Karzai’s Election Aftermath
Published in Süddeutsche Zeitung
(Germany) on 20 October 2009
by Stefan Kornelius (link to original)
President Karzai miscalculated when he first hesitated to hold a runoff election; but he has no alternatives, even though he will lose face among the Afghan people.
From Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s point of view, he has two unpleasant options: if he bows to international pressure and agrees to a runoff election and wins, he’ll be back in the West’s good graces but will lose face among his own Pashtun people, who find it unthinkable that anyone but a Pashtun should lead the nation.
Option two: Karzai ignores the massive election fraud and stands fast against a runoff election that, if he won, would be a crutch helping him back to legitimate rule. But that makes cooperation with the 42 nations engaged in rebuilding Afghanistan all but impossible.
The United States has already made it clear that it would send more troops and civilian aid to Afghanistan only after the election drama was over. This hesitancy could have serious consequences. If Karzai refuses, then Western troops and civilian aid personnel have nothing to gain by supporting him.
The consequences would be catastrophic. Without a compliant Karzai in power, support would disappear because it would be difficult to justify why his illegitimate government should deserve foreign support. Troops, civilian assistance, and billions of dollars would quickly vanish from the scene.
Archaic laws would again rule life in Afghanistan, and tribal leaders, as well as the Taliban, would return to their murderous ways in order to seize power. Karzai would not survive the civil war. One wonders why he found it so difficult to reach his decision.
From Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s point of view, he has two unpleasant options: if he bows to international pressure and agrees to a runoff election and wins, he’ll be back in the West’s good graces but will lose face among his own Pashtun people, who find it unthinkable that anyone but a Pashtun should lead the nation.
Option two: Karzai ignores the massive election fraud and stands fast against a runoff election that, if he won, would be a crutch helping him back to legitimate rule. But that makes cooperation with the 42 nations engaged in rebuilding Afghanistan all but impossible.
The United States has already made it clear that it would send more troops and civilian aid to Afghanistan only after the election drama was over. This hesitancy could have serious consequences. If Karzai refuses, then Western troops and civilian aid personnel have nothing to gain by supporting him.
The consequences would be catastrophic. Without a compliant Karzai in power, support would disappear because it would be difficult to justify why his illegitimate government should deserve foreign support. Troops, civilian assistance, and billions of dollars would quickly vanish from the scene.
Archaic laws would again rule life in Afghanistan, and tribal leaders, as well as the Taliban, would return to their murderous ways in order to seize power. Karzai would not survive the civil war. One wonders why he found it so difficult to reach his decision.
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