Iran and War: The Thin Red Line

Published in El Universal
(Mexico) on 25 March 2012
by Mauricio Meschoulam (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Bianca Fierro. Edited by .

Edited by Casey J. Skeens

The thin red line is one that has unforeseeable conditions occur when it is crossed. It marks the point at which the detonation of a war could be inevitable. The problem is to define it, to delimit it. The problem is the responsibility of those who establish it, since one cannot look back if someone crosses it. The problem is sending messages and not having the awaited response, the potential conflict and its consequences get out of hand. The problem is that the actors involved understand it in a distinct manner.

The United States needs to avoid war. Without doubt, its interests are stability, control and the prediction of behavior in the strategic region. But apart from this, Washington is operating with the most elevated debt in all of its history and with a phenomenal fiscal deficit that not only does not help to resolve the problem, but also increases it daily. That is why the White House is looking in these moments for how to decrease its spending and its military bases, including embassies like that in Iraq. At the same time, at the root of the confrontation with Tehran, fuel prices are escalating without remedy, generating problems for the world's economies already in a recession. If this were not enough, the United States knows that Russia completely opposes the Pentagon introducing itself into the Kremlin’s geopolitical strategic zone. Also, it seems that, in principle, it is not in the interests of Washington to dissatisfy Moscow at the moment with respect to this particular subject.

So, Obama then decides to draw his red line with total clarity, and this way communicates it, of course, precisely via Russia: The United States will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Period. However, and this is the key, having a nuclear capability does not necessarily implicate crossing the red line. Having the potential to elaborate a bomb as long as there is no assembly is something that Washington is willing to allow. But not Israel.

For Israel, the interests have nothing to do with the world economy, the supply or price of fuel, the deficit or American debt, but what it perceives as the most serious threat to its national security since 1948. In this sense, Israel has established something that seems to be a much thinner red line than the one drawn by Obama: In Tel Aviv’s vision, Iran cannot be able to have the capacity or potential to assemble a bomb, even if it does not assemble it. Furthermore, Ehud Barak has signaled a more delicate point: Iran is working to become immune from any attack on its nuclear installations, constructing sophisticated subterranean complexes that are deeper each time. The moment that Israel perceives that Iran is going beyond the immunity barrier, they are likely to detonate the attack, regardless of how advanced the nuclear program is. We are talking about months.

In every scenario, Israel would be capable of exerting limited damage after many complications — not eliminating — the Iranian atomic project, but this will not prevent attack. It is thought that Tehran’s response will be fierce, even though Israel is proving to have enormously developed its defensive powers in the face of the missiles that could be thrown at them. The conflict can be easily regionalized, involving actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon. The monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula are also interested in stopping Iran’s nuclearization, but it is difficult for them to collaborate in a war in which Israel was involved.

The question is that the subject gets complicated with regard to the United States, since the war games (recently documented by the New York Times) demonstrate that Washington would have to become entangled in the confrontation, even if it does not wish to do so.

This is one of those instances in which nobody wants a war, but everyone finds themselves moving along that direction in each day that passes. If it is true that the actors wish to explore last possibilities to minimize the risks of a conflict, they must exercise the utmost restraint in terms of the emitted rhetoric and, in exchange, send the necessary messages with total clarity. They must find a point in which Iran can feel that it has been able to deter or contain the West and feel victorious in the meantime, but at the same time not only the United States, but also Israel can co-exist with the result. Can they achieve this?


La delgada línea roja es esa que cuando se cruza se producen condiciones imprevisibles. Es la que marca el punto ante el cual la detonación de una guerra pudiera ser ya inevitable. El problema es definirla, delimitarla. El problema es la responsabilidad que llevan quienes la establecen, porque si alguien la atraviesa ya no se puede mirar atrás. El problema es enviar los mensajes y que no tengan la recepción esperada, y que el potencial conflict y sus consecuencias, se salgan de las manos. El problema es que los actores involucrados la entienden de manera distinta.

EU necesita evitar la guerra. Sus intereses son sin duda la estabilidad, el control y la predicción del comportamiento de una región estratégica. Pero al margen de ello, Washington está operando con la deuda más elevada de toda su historia y con un fenomenal déficit fiscal que no solo no le ayuda a resolverla, sino que la incrementa a diario. Por eso, la Casa Blanca en estos momentos busca como recortar sus gastos, sus bases militares, incluso embajadas como la de Irak. Al mismo tiempo, a raíz de una confrontación con Teherán, los precios del petróleo escalaran sin remedio generando problemas para las economías del planeta en un entorno ya recesivo. Por si fuera poco, EU sabe que Rusia se opone rotundamente a que el pentágono se introduzca en una zona considerada geopolíticamente estratégica para el Kremlin y, en principio según parece, no está en el interés de Washington inconformar a Moscú en estos momentos al respecto de este tema particular.

Entonces, Obama decide dibujar su línea roja con toda claridad, y así comunicarlo, por cierto a través precisamente de Rusia: EU no permitirá que Irán posea un arma nuclear. Punto, Sin embargo, y aquí está la clave, tener capacidad nuclear no implica necesariamente cruzar la raya. Contar con el potencial para elaborar la bomba siempre y cuando no se ensamble, es algo que Washington si está dispuesto a permitir. Pero Israel no.

Para Israel los intereses no tienen nada que ver con la economía mundial, con el abasto o precio del petróleo, ni con el déficit o deuda estadounidenses, sino con lo que como la amenaza más seria a sus seguridad nacional desde 1948. En ese sentido, Israel ha establecido algo que parece ser una línea roja mucho más delgada que la dibujada por Obama: Irán no puede llegar, en la vision de Tel Aviv, a tener capacidad o potencial de armar una bomba, auque no la arme. Es más, Ehud Barak ha señalado un punto más delicado: Irán está trabajando para volverse immune ante cualquier ataque a sus instalaciones nucleares construyendo sofisticados complejos subterráneos cada vez más profundos. En el momento en que Israel perciba que Irán está rebasando la barrera de inmunidad, es probable que el ataque se detone, independientemente del grado de avance del programa nuclear. Estamos hablando de meses.

En todos los scenarios, Israel sería capaz, y tras muchas complicaciones, de ejercer un daño limitado-no eliminar-al proyecto atomic iraní, pero ello no le impedirá atacar. Se piensa que la respuesta de Teherán sera feroz, auque Israel está demostrando haber desarrollado enormemente su poder defensive ante los misiles que puedan lanzarle. El conflict se puede regionalizar con facilidad involucrando a actors como Hezbollah en el Líbano. Las monarquías de la peninsula arábiga están también interesadas en detener la nuclearización de Irán, pero es difícil que colaboren en una guerra en la que Israel estuviese involucrado.

La cuestión es que en cuanto a Estados Unidos, el tema se complica puesto que los juegos de guerra (recientemente documentados por el NYT) muestran que Washington se tendría que enredar en la confrontación, aún no deseándolo.

Este es uno de esos casos en los que nadie parece querer la guerra, pero en los que cada día que pasa todos se encuentran más encaminados en esa dirección. Si de verdad los actors desearan explorer las últimas posibilidades para minimizar los riesgos de un conflict, se debe ejercer la mayor de las prudencias en cuanto a la retórica emitida, y en cambio, enviar con toda claridad los mensajes necesarios, encontrando un punto en el que Irán pueda sentir que ha conseguido disuadir o contener a Occidente y por tanto se siente victorioso, pero que al mismo tiempo, no sólo EU sino también Israel puedan coexistir con el resultado. ¿Podrán conseguirlo?
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