Is There a Change in US Policy on Islamic State?

Based on some media leaks as well as more straightforward statements, it looks as though the White House is announcing a change in the U.S. government's approach to dealing with the Islamic State. They are adapting their stance to the needs of allies in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey, toward an attempt at eliminating the head of the regime in Damascus, as part of efforts made to eliminate the Islamic State group. It's hard to believe that will achieve anything, or that the ripple effects might not cancel out such achievements.

President Barack Obama’s statement regarding the launch of a military operation targeting the Islamic State group may have brought a degree of surprise, or rather outrage, in U.S. media and politics. He remarked one day that he had no long term plan to face this organization even though years had passed since the Syrian crisis broke out, and long weeks had passed since the Islamic State group had taken over Mosul and vast areas of Iraq. The media machine supporting the White House rushed to confirm that the president was only talking about the specific details of the plan and not the basic idea; there are a few plans being studied and evaluated, and he spoke to a public that prefers frankness from their president rather than empty promises.

As a matter of fact, within a few days, the president himself changed the tone to one that was more determined and firm. The U.S. military went to work executing a plan that seemed to come out of nowhere, as if it had been deliberate all along. But even with the firm tone the president took, there was still some uncertainty. He indicated that the plan was to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State group and clarified that the battle would be long. So the first thing was not to destroy the organization, and there may not be immediate results.

More troubling talk about cuts and fatigue signified the failures which unrolled in the following weeks. More questions came with no good answers: Is the goal to expel the Islamic State group from Iraq, or to pursue and destroy them in Syria? For the scarcity of air strikes wouldn't give the group the impression that they'll face a judicial power capable of destroying them. And what of the proposal to target jihadi groups opposed to the Islamic State group? Jabhat al-Nusra not only has a relationship with al-Qaida, though their anti-Americanism has calmed down, but they are also affiliated with other local groups. And what of the Khorosan group that has been described in statements as more dangerous than the Islamic State group and al-Qaida, and which none of the jihadis seem to know anything about? Can the American government really not see that their strikes against local groups will stimulate the regime, and that the so-called "moderate" groups, by going along with the U.S., will lose all credibility and be transformed from revolutionaries to customers?

To answer the last question, however strange, the American government was really oblivious to what is so self-evident. Neither President Obama, nor any of his senior advisers experienced with Syria and related topics, put in the required effort to measure the consequences. What follows, then, is a hasty evaluation after weeks of damage, leading to a review, then retraction, then revealing the intention to make corrections.

The position announced today aligns the targeting of the Islamic State group with capping and undermining the ruling party in Damascus, so as to satisfy the allies. But what satisfies the allies is rejected by the enemies. That's not to say that Russia is ready to bless this approach, or that Obama is ready to spar with Moscow. The president faces two opposing forces in Washington to his new war in the Middle East. The first comes from his own political base, the doves of the progressive left. They understand that, regardless of the Islamic State group's advances, it is better not to get involved in a new military venture and warn of mission creep. Rather, they see that all alternatives presented by the president in the past few weeks have tended to push further toward increasing numbers and gear in the battle.

As for the second opposing force, they are Obama's political enemies, the conservative hawks of the right. Though their interventionism had become unpopular with the public discontent with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they see their opposition to a quick withdrawal from Iraq as warranted. They say they don't want to make the same mistake in Afghanistan and want to reschedule the withdrawal based on what the situation on the ground requires. They say that Iraq and Syria demand real intervention, not merely strikes from a distance, no matter how much it hurts. This group does not currently enjoy wide support among U.S. citizens, but it relies on the growing distaste in American society for the Islamic State group and anything related to it. This aversion forced the president to do something after American journalists had been slaughtered, and to consider the need to send soldiers to fight a real battle.

Without a doubt, the battle has forced its way in. For, despite the fact that the president drew red lines which couldn't be crossed regarding the deployment of troops, the demands of the field require support from a small land force going along with it, and consequently, experts and trainers in expandable missions.

Today Obama announced his decision to move a step in the direction of the Islamic State group, as he had previously announced his determination to continue the peaceful settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians. His irresolute steps in these issues are doomed by voter and ally considerations. Even though he is in his last two years of his second and final term and is not susceptible to electoral threat, he wants a reputation of credibility, so that he is able to do anything after he finishes his role as president. So it's in his interest to resolve this issue. But his fluctuating behavior here, and his record on similar issues — he faces pressure on more than one front — does not bode well for the stability of his vision and decisiveness. Realizing this is necessary for both the ally and the enemy alike.