Biden, In the Theater of Operations
U.S. vice president Joe Biden’s visit to the country is of particular significance, given that Mexico is in the midst of armed conflict in which the U.S. government has an undeniable role.
Washington officially serves as a close ally of Calderon’s government in what is presented as a confrontation between the federal government and criminal groups, especially those dealing with drug trafficking. They control parts of the country, in economic sectors — particularly in the informal economy — and even portions of public administration at all three levels of government, given their ability to infiltrate through the purchase or extortion of officials.
But besides the official discourse of both countries, if one were to take into account public information on the performance of both in this war, they would see that things wouldn’t fall into place so simply: on one hand, the U.S. government contributes weapons, technical equipment, advice and information to the war effort by Felipe Calderon, in line with the anti-drug policy from the neighboring country. But on the other hand, it fails to take meaningful action to stop the flow of weapons from the north of the Rio Grande, destined to Mexican organized crime, in addition to being tolerant of money laundering by large financial corporations in America. In both cases, the deadly Mexican circumstance brings objective economic benefits to the superpower.
To this, one should add an obvious geopolitical benefit: the greater the instability and violence in Mexico, the bigger the margin is of American institutions to intervene in the security matters of our country. In addition, government offices in Washington have been involved in the supply of weapons to Mexican cartels, named "Operation Wide Receiver" and "Fast and Furious." There’s even been laundering of millions of dollars for them, as the neighboring country has been doing in the DEA counternarcotic office, as recently discovered.
Another unavoidable element of the Mexican context is the impending presidential election, scheduled for next July, in which will be at stake, besides the strategy against crime, the perpetuation or the change of the economic model in force thus far in the country, and imposed by Washington for decades.
The immediate background is the rude and unacceptable interference by the White House and the State Department in the 2006 Mexican presidential succession and the strengthening of Felipe Calderon even before he was declared the elected president. In addition, there’s the then Ambassador Tony Garza’s perception of “the greatest possible political position of weakness,” not only because of irregularities registered in the elections, but also for conflicts with Vicente Fox.
In that circumstance, as Garza himself wrote in a confidential cable then delivered to La Jornada by WikiLeaks, and whose content was published in this newspaper (on Feb. 21, 2011) for the PAN Michoacan, which operated on “fine line legitimacy.” There was the “anticipated” acknowledgment of crucial importance, of ex-President George W. Bush, who called to congratulate him before the announcement of the outcome of the vote. “From the embassy we immediately embark on a process of transition planning with Calderon’s team, starting with a meeting with Juan Camilo Mouriño and Josefina Vázquez Mota,” wrote the ambassador, in order to prevent “stalling issues that are in our best interest.” Far from neutrality, moreover, was the former ambassador’s report on the post-election conflict that rocked the country in the second half of this year, and that is still projecting in the current institutional reality.
In light of this precedent, it is hoped that this time the U.S. government itself will be respectful of Mexico’s internal political process and that it will refrain from any interference in the electoral arena, as Joe Biden expressed to the presidential candidates with whom he held meetings: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Enrique Peña Nieto and Josefina Vázquez Mota.
Washington officially serves as a close ally of Calderon’s government in what is presented as a confrontation between the federal government and criminal groups, especially those dealing with drug trafficking. They control parts of the country, in economic sectors — particularly in the informal economy — and even portions of public administration at all three levels of government, given their ability to infiltrate through the purchase or extortion of officials.
But besides the official discourse of both countries, if one were to take into account public information on the performance of both in this war, they would see that things wouldn’t fall into place so simply: on one hand, the U.S. government contributes weapons, technical equipment, advice and information to the war effort by Felipe Calderon, in line with the anti-drug policy from the neighboring country. But on the other hand, it fails to take meaningful action to stop the flow of weapons from the north of the Rio Grande, destined to Mexican organized crime, in addition to being tolerant of money laundering by large financial corporations in America. In both cases, the deadly Mexican circumstance brings objective economic benefits to the superpower.
To this, one should add an obvious geopolitical benefit: the greater the instability and violence in Mexico, the bigger the margin is of American institutions to intervene in the security matters of our country. In addition, government offices in Washington have been involved in the supply of weapons to Mexican cartels, named "Operation Wide Receiver" and "Fast and Furious." There’s even been laundering of millions of dollars for them, as the neighboring country has been doing in the DEA counternarcotic office, as recently discovered.
Another unavoidable element of the Mexican context is the impending presidential election, scheduled for next July, in which will be at stake, besides the strategy against crime, the perpetuation or the change of the economic model in force thus far in the country, and imposed by Washington for decades.
The immediate background is the rude and unacceptable interference by the White House and the State Department in the 2006 Mexican presidential succession and the strengthening of Felipe Calderon even before he was declared the elected president. In addition, there’s the then Ambassador Tony Garza’s perception of “the greatest possible political position of weakness,” not only because of irregularities registered in the elections, but also for conflicts with Vicente Fox.
In that circumstance, as Garza himself wrote in a confidential cable then delivered to La Jornada by WikiLeaks, and whose content was published in this newspaper (on Feb. 21, 2011) for the PAN Michoacan, which operated on “fine line legitimacy.” There was the “anticipated” acknowledgment of crucial importance, of ex-President George W. Bush, who called to congratulate him before the announcement of the outcome of the vote. “From the embassy we immediately embark on a process of transition planning with Calderon’s team, starting with a meeting with Juan Camilo Mouriño and Josefina Vázquez Mota,” wrote the ambassador, in order to prevent “stalling issues that are in our best interest.” Far from neutrality, moreover, was the former ambassador’s report on the post-election conflict that rocked the country in the second half of this year, and that is still projecting in the current institutional reality.
In light of this precedent, it is hoped that this time the U.S. government itself will be respectful of Mexico’s internal political process and that it will refrain from any interference in the electoral arena, as Joe Biden expressed to the presidential candidates with whom he held meetings: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Enrique Peña Nieto and Josefina Vázquez Mota.