A Chance For Diplomacy
Published in Der Tagesspiegel
(Germany) on 18 September 2009
by Christoph von Marschall (link to original)
U.S. President Obama is abandoning plans for a European missile shield. He sees it as a technology that doesn’t yet work aimed at a threat that doesn’t yet exist.
It isn’t all completely about the workings of international policy; the perception of it in other countries is equally as important, and the perception isn’t always based in fact. That sums up the debate about the European missile shield – from George W. Bush’s forcing it on Europe to the policy turnaround under Barack Obama. The whole matter revolves around whether or not Iran poses a credible threat. Either Bush is right in maintaining that Iran is making progress working toward a nuclear bomb and the long-range missiles to deliver it at least as far as Israel, Europe and U.S. military bases overseas; in that case, there must be plans in place to counter that whether one likes Bush or not. Or Obama is correct in his new approach: Tehran isn’t making the technological progress they need, as many had feared. In that case, the West can postpone – not abandon - defensive measures and give diplomacy a chance to dissuade Iran from its plans via sanctions and incentives.
Bush was never successful in selling his view of the situation. The perception internationally was that a missile shield against Iran was an affront to Moscow and a closing of ranks with the newly found allies in Eastern Europe, mainly Poland and the Czech Republic. It isn’t going much better for Obama. Now that he has changed policy, Iran no longer is the focus of international reaction; now it’s the assumed repercussions on those nations affected, and often in exaggerated form: Is the United States allying itself with Russia at Eastern Europe’s expense, 70 years after the Hitler-Stalin Pact and 64 years after Yalta, when East and West staked out their sphere of influence claims in Europe?
Obama is considering only those sober facts concerning U.S. interests. He considers the missile shield a technology that doesn’t yet work against a threat that isn’t yet imminent at a cost that would be uncontrollable. Besides that, locating such a shield in Poland and the Czech Republic only serves to hinder any agreement with Moscow concerning heftier sanctions against Iran. The projects in Eastern Europe, therefore, will be halted because their cost is higher than their worth. If a missile defense system becomes necessary, it could be based in Turkey or on naval vessels.
With the perception of a course change, Obama will have a fight on his hands in any case. The nations in central Eastern Europe will feel abandoned. For Poland, it was never a case that they really felt threatened by Iran, it was simply an attempt to get U.S. forces stationed there as a deterrent to Russia. Obama will offer them some kind of consolation prize. One side effect of the policy change: the disappointment with the United States is pulling Poland and the Czech Republic closer to Western Europe. The chasms opened during the Bush years have been closed at least a little.
It isn’t all completely about the workings of international policy; the perception of it in other countries is equally as important, and the perception isn’t always based in fact. That sums up the debate about the European missile shield – from George W. Bush’s forcing it on Europe to the policy turnaround under Barack Obama. The whole matter revolves around whether or not Iran poses a credible threat. Either Bush is right in maintaining that Iran is making progress working toward a nuclear bomb and the long-range missiles to deliver it at least as far as Israel, Europe and U.S. military bases overseas; in that case, there must be plans in place to counter that whether one likes Bush or not. Or Obama is correct in his new approach: Tehran isn’t making the technological progress they need, as many had feared. In that case, the West can postpone – not abandon - defensive measures and give diplomacy a chance to dissuade Iran from its plans via sanctions and incentives.
Bush was never successful in selling his view of the situation. The perception internationally was that a missile shield against Iran was an affront to Moscow and a closing of ranks with the newly found allies in Eastern Europe, mainly Poland and the Czech Republic. It isn’t going much better for Obama. Now that he has changed policy, Iran no longer is the focus of international reaction; now it’s the assumed repercussions on those nations affected, and often in exaggerated form: Is the United States allying itself with Russia at Eastern Europe’s expense, 70 years after the Hitler-Stalin Pact and 64 years after Yalta, when East and West staked out their sphere of influence claims in Europe?
Obama is considering only those sober facts concerning U.S. interests. He considers the missile shield a technology that doesn’t yet work against a threat that isn’t yet imminent at a cost that would be uncontrollable. Besides that, locating such a shield in Poland and the Czech Republic only serves to hinder any agreement with Moscow concerning heftier sanctions against Iran. The projects in Eastern Europe, therefore, will be halted because their cost is higher than their worth. If a missile defense system becomes necessary, it could be based in Turkey or on naval vessels.
With the perception of a course change, Obama will have a fight on his hands in any case. The nations in central Eastern Europe will feel abandoned. For Poland, it was never a case that they really felt threatened by Iran, it was simply an attempt to get U.S. forces stationed there as a deterrent to Russia. Obama will offer them some kind of consolation prize. One side effect of the policy change: the disappointment with the United States is pulling Poland and the Czech Republic closer to Western Europe. The chasms opened during the Bush years have been closed at least a little.
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