Edited by Jessica Boesl
Issues Involved in Obama’s Trip to Asia Seeking “Strategic Reassurance”
Published in Zhongguo Wang - China Net
(China) on 12 November 2009
by Dr. Liu FeiTao (link to original)
U.S. President Obama will be visiting Japan, Singapore, China and Korea November 12-19, and attending an informal meeting of APEC leaders in Singapore, while leaders from the ten ASEAN countries also hold discussions. Obama will touch upon a variety of bilateral and multilateral issues, though the main goal is to highlight the U.S.’s presence in Asia, with the hope that the U.S. and Asian countries will work together to provide mutual “strategic reassurance.”
As far as the U.S.’s first visit to Japan is concerned, the U.S. has consistently regarded its alliance with Japan as the cornerstone of its Asian policies. However, as China’s status continues to gain strength, the U.S. has needed to rely more and more on China to solve problems in Asia and around the world. Since the financial crisis, Japan has listened more closely to the sensationalizing of concepts like “G-2” and “Chinamerica.”
In Japan, as in Asia overall, a small wave in the U.S. makes a big wave there; this time is no different. With Yukio Hatomaya as Prime Minister of Japan after winning the election in August of this year, it is clear that Japan is aiming to establish a balanced relationship with the U.S. and attempting to change its current situation of depending on the U.S. at every turn. On the issue of shifting U.S. military bases, the Democratic party constantly uses the heavy burden of Okinawa as a reason to advocate for changing the 2006 agreement between Japan’s Liberal Democratic party and the U.S., in favor of not transferring Okinawa’s Futenma base from Ginowan City to Nago City, but to another county or country.
On the matter of anti-terrorism, by January of next year, the head of the Democratic party plans to terminate the use of defense warships in the Indian Ocean by the U.S. and other countries as a place to refuel warships for military purposes. What’s more, the U.S. cannot accept the fact that Hatoyama neither consulted the U.S. before abandoning the concept of the “East Asian Community,” nor has he given a clear response as to whether or not to include the U.S. To this, special assistant to the White House Security Council’s Asian policies, Bader, purposefully pointed out a Brookings Institute briefing that claims the purpose of Obama’s trip was to demonstrate that the U.S. will be an active participant in Asian affairs, not a mere spectator, while Asia continues to develop and form new blocs and infrastructures.
In Singapore and other ASEAN countries, the attitude toward the U.S.’s return to Southeast Asia is more clear. In February of this year, Secretary of State Hillary’s first visit to Asia included a trip to Indonesia and a visit to the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta. In July, Hillary led a high-profile delegation to attend an ASEAN discussion forum in Thailand for member leaders, signing the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” and emphatically announcing the U.S.’s return to southeast Asia.
This time, Obama’s visit to Singapore is to attend the first meeting of U.S.-ASEAN heads of state, reaffirming its support of two big military alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. The Americans’ invitation to return to southeast Asia, in essence, is to provide southeast Asian countries with “strategic reassurance.” In Bader’s words, “Obama’s trip sends a clear message to the people of Asia that the U.S. will remain in Asia.”
In terms of the relationship with China, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg emphasized “strategic reassurance” as the focal point of the U.S.-China relationship in his keynote address, “The Current Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” given on September 24 at the Washington-based think tank, the Center for New American Security. Pointing out that the U.S. and other allies need to clearly welcome the arrival of China as a large nation with a booming economy, China must at the same time pledge to the rest of the world that its development and growing impact on the global community should not come at the cost of other nations’ securities or well-being.
Steinberg’s “strategic reassurance” theory is widely seen as a new label for the Obama government’s China policies. He said, “During Obama’s visit to China, leaders from both sides will discuss a wide range of topics. Currently, [we] cannot respond to many issues without China’s cooperation, such as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the question of North Korean and Iranian nuclear, climate change and global warming, rebuilding the sustainability of the global economy and the basis of balanced development, and the state of affairs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With China as one of this century’s biggest up-and-coming countries, a stable and lasting relationship does not occur overnight. It requires us to work hard in investing time, money and energy, and for both sides to be mutually adaptable. Establishing mutual trust does not come through fantasizing, but through effort and action in order to realize.”
Clearly, no matter what level of cooperation is established, the sincere goal of U.S. relations with China is still for China to side with the U.S. in providing “strategic reassurance;” in essence, to establish China’s peaceful development without crossing any lines.
South Korea, the last stop on Obama’s journey, is another U.S. security ally in Asia and plays an important role in safeguarding Asian regional security. The U.S.-Korea relationship has been at a good stage in development since Lee Myung-bak’s government took office. South Korea needs the U.S.’s “strategic reassurance” on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, namely to ensure that the U.S. will not bypass South Korea to make a deal with North Korea. At the briefing, Bader placed special emphasis on the fact that this will strengthen cooperation and consultation between the U.S. and Korea. He said, “President Obama cares about U.S.-Korean relations. At the same time, there is consensus with Lee Myung-bak on the U.S.-Korea alliance and strategic partnership. Especially regarding the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, we will earnestly push forward with negotiations to reach a consensus with our allies, to sincerely listen to their ideas, suggestions and complaints. Before making decisions, we will carry out deliberations instead of circulating information after the fact. Before complete and thorough discussions, we will not take any action.”
Of course, South Korea will still require the U.S. not to use the war in Afghanistan as a reason to decrease the USFK (United States Forces Korea, referring to the U.S. military forces in Korea). In exchange, South Korea will continue to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan as a way of returning to “strategic reassurance.”
