Barack Obama Discovers the Russian Giant
Published in Le Figaro
(France) on 6 July 2009
by Laure Mandeville (link to original)
The American president, symbol of the democratic dynamism of the United States, places his visit to the country of Putin under the sign of pragmatism.
It is often said that Barack Obama knows nothing about Europe and that his priorities and affinities lie mainly with the major arc of tension that runs from Africa to Pakistan. What does one say about Russia, the enigmatic and distant country-continent, half European and half Asian, which the new president will visit for the first time in his term this Monday? The country of Pushkin and Putin is without a doubt just as exotic for Obama as Obama, a man of mixed race and the symbol of the dynamism of American democracy, is for Russia.
The politics of the new president towards Russia could not be more pragmatic. Since Reagan, his predecessors have made the “management of the transition” of Eastern Europe an essential point. Barack Obama, however, has identified Russia not as a subject in and of itself, but as one of the key actors in a complex geopolitical puzzle. It’s a major country certainly capable of nuisance and blockages, but susceptible, if one takes care, of contributing to the diffusing of explosive issues – Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East, North Korea – that Washington is going to be confronting in the upcoming months. “The idea is to no longer see Russia as a problem that America must regulate, but as a partner country with which one can try to tackle crucial subjects,” explains Sarah Mendelson, Russian specialist at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington.
This deliberately conciliatory response, in step with that of France and Germany, makes a break with the policy of the Bush administration, which was too quick, according to the Obama team, to give good or bad “points” evaluating democracy across the post-Soviet world. “We are going to work to re-create a substantial Russian-American relationship,” explained Michael McFaul, White House Russia expert, before the trip. “I insist on the word ‘substantial’ as opposed to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from before. We want to work with the Russians on the subjects that concern our common national security and prosperity.”
The Question of Nuclear Disarmament
To put to music this new era of dialogue without sentiment, destined to repair a relationship “adrift,” the new administration has taken out from their diplomatic toolbox the notion of “restarting.” During a meeting in Geneva in March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered to her counterpart Sergei Lavrov, who was a little surprised, a lever with a button that they both pushed to symbolize their good will. Then, on the first of April, during his trip to London for the G20 summit, Barack Obama met with his counterpart, Demitri Medvedev, to define a list of common goals. The two men, who seem to be well acquainted, have notably agreed to restart a round of nuclear disarmament negotiations with the goal of signing a strategic accord before the end of December to replace the current START treaty, which expires soon.
The objective of a substantial reduction of arsenals, which would lead the two parties to accept a ceiling of 1,500 nuclear devices, has been mentioned. But no major advance is envisioned during the summit, according to the White House, considering the technical difficulties of counting the warheads and the thorny question of verification. Moscow seems to continue to wish to link these negotiations with the question of an American anti-missile shield in Europe, which they challenge. Washington hopes to dissociate the two subjects, suggesting instead that the discussion of the shield be coupled with the nuclear menace from Iran. If this menace were to disappear, there would be no reason for the shield, indicates the White House, hoping to persuade Moscow to use its influence to convince Tehran to renounce their military nuclear program.
Nothing indicates that Russia is ready to help America on this major issue. For the Kremlin, the strategic and commercial relationship it maintains with Iran and the mullahs is a precious geopolitical lever, which it continues to activate ambiguously without resorting to adopting a clear position over the question of eventual sanctions. The warm greeting that greeted President Ahmadinejad of Iran in Russia after his contested election and after the repression used by the Iranian government against the tide of opponents to the regime says much to the priorities of the Russian regime. Faced with the menace of popular revolution, the authoritarian regimes close ranks. Above all, “one must ask if a nuclear Iran, as dangerous as that would be, is not a more acceptable option for the Kremlin than an Iranian-American reconciliation, which would drastically reduce Russian influence in the region,” noted a source in the American State Department recently.
Beyond the discourse of overture, among these flat notes, Moscow’s most troubling move was the role it played in the closing of the American base in Kyrgyzstan – crucial for the provisioning of the “boys” in Afghanistan - which was a letdown for good relations with the White House. “I was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of ‘restarting,’” explains Andrew Kuchins, another influential expert at the Center for Strategic Studies. “But there was a serious flaw in the approach. A new leader has just appeared in Washington, but there hasn’t been a change in leadership in Moscow. The Putin-Medvedev tandem is fiction … on every subject it’s Putin who decides.” He is more than uncertain that the Russians are ready for a true restarting of relations with America. “We must pay attention to the failures at this summit,” he concludes, expressing an opinion widely shared.
