor Yanukovych. This American support of a popular revolution on both moral and political fronts can only be saluted, because it respects the democratic and liberal principles of the United States and the European Union. Some weeks later, when the fall of the president’s regime seemed inevitable, a pirated conversation between American Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt, stationed in Kiev, and Victoria Nuland was revealed to the public by the pro-Russian party: Nuland was cleaning house by distributing posts within the future transitional Ukrainian government and saying her famous line, “Fuck the EU.” One could be shocked by such comments, but they permitted an orderly transition, validated by fair and democratic presidential elections, which took place three and eight months later, respectively. Let us remember that only 2 percent of Ukrainian voters were voting for extreme rightist parties while their country was already partially invaded by Russian troops and accused by the Russian media machine of neo-Nazism.

This second Ukrainian revolution, which occurred within the space of two years, took place in a tense diplomatic context between the U.S. and Russia. The Arab Spring, followed by the fall of the Gadhafi regime in Libya, strained relations between the two countries. If Medvedev’s Russia had abstained during the U.N.’s 1973 resolution concerning Libya, it was partly to protect the civilian population and partly to improve relations with Washington after the war in Georgia in 2008. However, on March 21, 2011, Putin publicly expressed his “personal” disagreement with the Libyan politics of President Medvedev. His return to the most powerful position in the Kremlin in March 2012 put an end to all Russian concessions. The Syrian crisis was the first example. The result: Obama did not hesitate one moment before shifting and accepting the last-minute Russian proposal to dismantle Assad’s chemical weapons, crossing his “red line.” This Russian diplomatic victory was a heavy blow to the democratic president’s international credibility. Although Obama made it possible to avoid another war venture and to conserve a dialogue or a semblance of cooperation with Moscow, his concession was the equivalent of abandoning the Syrian opposition.

In this sense, American support of the Ukrainian democratic movement brings to mind the famous words of Cardinal Richelieu to the Duke of Rohan when he brought his castle down: “Sir, I just threw a good ball into your game of ninepins.” The ball that was thrown was explosive. The Ukrainian revolution followed by a liberal and democratic transition could, in the long term, represent the end of Putin’s authoritarian, kleptomaniacal model. He had to act, and act fast! All the same, he waited until the end of the Olympic Games at Sochi to invade Crimea and annex it 15 days later. He organized strikes at Lugansk, Donetsk and Kharkiv; justified the existence of a New Russia extending from Bessarabia to Donbass; unofficially supported the referendums hurriedly organized at Lugansk and Donetsk; and armed and financed his new illegal entities, going so far as to send military support without the West imposing any significant sanctions. Only the destruction of the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 morally obligated the recalcitrant Western countries to impose severe economic and financial sanctions against Russia.

The American politics in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict were very subtle and discreet up until late last week. The Americans have stayed out of all talks, allowing the Europeans to interfere and negotiate the two Minsk treaties which, let us remember, have never been respected by Moscow. This is why we are now on “Minsk II agreement + umpteen Russian demands.” Nuland’s “Fuck the EU” would not have fallen on deaf ears. The Russian bear only seems ready to negotiate with Washington, one-on-one, as in earlier days during the Cold War. By opposing the sending in of military aid and the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO candidature through limiting hopes to rapid adhesion to the European Union, and constraining Kiev to a federal state with two forcibly imposed pro-Russian entities, Germany and France have lost much of their prestige in Ukrainian politics and opinions, while in [Russia’s] eyes the Americans remain faithful and loyal.

Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Sochi on May 12 was quite the surprise, and many wondered about the real stakes in these bilateral negotiations. The Americans’ statement mentioned that Kerry and his Russian homologue Lavrov would discuss Syria, Iran and Ukraine. As for concrete actions, the meeting led to the establishment of a Russo-American diplomatic canal addressing Ukrainian affairs entrusted to Nuland and Grigory Karasin, the Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Some weeks later, Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande asked Petro Poroshenko to accelerate the procedure that would constitutionally guarantee the special status of two secessionist bodies from Donbass while the Minsk treaty includes previous demands for a ceasefire, which is still not totally respected by the pro-Russian forces. The Franco-German appeal, responding to Moscow and Washington’s wishes, was received coldly by Kiev. It will be necessary to wait until Victoria Nuland arrives in person to convince the most recalcitrant parliamentarians, including those who were behind the Maidan movement, to vote for this change in the constitution. The day before, she invited them to the American Embassy and went with Ambassador Pyatt to the Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) on the day of the vote. Yet the legal approval of this constitutional change depended on Yanukovych’s former Regional Party.

It is doubtless shocking for many Ukrainians to see such a flagrant foreign intervention in the vote of a democratically elected Assembly. Maybe they have been too naïve. The American administration’s priority has always been a timid approach toward Tehran, the destruction of the Islamic State and a rapid solution for bringing peace to Ukraine. None of these objectives can be realized without Russian participation.

The American logic is understandable. Yet it carries an enormous risk. By incorporating the two militarized entities from Donbass, Ukraine constitutionally guarantees the survival of the former kleptomaniacal system that has been doing a disservice to this country’s development. It gives carte blanche to Russia to interfere with its internal affairs and its external politics. Worse, this status quo policy could, in the midterm, lead to a generalized pessimism within the Ukrainian population and incite armed militias on the extreme right to try and forcibly take power. Finally, this would validate the Russian strategy, that consists of creating secessionist pockets in all the countries of the former Soviet Union, thus establishing a system of vassalization.

The best solution to ensure the prosperity of the Ukrainian population would be the country’s separation from the entities created by Russia, thus obliging [Russia] to pay the price for its aggressive and destructive politics. Using the old Mexican expression, “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States,” we can conclude that Ukraine’s tragedy is “Poor Ukraine, so far from the United States, so close to Russia!” Nuland’s sandwiches have a very bitter aftertaste.