Hawks in Washington
Published in Cadena Global
(Venezuela) on 12 July 2009
by Díaz Rangel (link to original)
“The military coup in Honduras has uncovered political currents in Washington that if not opposed, at least reveal some divergences” commented the “Ultimas Noticias” director this Sunday.
He wrote:
Every time the United States is at war, two tendencies emerge, commonly denominated as hawks and doves, according to their strong support of war or their inclination toward diplomatic negotiations.
Normally one of those tendencies dominates. In the beginning of World War II there was a strong opposition to the entrance of the USA into that conflict. There is even a theory that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was known in advance by the White House and that it was allowed to happen in order to justify the entry into the war. When the negotiations with Vietnam started, the doves predominated. The war was lost and an agreement had to be made. It was also possible to observe these tendencies later in the Iraq invasion. Bush was the head of the hawks, because of his clumsiness and inability to hide errors. In the long run this resulted in a lack of confidence in his government, his decrease in popularity and the Republican defeat in the elections. Similar cases have occurred, such as during the Korean War (1950-53), and with ups and downs during the long Cold War years.
Such divergences have appeared in the coup d’états in Latin America. It’s difficult to assume that any of these did not have factors of U.S. foreign policy involved.
Strangely, the corresponding documents have not been declassified. It is not known why there has been no interest to know the conspiracy details against presidents Jacobo Arbens in Guatemala (1954), Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic (1963) and Joao Goulart in Brazil (1964).
But two coup d’états left tracks, some more revealing than others. In one case the two classic tendencies were present, and in another absolute superiority of the hawks; because they had President Nixon at the top of them. The 25 thousand documents President Clinton ordered to be declassified by the CIA, State Department, FBI and other agencies clearly demonstrate the total responsibility of the U.S. in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende. They have been transcribed, reproduced, commented upon and analyzed in The Pinochet File: a Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, a book by Peter Kornbluh. The other one was the coup that overthrew Rómulo Gallegos (11/24/1984).
While at first there were no main fissures between them, in the conspiracy against Gallegos there ended up being two clear divergent lines. In 1980, the Foundation for the Rescue of the Venezuelan Documentary Materials had access to both Roosevelt and Truman’s presidential files and the U.S. Army Joint Chiefs of Staff's archives, and verified that “…an entire background of antagonism and distensions between the American diplomats and the members of the military attaché…” existed, that extended to the ambassadors Frank Corrigan and Walter Donnelly, who repeatedly sought the removal of the military attachés. In the reports that each brought to the state department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the opposing tendencies on Gallegos’s government and the conspirator’s military are obvious; one is its stabilizer, the other tries to overthrow him. Colonel F.J. Adams ultimately won, having had lunch with the coup participants on November 24th in Miraflores.
The military coup in Honduras revealed currents in Washington that if not completely opposed, have some divergences. The House of Representatives is a good example: the Republicans look like the hawks supporting the coup. That stand also exists in the Pentagon and certainly in various economic sectors. In the meanwhile, President Obama hasn’t stop harmonizing the ambiguous position of his government with his speeches in the OAS and the UN; these are categorical condemnations which require the return of the constitutional president to his position.
The conflict may broaden in time and while the government de facto of Honduras receives aid from the USA, it could sustain its situation of international isolation until elections. That picture of uncertainty is fed with “negotiations" of commissions from both sides, encouraged by Washington. It would be enough for the USA to suspend its implicit support to the coup participants for them to collapse.
But can the U.S. government change its position with the pressures from inside and outside of Honduras? It’s hard to expect much more from people who have maintained their mobilizations through almost two weeks, and despite the lack of organizations (it even lacks parties) have demonstrated a high capacity for struggle. These mobilizations require a more active international action, starting with Latin America. The reception of President Leonel Fernández to Zelaya in Santo Domingo is a good example of that.
What’s at stake is much bigger than the constitutional government of Honduras. It is as if it was the battle of Ayacucho (decisive military encounter during the Peruvian War of Independence that sealed the independence of that country).
He wrote:
Every time the United States is at war, two tendencies emerge, commonly denominated as hawks and doves, according to their strong support of war or their inclination toward diplomatic negotiations.
Normally one of those tendencies dominates. In the beginning of World War II there was a strong opposition to the entrance of the USA into that conflict. There is even a theory that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was known in advance by the White House and that it was allowed to happen in order to justify the entry into the war. When the negotiations with Vietnam started, the doves predominated. The war was lost and an agreement had to be made. It was also possible to observe these tendencies later in the Iraq invasion. Bush was the head of the hawks, because of his clumsiness and inability to hide errors. In the long run this resulted in a lack of confidence in his government, his decrease in popularity and the Republican defeat in the elections. Similar cases have occurred, such as during the Korean War (1950-53), and with ups and downs during the long Cold War years.
Such divergences have appeared in the coup d’états in Latin America. It’s difficult to assume that any of these did not have factors of U.S. foreign policy involved.
Strangely, the corresponding documents have not been declassified. It is not known why there has been no interest to know the conspiracy details against presidents Jacobo Arbens in Guatemala (1954), Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic (1963) and Joao Goulart in Brazil (1964).
But two coup d’états left tracks, some more revealing than others. In one case the two classic tendencies were present, and in another absolute superiority of the hawks; because they had President Nixon at the top of them. The 25 thousand documents President Clinton ordered to be declassified by the CIA, State Department, FBI and other agencies clearly demonstrate the total responsibility of the U.S. in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende. They have been transcribed, reproduced, commented upon and analyzed in The Pinochet File: a Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, a book by Peter Kornbluh. The other one was the coup that overthrew Rómulo Gallegos (11/24/1984).
While at first there were no main fissures between them, in the conspiracy against Gallegos there ended up being two clear divergent lines. In 1980, the Foundation for the Rescue of the Venezuelan Documentary Materials had access to both Roosevelt and Truman’s presidential files and the U.S. Army Joint Chiefs of Staff's archives, and verified that “…an entire background of antagonism and distensions between the American diplomats and the members of the military attaché…” existed, that extended to the ambassadors Frank Corrigan and Walter Donnelly, who repeatedly sought the removal of the military attachés. In the reports that each brought to the state department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the opposing tendencies on Gallegos’s government and the conspirator’s military are obvious; one is its stabilizer, the other tries to overthrow him. Colonel F.J. Adams ultimately won, having had lunch with the coup participants on November 24th in Miraflores.
The military coup in Honduras revealed currents in Washington that if not completely opposed, have some divergences. The House of Representatives is a good example: the Republicans look like the hawks supporting the coup. That stand also exists in the Pentagon and certainly in various economic sectors. In the meanwhile, President Obama hasn’t stop harmonizing the ambiguous position of his government with his speeches in the OAS and the UN; these are categorical condemnations which require the return of the constitutional president to his position.
The conflict may broaden in time and while the government de facto of Honduras receives aid from the USA, it could sustain its situation of international isolation until elections. That picture of uncertainty is fed with “negotiations" of commissions from both sides, encouraged by Washington. It would be enough for the USA to suspend its implicit support to the coup participants for them to collapse.
But can the U.S. government change its position with the pressures from inside and outside of Honduras? It’s hard to expect much more from people who have maintained their mobilizations through almost two weeks, and despite the lack of organizations (it even lacks parties) have demonstrated a high capacity for struggle. These mobilizations require a more active international action, starting with Latin America. The reception of President Leonel Fernández to Zelaya in Santo Domingo is a good example of that.
What’s at stake is much bigger than the constitutional government of Honduras. It is as if it was the battle of Ayacucho (decisive military encounter during the Peruvian War of Independence that sealed the independence of that country).