Egypt & The U.S.: The Faustian Pact
Published in Sueddeutsche Zeitung
(Germany) on 31 January 2011
by Stefan Kornelius (link to
original)
For too long, stability has been confused with stagnation: Washington bids farewell to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak— and also to the idea of being able to buy peace and influence with heads of state. The Western world must admit with shame that they have failed in Egypt.
The Cold War ended a good 20 years ago. Hosni Mubarak was already Egypt’s president for 10 years and a— if not the— central figure in the ploy for power and influence in the Middle East. The Cold War had not left much room for shades of gray; there was only black and white: my dictator or your dictator, my autocracy or your autocracy— in the struggle among the great blocs for influence and following there was only for or against. Mubarak dominated the play masterfully, particularly as he took over the key role in the ensuing act after the collapse of the old order: peace in the Middle East. Mubarak was a guarantee for stability, an anchor for the Arab world.
The self-liberation of the Tunisian and now the Egyptian citizens from their rulers and their decrepit systems now completes another infamous episode in satellite politics, which has in recent history caused harm far too often. The meager seesaw policy of Obama’s administration has shown this in the past few days. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called first for peace and levelheadedness, then fixed the White House in the abstract position that a people be allowed to voice their opinions and to demonstrate. Finally, ally Mubarak received clear admonition to silence his weapons and to allow peaceful transition into a new era. America has bid farewell to Mubarak.
The Obama administration must also take leave of the idea that they may purchase stability and permanent influence over heads of state. The notion of winning influence and political affection with $1.5 billion annually is all but washed up. Be it regimes in South America, or family clans such as the Marcos in the Philippines— in the end, the will of the people is stronger; no valve holds back the pressure in the boiler. No as-yet-comprehensible special interest policies can function if they disregard the archaic strengths of an oppressed people.
The satellite model is no American phenomenon. The U.S. is only particularly exposed because its arm extends exceedingly far. However, German foreign policy itself has trusted in Mubarak and accepted the deal that the leader offered: stability in the region and some hope for peace with Israel in return for keeping silent— holding one’s tongue on human rights, on political and societal modernization, on corruption and lack of transparency. The uprising in Egypt is not directed against the influence of foreign powers. That only plays a secondary role. The people in Cairo have their ruler set in their sights. The puppet state of the Mubarak regime is imprisoned by the old system and is now paying the price, even though the U.S. pressed Mubarak silently in recent months to open up the system and bestow freedoms.
The disempowerment from the streets is, for the patronage forces, evidence of their powerlessness. The U.S. could not move Mubarak to reforms, but it also could not cut him off from the money drop. The Faustian pact worked— the deep fear of fundamentalists and nationalists begat a dependency that, in the end, those heads of state would in fact just strengthen. Mubarak used the gratuitous funds to cement his regime and pay for his security organizations. What ought to have prevented an Islamist threat also helped the suppression of modernizers and democrats. In the end, Mubarak’s fear of the Muslim Brotherhood made helpers abroad blind to the threats that emanated from the regime. Now the danger exists that anarchy and fanaticism could escalate uncontrollably, and that this powerful nation will implode upon itself.
Stability cannot be bought from the outside, especially when stability is confused with stagnation. The Egyptians themselves are now deciding Egypt’s future. They have realized that they must scare off the deniers of modernity at the top in order to, once more, have fresh air to breathe. America and the rest of the democratic West, who praise themselves and their known superiority, quite to the injustice of their democratic and liberal system, must now admit in shame that they have failed. For a cheap win— a little stability, a little peace— they have closed their eyes to the flouting of the most important political values. And they have failed to put their allies in their place.
All of this will not lessen the attractiveness of America and Europe for many in the Arab world. But the immediate likelihood of influence and of respect for the politics of the West is dwindling. The Arab world is staggering through a dramatic phase of transition, with the West standing by to watch. The shockwave of the Egyptian tremor will be felt from Tangier to Tehran, in Rabat and Riyadh. Sovereignty works the same everywhere— and it was from no Western place that this patronage and support has been stripped from the powers that be.
