Edited by Katie Marinello
What Will the President Do?
Mexico’s problems are constantly monitored by U.S. national security study centers. Our country only concerns them when it comes to their own interests and potential threats to them. What worries them the most is currently the explosive crime rate, of which drug trafficking plays a significant part.
One long year ago in July 2011, one of its highest military study centers produced a high-quality report. There is nothing new to uncover. What is noteworthy, however, is its attachment to the realities, relevance, conclusions and, above all, the fact that it exists when many of our own numerous study centers have hardly touched the topic.
These types of reports regarding the alternatives that the next Mexican government will have are devised by civil and military experts with a vision of that nature and are intended for the Pentagon, the State Department and even the White House. The Centre for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, the main military academic organization in the U.S, is one of the highest institutions that this university hosts. Others would be the U.S. War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. They are truly the best and brightest of these armed forces as a whole.
In a nutshell, the report discusses President Calderón’s decision to place the armed forces at the front line of the fight against criminal organizations with the full collaboration of the United States. They assure that it is the best time in decades for the once unrealistic collaboration between armies. This begs the question: Will the same level of collaboration continue with the next government? The answer depends on one of the most critical strategic decisions that the new president will adopt when he takes charge.
From the United States’ perspective, political continuity in Mexico so that the continuity of the collaboration is maintained is preferable. They honestly recognize that U.S. politics have not been indispensable in successfully confronting international crime. They warn that the United States has less and less opportunities to create the conditions that induce the strategic decisions of Mexico that suit them best.
The carried report condenses four possible decisions to be made by the new president.
1. Maintaining the present focus of the Calderón administration.
2. Entrusting crime confrontation to the institutional forces of security and justice, although the report warns that the strengthening process could take up to four years.
3. Adopting an alternative aimed at reducing a culture of disregard for and immunity to the law through social transformation.
4. Adjusting or negotiating a relationship with criminal organizations.
Whoever is declared president-elect of the next Mexican government will have to outline in practical terms how they will tackle crime. During the campaign, the four candidates fumbled around the subject; however, the chosen strategy will inevitably fall into the category of the described options.
The report states forcefully that, from the U.S.’ point of view, continuing and improving the collaboration established during the Calderón administration (options 1 and 2) will be the most desirable route. Option 3 would mean that Mexico must do its part to integrate the social effort by reinforcing a culture in favor of the rule of law.
If the government chooses the fourth option, the center says while baring its teeth that, “the U.S. will be forced to consider restricting any form or function of cooperation including information and intelligence.”* They regret to point out that this decision would nullify the increased collaboration of many years.
The analysts conclude that the improvement in the defense forces in both countries in recent years has been an indicator of the commitments that both nations have made to combat crime. They think that those who oppose this collaboration strategy in Mexico do not help their country to resolve the problem – although in many aspects, this criticism may be correct. Reaching an American strategy that demonstrates real support for Mexico is also difficult due to the need to reach a consensus between the internal stakeholders that do not believe that Mexico’s challenges affect the United States. Thus, they state that the plurality of opinions in both nations results in the weakening of the efforts to reach an effective support.
In July 2011, the researchers concluded by assuring the United States that it still has the chance to influence the conditions in which Mexico will make its next strategic decision, and that the time has arrived to show that the United States’ promises in this fight match the interests of the Mexicans.
The state department’s second in command, Bill Burns, visited our country at the end of July and was interviewed by high authorities. He used the same arguments in his public comments. Our government stayed silent. Without revealing any deep secrets in his speech or in the report, it is useful to observe in which level and from which perspective we are being carefully watched. And what about our strategies? U.S. study centers carry out studies on national security in which the constant factor is the situation of Mexico, due to the possible threats that this poses for their nation.
*The following quote, while translated correctly, could not be verified in English.
One long year ago in July 2011, one of its highest military study centers produced a high-quality report. There is nothing new to uncover. What is noteworthy, however, is its attachment to the realities, relevance, conclusions and, above all, the fact that it exists when many of our own numerous study centers have hardly touched the topic.
These types of reports regarding the alternatives that the next Mexican government will have are devised by civil and military experts with a vision of that nature and are intended for the Pentagon, the State Department and even the White House. The Centre for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, the main military academic organization in the U.S, is one of the highest institutions that this university hosts. Others would be the U.S. War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. They are truly the best and brightest of these armed forces as a whole.
In a nutshell, the report discusses President Calderón’s decision to place the armed forces at the front line of the fight against criminal organizations with the full collaboration of the United States. They assure that it is the best time in decades for the once unrealistic collaboration between armies. This begs the question: Will the same level of collaboration continue with the next government? The answer depends on one of the most critical strategic decisions that the new president will adopt when he takes charge.
From the United States’ perspective, political continuity in Mexico so that the continuity of the collaboration is maintained is preferable. They honestly recognize that U.S. politics have not been indispensable in successfully confronting international crime. They warn that the United States has less and less opportunities to create the conditions that induce the strategic decisions of Mexico that suit them best.
The carried report condenses four possible decisions to be made by the new president.
1. Maintaining the present focus of the Calderón administration.
2. Entrusting crime confrontation to the institutional forces of security and justice, although the report warns that the strengthening process could take up to four years.
3. Adopting an alternative aimed at reducing a culture of disregard for and immunity to the law through social transformation.
4. Adjusting or negotiating a relationship with criminal organizations.
Whoever is declared president-elect of the next Mexican government will have to outline in practical terms how they will tackle crime. During the campaign, the four candidates fumbled around the subject; however, the chosen strategy will inevitably fall into the category of the described options.
The report states forcefully that, from the U.S.’ point of view, continuing and improving the collaboration established during the Calderón administration (options 1 and 2) will be the most desirable route. Option 3 would mean that Mexico must do its part to integrate the social effort by reinforcing a culture in favor of the rule of law.
If the government chooses the fourth option, the center says while baring its teeth that, “the U.S. will be forced to consider restricting any form or function of cooperation including information and intelligence.”* They regret to point out that this decision would nullify the increased collaboration of many years.
The analysts conclude that the improvement in the defense forces in both countries in recent years has been an indicator of the commitments that both nations have made to combat crime. They think that those who oppose this collaboration strategy in Mexico do not help their country to resolve the problem – although in many aspects, this criticism may be correct. Reaching an American strategy that demonstrates real support for Mexico is also difficult due to the need to reach a consensus between the internal stakeholders that do not believe that Mexico’s challenges affect the United States. Thus, they state that the plurality of opinions in both nations results in the weakening of the efforts to reach an effective support.
In July 2011, the researchers concluded by assuring the United States that it still has the chance to influence the conditions in which Mexico will make its next strategic decision, and that the time has arrived to show that the United States’ promises in this fight match the interests of the Mexicans.
The state department’s second in command, Bill Burns, visited our country at the end of July and was interviewed by high authorities. He used the same arguments in his public comments. Our government stayed silent. Without revealing any deep secrets in his speech or in the report, it is useful to observe in which level and from which perspective we are being carefully watched. And what about our strategies? U.S. study centers carry out studies on national security in which the constant factor is the situation of Mexico, due to the possible threats that this poses for their nation.
*The following quote, while translated correctly, could not be verified in English.
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