The Perfect Location for Al-Qaeda
Yemen is a spectacularly beautiful country with a rich patriarchal culture. Its society is characterized by adherence to a traditional form of Muslim belief, one where modern Islam has never really caught on. The central government, consisting of a president, an army, and tribal alliances, is weak; its ability to survive is dependent on cooperative flexibility with other powerful warlords.
It is only because of this delicate balancing act between divergent tribal interests and foreign economic support that President Abdullah Saleh has been able to remain in power for several decades. Now, broad portions of the nation are slipping out of his control. The central government is threatened in the northern regions by insurgent Shiite tribes while in the south, and a separatist movement seeks independence from Sanaa.
Yemen is similar to Afghanistan in that its societal and political structures are unstable. It is not surprising, then, that al-Qaeda militants have sought refuge here after experiencing heavy losses in Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia. Yemen offers al-Qaeda a quasi-natural habitat on the Arabian Peninsula.
Thus, Islamic fundamentalism in Yemen finds a symbiotic relationship with the pervasive native fear of cultural alienation and encroaching western values. This religiously based rejection of forced external value systems that invariably threatens traditional societal structures (and therefore also the basis of tribal power) is an ideological corset to al-Qaeda when they seek to enlist allies in the struggle against the West. The bitter poverty in Yemen that contrasts so depressingly with the flagrant wealth of neighboring Gulf States is another source of rebellion and for the mobilization of local fundamentalists.
The United States reacts to this very real threat by supporting and arming the Yemeni central government and by taking an active military role – thus far somewhat limited – against the Islamists. One must at least question whether these tactics will be any more successful in Yemen than they have thus far been in Afghanistan.
It is only because of this delicate balancing act between divergent tribal interests and foreign economic support that President Abdullah Saleh has been able to remain in power for several decades. Now, broad portions of the nation are slipping out of his control. The central government is threatened in the northern regions by insurgent Shiite tribes while in the south, and a separatist movement seeks independence from Sanaa.
Yemen is similar to Afghanistan in that its societal and political structures are unstable. It is not surprising, then, that al-Qaeda militants have sought refuge here after experiencing heavy losses in Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia. Yemen offers al-Qaeda a quasi-natural habitat on the Arabian Peninsula.
Thus, Islamic fundamentalism in Yemen finds a symbiotic relationship with the pervasive native fear of cultural alienation and encroaching western values. This religiously based rejection of forced external value systems that invariably threatens traditional societal structures (and therefore also the basis of tribal power) is an ideological corset to al-Qaeda when they seek to enlist allies in the struggle against the West. The bitter poverty in Yemen that contrasts so depressingly with the flagrant wealth of neighboring Gulf States is another source of rebellion and for the mobilization of local fundamentalists.
The United States reacts to this very real threat by supporting and arming the Yemeni central government and by taking an active military role – thus far somewhat limited – against the Islamists. One must at least question whether these tactics will be any more successful in Yemen than they have thus far been in Afghanistan.
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