The “Restart” in Relations Between Russia and the US
Published in Ria Novosti
(Russia) on 11 May 2012
by Fyodor Lukyanov (link to original)
(Russia) on 11 May 2012
by Fyodor Lukyanov (link to original)
Translated from
by Dagny Dukach.
Edited by Lydia Dallett.
Russian-American relations under Putin’s third term were off to an exciting start. The president of Russia informed his American colleague that he wouldn’t be coming to the G-8 Summit at Camp David, because he was very busy. In response, those surrounding Barack Obama have begun to question whether it is necessary that Obama attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok this fall, especially since this would also be without a doubt out of the way for the U.S. president — for the crucial phase of his election campaign is beginning.
Naturally, everyone is racking their brains, trying to understand the reason for such an unexpected decision. After all, last month both parties very delicately agreed to relocate the meeting from Chicago to avoid creating any unnecessary tensions in connection with the NATO summit.
There is a wide range of explanations for this decision. From the official, albeit unlikely version (that there was urgent work to be done in the government, but without the prime minister), to the informal version — that this was done to put the White House in its place and immediately make it clear that America is not the only fish in the sea. Regardless of what is actually the case, what is interesting here is not forms and gestures, but content.
We must begin with the fact that discussing anything concrete today is pointless. As Obama honestly admitted in a private conversation with Dmitry Medvedev in Seoul, until the elections are over, he is completely tied up with election issues. Flexibility regarding the burning issue of missile defense will be possible only after the November elections. Or to be more precise, no earlier than February or March, when the new administration will embark upon the formulation of foreign policy priorities.
Now, even mentioning the fact that Obama and Putin once discussed something exposes the president to harsh attacks from the opposing Republican Party. The same situation will arise at the G-20 summit in Mexico, where the two heads of state are still apparently planning to meet, and again to an even greater extent at the APEC conference in Vladivostok.
So, the assertion that the Russian president’s absence at Camp David would prohibit the advancement of the discussion of important issues is incorrect — it will be impossible to avoid forward movement during the next few months.
It is true that in politics, communication alone is sometimes no less important than results, especially in periods of political fervor such as now, in the midst of electoral campaigns in both countries.
But Putin clearly disagrees with the previous statement. He has been in power since the end of the 1990s, and has long outgrown the state in which politics draws its pleasure simply from international processes and appearances before TV cameras. At a certain point, Putin began to tire of this, as he is basically hard-wired to strive for fast results and concrete agreements.
It is no accident that Putin is considerably more willing to communicate with representatives of Western big business — it is clear what they need, what is needed from them, and how to deal with them.
Political conventions, which abound in the routines of diplomacy, are alien to Putin. He simply does not buy into the sincerity of the American and European leaders’ discussions of democracy and human rights, believing that they are nothing more than covers for economic and geopolitical interests. And he considers conducting sophisticated verbal arguments to be unnecessary, save for the occasional delivery of one of his trademark metaphors on the edge of correctness, which always resonate, though their abuse it not recommended.
Indeed, Putin was more than satisfied with the situation of 2008-2012, when he was the prime minister and all ceremonial and representative duties were taken on by Medvedev. He himself rarely expressed his opinions publicly; he only spoke up in those few cases when he was unhappy with something.
In all probability, once he has become president, Putin will maintain this tandem position, leaving the prime minister with an expanded amount of international activity. The constitution allows for this to happen, as it mentions the role of the head of the government in foreign policy, but leaves everything else to be arranged by agreements.
Moreover, Medvedev is no ordinary prime minister. He just completed his presidential duties and is also the closest confidant of the current president. Therefore, whatever is discussed with Medvedev will be transmitted, in the most direct manner, to Putin.
The president himself will attend the most important events. For example, events at which the absence of the top leader could be interpreted as a clear sign of disrespect (for example, in Asia — it is no accident that Putin is actively preparing to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit), or events at which something might actually be resolved.
How effective this model of Russian foreign policy will be, both in general and in relations with the U.S. in particular, is an open question. It could expand our toolkit, if it succeeds in providing the prime minister with political clout comparable to that of the president. This would be something similar to the Chinese situation, where a visit from prime minister Wen Jiabao attracts no less attention than the arrival of Chairman Hu Jintao.