The Cold War ended a good 20 years ago. Hosni Mubarak was already Egypt’s president for 10 years and a— if not the— central figure in the ploy for power and influence in the Middle East. The Cold War had not left much room for shades of gray; there was only black and white: my dictator or your dictator, my autocracy or your autocracy— in the struggle among the great blocs for influence and following there was only for or against. Mubarak dominated the play masterfully, particularly as he took over the key role in the ensuing act after the collapse of the old order: peace in the Middle East. Mubarak was a guarantee for stability, an anchor for the Arab world.
The self-liberation of the Tunisian and now the Egyptian citizens from their rulers and their decrepit systems now completes another infamous episode in satellite politics, which has in recent history caused harm far too often. The meager seesaw policy of Obama’s administration has shown this in the past few days. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called first for peace and levelheadedness, then fixed the White House in the abstract position that a people be allowed to voice their opinions and to demonstrate. Finally, ally Mubarak received clear admonition to silence his weapons and to allow peaceful transition into a new era. America has bid farewell to Mubarak.
The Obama administration must also take leave of the idea that they may purchase stability and permanent influence over heads of state. The notion of winning influence and political affection with $1.5 billion annually is all but washed up. Be it regimes in South America, or family clans such as the Marcos in the Philippines— in the end, the will of the people is stronger; no valve holds back the pressure in the boiler. No as-yet-comprehensible special interest policies can function if they disregard the archaic strengths of an oppressed people.
The satellite model is no American phenomenon. The U.S. is only particularly exposed because its arm extends exceedingly far. However, German foreign policy itself has trusted in Mubarak and accepted the deal that the leader offered: stability in the region and some hope for peace with Israel in return for keeping silent— holding one’s tongue on human rights, on political and societal modernization, on corruption and lack of transparency. The uprising in Egypt is not directed against the influence of foreign powers. That only plays a secondary role. The people in Cairo have their ruler set in their sights. The puppet state of the Mubarak regime is imprisoned by the old system and is now paying the price, even though the U.S. pressed Mubarak silently in recent months to open up the system and bestow freedoms.
The disempowerment from the streets is, for the patronage forces, evidence of their powerlessness. The U.S. could not move Mubarak to reforms, but it also could not cut him off from the money drop. The Faustian pact worked— the deep fear of fundamentalists and nationalists begat a dependency that, in the end, those heads of state would in fact just strengthen. Mubarak used the gratuitous funds to cement his regime and pay for his security organizations. What ought to have prevented an Islamist threat also helped the suppression of modernizers and democrats. In the end, Mubarak’s fear of the Muslim Brotherhood made helpers abroad blind to the threats that emanated from the regime. Now the danger exists that anarchy and fanaticism could escalate uncontrollably, and that this powerful nation will implode upon itself.
Stability cannot be bought from the outside, especially when stability is confused with stagnation. The Egyptians themselves are now deciding Egypt’s future. They have realized that they must scare off the deniers of modernity at the top in order to, once more, have fresh air to breathe. America and the rest of the democratic West, who praise themselves and their known superiority, quite to the injustice of their democratic and liberal system, must now admit in shame that they have failed. For a cheap win— a little stability, a little peace— they have closed their eyes to the flouting of the most important political values. And they have failed to put their allies in their place.
All of this will not lessen the attractiveness of America and Europe for many in the Arab world. But the immediate likelihood of influence and of respect for the politics of the West is dwindling. The Arab world is staggering through a dramatic phase of transition, with the West standing by to watch. The shockwave of the Egyptian tremor will be felt from Tangier to Tehran, in Rabat and Riyadh. Sovereignty works the same everywhere— and it was from no Western place that this patronage and support has been stripped from the powers that be.
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