Direct Dialogue with the Civil Society
It is worth noting the sentiment of the American researcher David Satter. For him, in opting for the notion of restarting, the Obama team shows a certain naïveté and ignores the terms of the Russian-American equation. “They’re acting as though the relationship degraded because of the Bush administration. But the bilateral problems have appeared because of internal changes following the arrival of Putin to power and with the change of the Russian political elite, who no longer remember democratic values,” he explains, predicting that Obama will come up against the same problem of values arising from the authoritarian interior of Russia.
The White House is conscious of the problem. In his briefing before the trip, McFaul remembered that “the United States has been considered in Russia an adversary, the very worst adversary. They have thought that our number one objective in the world is to render Russia as weak as possible, to encircle them. The president will say that this is not how he sees the relationship.”
This is how Barack Obama, following a tradition already well established, will begin a major speech discussing Russian-American relations and the manner in which the two great countries must “tackle the problems of the 21st century.” The speech will engage in a direct dialogue with the Russian civil society, clarify the experts. The president will address the great problems in the world, but also human rights and democracy. Obama does not want to appear to be teaching lessons, but he doesn’t want to elude the fundamental questions either, which he will evoke in meetings with representatives from political parties, intellectuals, and activists from nongovernmental organizations. He must also give an interview to the opposition publication, Novaia Gazeta, which has seen many of its journalists assassinated.
But no one knows how this speech will be received. According to statistics from a survey given by the University of Maryland, it appears that the Russians are, across the world, among the most skeptical of the Obama phenomenon. The continuous anti-American bludgeoning on the part of the Kremlin and among the largest television networks doesn’t help change the stereotypes. And it is uncertain whether the speech given by the American president will be able to have the same effect on the “Russian road” as he had in Cairo on the “Muslim road.” Besides, it will only be repeated on RTVi, a minor channel.
Even if Barack Obama is not as implicated in the democratization of Eastern Europe as his predecessor, his team during his arrival to power indicated that they would never accept the idea of a sphere of influence demanded by the Kremlin. The announcement of a visit to be made by Vice President Joe Biden to Georgia and to the Ukraine to reaffirm American support two weeks after Obama’s visit to Russia was not helpful to relations. “NATO’s door remains open for Tbilisi and Kiev and … America does not have the intention to bargain with the Russians behind the back of a third party,” Michael McFaul insisted this week, in response to a question over the enlargement of the antimissile shield. All of these elements go to show the limits of an American opening to Moscow. Barack Obama, the great conciliator, will take the hand, but not turn the cheek.
It is often said that Barack Obama knows nothing about Europe and that his priorities and affinities lie mainly with the major arc of tension that runs from Africa to Pakistan. What does one say about Russia, the enigmatic and distant country-continent, half European and half Asian, which the new president will visit for the first time in his term this Monday? The country of Pushkin and Putin is without a doubt just as exotic for Obama as Obama, a man of mixed race and the symbol of the dynamism of American democracy, is for Russia.
The politics of the new president towards Russia could not be more pragmatic. Since Reagan, his predecessors have made the “management of the transition” of Eastern Europe an essential point. Barack Obama, however, has identified Russia not as a subject in and of itself, but as one of the key actors in a complex geopolitical puzzle. It’s a major country certainly capable of nuisance and blockages, but susceptible, if one takes care, of contributing to the diffusing of explosive issues – Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East, North Korea – that Washington is going to be confronting in the upcoming months. “The idea is to no longer see Russia as a problem that America must regulate, but as a partner country with which one can try to tackle crucial subjects,” explains Sarah Mendelson, Russian specialist at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington.
This deliberately conciliatory response, in step with that of France and Germany, makes a break with the policy of the Bush administration, which was too quick, according to the Obama team, to give good or bad “points” evaluating democracy across the post-Soviet world. “We are going to work to re-create a substantial Russian-American relationship,” explained Michael McFaul, White House Russia expert, before the trip. “I insist on the word ‘substantial’ as opposed to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from before. We want to work with the Russians on the subjects that concern our common national security and prosperity.”
The Question of Nuclear Disarmament
To put to music this new era of dialogue without sentiment, destined to repair a relationship “adrift,” the new administration has taken out from their diplomatic toolbox the notion of “restarting.” During a meeting in Geneva in March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered to her counterpart Sergei Lavrov, who was a little surprised, a lever with a button that they both pushed to symbolize their good will. Then, on the first of April, during his trip to London for the G20 summit, Barack Obama met with his counterpart, Demitri Medvedev, to define a list of common goals. The two men, who seem to be well acquainted, have notably agreed to restart a round of nuclear disarmament negotiations with the goal of signing a strategic accord before the end of December to replace the current START treaty, which expires soon.