So as prime minister, Medvedev needs to obtain a level of clout analogous to that which his predecessor had when he held the same position. Then, no one will assume that the absence of Putin at some international event is a political démarche, and people will not react with as much shock as they do now.
Fyodor Lukyanov is the head editor of the journal, “Russia in Global Politics.” The opinion of the author does not necessarily represent the position of the editors.
Naturally, everyone is racking their brains, trying to understand the reason for such an unexpected decision. After all, last month both parties very delicately agreed to relocate the meeting from Chicago to avoid creating any unnecessary tensions in connection with the NATO summit.
There is a wide range of explanations for this decision. From the official, albeit unlikely version (that there was urgent work to be done in the government, but without the prime minister), to the informal version — that this was done to put the White House in its place and immediately make it clear that America is not the only fish in the sea. Regardless of what is actually the case, what is interesting here is not forms and gestures, but content.
We must begin with the fact that discussing anything concrete today is pointless. As Obama honestly admitted in a private conversation with Dmitry Medvedev in Seoul, until the elections are over, he is completely tied up with election issues. Flexibility regarding the burning issue of missile defense will be possible only after the November elections. Or to be more precise, no earlier than February or March, when the new administration will embark upon the formulation of foreign policy priorities.
Now, even mentioning the fact that Obama and Putin once discussed something exposes the president to harsh attacks from the opposing Republican Party. The same situation will arise at the G-20 summit in Mexico, where the two heads of state are still apparently planning to meet, and again to an even greater extent at the APEC conference in Vladivostok.
So, the assertion that the Russian president’s absence at Camp David would prohibit the advancement of the discussion of important issues is incorrect — it will be impossible to avoid forward movement during the next few months.
It is true that in politics, communication alone is sometimes no less important than results, especially in periods of political fervor such as now, in the midst of electoral campaigns in both countries.
But Putin clearly disagrees with the previous statement. He has been in power since the end of the 1990s, and has long outgrown the state in which politics draws its pleasure simply from international processes and appearances before TV cameras. At a certain point, Putin began to tire of this, as he is basically hard-wired to strive for fast results and concrete agreements.
It is no accident that Putin is considerably more willing to communicate with representatives of Western big business — it is clear what they need, what is needed from them, and how to deal with them.
Political conventions, which abound in the routines of diplomacy, are alien to Putin. He simply does not buy into the sincerity of the American and European leaders’ discussions of democracy and human rights, believing that they are nothing more than covers for economic and geopolitical interests. And he considers conducting sophisticated verbal arguments to be unnecessary, save for the occasional delivery of one of his trademark metaphors on the edge of correctness, which always resonate, though their abuse it not recommended.
Indeed, Putin was more than satisfied with the situation of 2008-2012, when he was the prime minister and all ceremonial and representative duties were taken on by Medvedev. He himself rarely expressed his opinions publicly; he only spoke up in those few cases when he was unhappy with something.
In all probability, once he has become president, Putin will maintain this tandem position, leaving the prime minister with an expanded amount of international activity. The constitution allows for this to happen, as it mentions the role of the head of the government in foreign policy, but leaves everything else to be arranged by agreements.
Moreover, Medvedev is no ordinary prime minister. He just completed his presidential duties and is also the closest confidant of the current president. Therefore, whatever is discussed with Medvedev will be transmitted, in the most direct manner, to Putin.
The president himself will attend the most important events. For example, events at which the absence of the top leader could be interpreted as a clear sign of disrespect (for example, in Asia — it is no accident that Putin is actively preparing to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit), or events at which something might actually be resolved.
How effective this model of Russian foreign policy will be, both in general and in relations with the U.S. in particular, is an open question. It could expand our toolkit, if it succeeds in providing the prime minister with political clout comparable to that of the president. This would be something similar to the Chinese situation, where a visit from prime minister Wen Jiabao attracts no less attention than the arrival of Chairman Hu Jintao.
So as prime minister, Medvedev needs to obtain a level of clout analogous to that which his predecessor had when he held the same position. Then, no one will assume that the absence of Putin at some international event is a political démarche, and people will not react with as much shock as they do now.
Fyodor Lukyanov is the head editor of the journal, “Russia in Global Politics.” The opinion of the author does not necessarily represent the position of the editors.