Clearly, whether it is “strategic reassurance” in return for “strategic reassurance” or cooperation to promote “strategic reassurance,” it all reflects the U.S.’s new way of thinking about strategic models in Asia given the background of changing Asian power structures.
(China Institute of International Studies Department of American Studies, Dr. Liu Feitao)
As far as the U.S.’s first visit to Japan is concerned, the U.S. has consistently regarded its alliance with Japan as the cornerstone of its Asian policies. However, as China’s status continues to gain strength, the U.S. has needed to rely more and more on China to solve problems in Asia and around the world. Since the financial crisis, Japan has listened more closely to the sensationalizing of concepts like “G-2” and “Chinamerica.”
In Japan, as in Asia overall, a small wave in the U.S. makes a big wave there; this time is no different. With Yukio Hatomaya as Prime Minister of Japan after winning the election in August of this year, it is clear that Japan is aiming to establish a balanced relationship with the U.S. and attempting to change its current situation of depending on the U.S. at every turn. On the issue of shifting U.S. military bases, the Democratic party constantly uses the heavy burden of Okinawa as a reason to advocate for changing the 2006 agreement between Japan’s Liberal Democratic party and the U.S., in favor of not transferring Okinawa’s Futenma base from Ginowan City to Nago City, but to another county or country.
On the matter of anti-terrorism, by January of next year, the head of the Democratic party plans to terminate the use of defense warships in the Indian Ocean by the U.S. and other countries as a place to refuel warships for military purposes. What’s more, the U.S. cannot accept the fact that Hatoyama neither consulted the U.S. before abandoning the concept of the “East Asian Community,” nor has he given a clear response as to whether or not to include the U.S. To this, special assistant to the White House Security Council’s Asian policies, Bader, purposefully pointed out a Brookings Institute briefing that claims the purpose of Obama’s trip was to demonstrate that the U.S. will be an active participant in Asian affairs, not a mere spectator, while Asia continues to develop and form new blocs and infrastructures.
In Singapore and other ASEAN countries, the attitude toward the U.S.’s return to Southeast Asia is more clear. In February of this year, Secretary of State Hillary’s first visit to Asia included a trip to Indonesia and a visit to the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta. In July, Hillary led a high-profile delegation to attend an ASEAN discussion forum in Thailand for member leaders, signing the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” and emphatically announcing the U.S.’s return to southeast Asia.
This time, Obama’s visit to Singapore is to attend the first meeting of U.S.-ASEAN heads of state, reaffirming its support of two big military alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. The Americans’ invitation to return to southeast Asia, in essence, is to provide southeast Asian countries with “strategic reassurance.” In Bader’s words, “Obama’s trip sends a clear message to the people of Asia that the U.S. will remain in Asia.”
In terms of the relationship with China, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg emphasized “strategic reassurance” as the focal point of the U.S.-China relationship in his keynote address, “The Current Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” given on September 24 at the Washington-based think tank, the Center for New American Security. Pointing out that the U.S. and other allies need to clearly welcome the arrival of China as a large nation with a booming economy, China must at the same time pledge to the rest of the world that its development and growing impact on the global community should not come at the cost of other nations’ securities or well-being.
Steinberg’s “strategic reassurance” theory is widely seen as a new label for the Obama government’s China policies. He said, “During Obama’s visit to China, leaders from both sides will discuss a wide range of topics. Currently, [we] cannot respond to many issues without China’s cooperation, such as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the question of North Korean and Iranian nuclear, climate change and global warming, rebuilding the sustainability of the global economy and the basis of balanced development, and the state of affairs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With China as one of this century’s biggest up-and-coming countries, a stable and lasting relationship does not occur overnight. It requires us to work hard in investing time, money and energy, and for both sides to be mutually adaptable. Establishing mutual trust does not come through fantasizing, but through effort and action in order to realize.”
Clearly, no matter what level of cooperation is established, the sincere goal of U.S. relations with China is still for China to side with the U.S. in providing “strategic reassurance;” in essence, to establish China’s peaceful development without crossing any lines.
South Korea, the last stop on Obama’s journey, is another U.S. security ally in Asia and plays an important role in safeguarding Asian regional security. The U.S.-Korea relationship has been at a good stage in development since Lee Myung-bak’s government took office. South Korea needs the U.S.’s “strategic reassurance” on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, namely to ensure that the U.S. will not bypass South Korea to make a deal with North Korea. At the briefing, Bader placed special emphasis on the fact that this will strengthen cooperation and consultation between the U.S. and Korea. He said, “President Obama cares about U.S.-Korean relations. At the same time, there is consensus with Lee Myung-bak on the U.S.-Korea alliance and strategic partnership. Especially regarding the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, we will earnestly push forward with negotiations to reach a consensus with our allies, to sincerely listen to their ideas, suggestions and complaints. Before making decisions, we will carry out deliberations instead of circulating information after the fact. Before complete and thorough discussions, we will not take any action.”
Of course, South Korea will still require the U.S. not to use the war in Afghanistan as a reason to decrease the USFK (United States Forces Korea, referring to the U.S. military forces in Korea). In exchange, South Korea will continue to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan as a way of returning to “strategic reassurance.”
Clearly, whether it is “strategic reassurance” in return for “strategic reassurance” or cooperation to promote “strategic reassurance,” it all reflects the U.S.’s new way of thinking about strategic models in Asia given the background of changing Asian power structures.
(China Institute of International Studies Department of American Studies, Dr. Liu Feitao)
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