The objective of a substantial reduction of arsenals, which would lead the two parties to accept a ceiling of 1,500 nuclear devices, has been mentioned. But no major advance is envisioned during the summit, according to the White House, considering the technical difficulties of counting the warheads and the thorny question of verification. Moscow seems to continue to wish to link these negotiations with the question of an American anti-missile shield in Europe, which they challenge. Washington hopes to dissociate the two subjects, suggesting instead that the discussion of the shield be coupled with the nuclear menace from Iran. If this menace were to disappear, there would be no reason for the shield, indicates the White House, hoping to persuade Moscow to use its influence to convince Tehran to renounce their military nuclear program.
Nothing indicates that Russia is ready to help America on this major issue. For the Kremlin, the strategic and commercial relationship it maintains with Iran and the mullahs is a precious geopolitical lever, which it continues to activate ambiguously without resorting to adopting a clear position over the question of eventual sanctions. The warm greeting that greeted President Ahmadinejad of Iran in Russia after his contested election and after the repression used by the Iranian government against the tide of opponents to the regime says much to the priorities of the Russian regime. Faced with the menace of popular revolution, the authoritarian regimes close ranks. Above all, “one must ask if a nuclear Iran, as dangerous as that would be, is not a more acceptable option for the Kremlin than an Iranian-American reconciliation, which would drastically reduce Russian influence in the region,” noted a source in the American State Department recently.
Beyond the discourse of overture, among these flat notes, Moscow’s most troubling move was the role it played in the closing of the American base in Kyrgyzstan – crucial for the provisioning of the “boys” in Afghanistan - which was a letdown for good relations with the White House. “I was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of ‘restarting,’” explains Andrew Kuchins, another influential expert at the Center for Strategic Studies. “But there was a serious flaw in the approach. A new leader has just appeared in Washington, but there hasn’t been a change in leadership in Moscow. The Putin-Medvedev tandem is fiction … on every subject it’s Putin who decides.” He is more than uncertain that the Russians are ready for a true restarting of relations with America. “We must pay attention to the failures at this summit,” he concludes, expressing an opinion widely shared.
Direct Dialogue with the Civil Society
It is worth noting the sentiment of the American researcher David Satter. For him, in opting for the notion of restarting, the Obama team shows a certain naïveté and ignores the terms of the Russian-American equation. “They’re acting as though the relationship degraded because of the Bush administration. But the bilateral problems have appeared because of internal changes following the arrival of Putin to power and with the change of the Russian political elite, who no longer remember democratic values,” he explains, predicting that Obama will come up against the same problem of values arising from the authoritarian interior of Russia.
The White House is conscious of the problem. In his briefing before the trip, McFaul remembered that “the United States has been considered in Russia an adversary, the very worst adversary. They have thought that our number one objective in the world is to render Russia as weak as possible, to encircle them. The president will say that this is not how he sees the relationship.”
This is how Barack Obama, following a tradition already well established, will begin a major speech discussing Russian-American relations and the manner in which the two great countries must “tackle the problems of the 21st century.” The speech will engage in a direct dialogue with the Russian civil society, clarify the experts. The president will address the great problems in the world, but also human rights and democracy. Obama does not want to appear to be teaching lessons, but he doesn’t want to elude the fundamental questions either, which he will evoke in meetings with representatives from political parties, intellectuals, and activists from nongovernmental organizations. He must also give an interview to the opposition publication, Novaia Gazeta, which has seen many of its journalists assassinated.
But no one knows how this speech will be received. According to statistics from a survey given by the University of Maryland, it appears that the Russians are, across the world, among the most skeptical of the Obama phenomenon. The continuous anti-American bludgeoning on the part of the Kremlin and among the largest television networks doesn’t help change the stereotypes. And it is uncertain whether the speech given by the American president will be able to have the same effect on the “Russian road” as he had in Cairo on the “Muslim road.” Besides, it will only be repeated on RTVi, a minor channel.
Even if Barack Obama is not as implicated in the democratization of Eastern Europe as his predecessor, his team during his arrival to power indicated that they would never accept the idea of a sphere of influence demanded by the Kremlin. The announcement of a visit to be made by Vice President Joe Biden to Georgia and to the Ukraine to reaffirm American support two weeks after Obama’s visit to Russia was not helpful to relations. “NATO’s door remains open for Tbilisi and Kiev and … America does not have the intention to bargain with the Russians behind the back of a third party,” Michael McFaul insisted this week, in response to a question over the enlargement of the antimissile shield. All of these elements go to show the limits of an American opening to Moscow. Barack Obama, the great conciliator, will take the hand, but not turn the cheek.
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