Without Dennis: Has Over-identification Harmed the Chance for Peace?

Dennis Ross, who was associated with the political processes more than anyone else in the American administration, resigns without succeeding to advance them — perhaps, because of an excessive solidarity with Israel. With all due respect, Ross shouldn’t have been identified with one side.

The longstanding involvement of Dennis Ross in Middle East political developments has made him an integral part of the peace endeavors. Dennis is a proud and warm Jew to whom the continuity of the Jewish people means a great deal. I don’t know if he defines himself as a Zionist, and I assume that the answer to that is negative, but in the eyes of the Arab leadership he is a Zionist, and he certainly won’t see a disgrace in this. It’s just that his friendliness to Israel did not always benefit us.

Dennis Ross, the end of whose duty in the White House which we’ve been informed about this week (in an unspecified position, but undoubtedly an influential one), has long understood that the most significant player in the Middle East is the Israeli prime minister. He invested far less in attempts to talk different prime ministers into accepting the American line, and far more in attempts to understand the prime ministers and come up with a solution that would match their criteria. There’s no more convenient policy for one standing at the helm in Israel; however, in practice, this is also very problematic for those trying to tailor the suit for his measures.

It wasn’t hard for Ross to convince the presidents with whom he worked that from all the possible standpoints, it’s preferable for them to reach a maximum level of coordination with the Israeli leader, never to surprise him, and not to dictate to him moves he’s unable to afford politically. He was the one to add concepts like “Shas”* to Clinton’s political vocabulary, and he was the one to explain to Obama apropos the competition for the leadership of the right wing between Netanyahu and Lieberman. His pro-Israeli bent, his understanding of the importance of the strategic alliance between the U.S. and Israel and his deep acquaintance with the Israeli arena have produced a situation where the border between the U.S. and Israel vis-à-vis the Arab countries and the Palestinians dissolved. If there’s anyone personally responsible for [the fact] that the U.S. has lost, to a great extent, its status as mediator in our region — it’s Dennis Ross.

It’s not like before Ross it wasn’t obvious that the American commitment to Israel is very strong, and that America is not a neutral mediator. The lack of neutrality on the part of America was respected by those who negotiated with us, as they realized that it is the one and the only superpower in the world capable of offering super mediation; to persuade and shift the sides from their opening positions.

It may be that had Ross been party to the Camp David talks in 1978, that summit would likely end up like the summit of Clinton, Barak and Arafat at the same place, 22 years later. From the minute the border between the American administration and us blurred — every American proposal was perceived as Israeli one, and the Americans could no longer put forward their own propositions.

The books written in recent years about the high-ranking American personalities who worked with Ross, present the political failure in a policy of an over-identification with one side that hurt, first of all, the party the American administration wished to espouse. As much as the fiasco of the talks between the Barak government, the Syrian leadership and the Palestinian one stemmed, among other things, from this mistake — so Carter’s success originated from his managing to bring about a change in positions of both sides and not being completely identified with one of them.

Clinton’s Parameters

Ross believes with all of his heart that peace in the Middle East is a national Israeli interest, just as this is an American interest. On the Israeli-Palestinian axis, his positions are identified with the bridging paper suggested by Clinton, known as “The Clinton Parameters.” On the Israeli-Syrian axis, it’s clear to him that there will be no peace without an Israeli withdrawal from Golan Heights.

In the 90s, he was positive that peace with Syria is significant and outweighs the Israeli-Palestinian process. We had quite a few discussions on that account. I tried to explain to him and to Martin Indyk, who advocated the same opinion, that one who believes in the vitality of the peace, does not join a pro-Syrian or pro-Palestinian [political] party here, and that the common framework built in Madrid with regard to all future partners to peace is the most fitting one.

Ross was opining, mistakenly, that the controversy in Israel is between those pushing for peace with the Palestinians and those pushing for peace with Syria. To his credit, it should be said that when surprised by the signing of the Oslo Agreement without the involvement of the U.S., he did not worry about the copyright, did not keep arguing over the question of which channel is better and stood up for the success of the move.

His mobilization was beyond what the sides sought. According to the story already published in the past, when Abu Ala and Uri Savir** carried out negotiations on the Interim Agreement*** and arrived at many points of consensus between them, Dennis Ross came to visit them in order to help with bridging the differences. When he showed up, the two hurried to hide their paperwork and when he asked how the negotiation was going, they returned to complaining about each other, claiming that the other fellow does not really want to advance the process. The moment he left the place, the two pulled back the documents and wrapped up the work without any American assistance.

The origins of Ross’ political involvement date back to the days of Senator George McGovern’s race to the U.S. presidency. The year was 1972, Vietnam was the most important topic on the agenda, President Nixon was hated by the soul of the liberals, and the young generation of the Democrats wholeheartedly believed that the courageous senator would rescue the U.S. from darkness.

McGovern’s defeat at the elections affected his young supporters. Ross found himself, much later, in the American administration, and most surprisingly — especially close to Secretary of State James Baker. At the hour Baker was summoned to the President Bush the father to head his White House staff, Ross quit his job as well and made a transition to the West Wing.

I remember the conversation we had in a small room at the White House in 1992, before the elections where the young Democratic candidate, Clinton, would win. Ross was almost desperate. He told me that even Baker failed to save Bush from losing his second term in office, and that the polls were creating a gloomy atmosphere in the White House corridors.

I asked him how the Republican defeat could upset him to that degree, as his liberal values were not exactly represented by the White House. His answer was political. According to him, there had been a very deep trust forged between Hafez al-Assad and Baker. Should Bush win, Baker would be back at the State Department and it would be possible to conduct a serious negotiation, and maybe even very quickly, with Assad and Rabin. On the contrary, should Bush lose, Baker would disappear from the scene, and until a renewed trust is established between Assad and the secretary of state appointed by the new government — we’d all lose precious time.

At the end of the bill, that was not the reason for blowing up the peace with Syria, but there’s no doubt that Ross’ concern was genuine.

Ross, erudite in the goings-on in the region, and one linked to them more than any other person in the administration, resigned without achieving any success in promoting them as he hoped. Those believing in peace on our side can’t help but express appreciation for his efforts, just like they can’t but criticize him for [the point] that out of his amity to us, he led to the blurring of the line that must separate the American administration and the Israeli government in the deliberations on achieving the longed-for peace.


*Translator’s note: Shas is an ultra-orthodox religious political party in Israel, the fourth largest member of the governmental coalition.

**Translator’s note: Israeli diplomat and politician who served as head of Israeli diplomacy in the critical years, 1993-1996, when he was the Chief Negotiator of the Oslo Accords.

***Translator’s note: Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or the Oslo II agreements (1995).