Iran Stands Its Ground: US and Israel Have Miscalculated

Published in Wen Wei Po
(Hong Kong) on 24 March 2026
by Fan Hongda (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew McKay. Edited by Laurence Bouvard.
The conflict in the Middle East has now entered its fourth week since the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran on Feb. 28. In addition to Iran sustaining heavy blows, Israel has suffered damage, its cities including Tel Aviv, Haifa, and even the “nuclear city” of Dimona coming under Iranian missile attack; Iran has additionally struck U.S. military bases in the Middle East. Of particular concern are the repeated attacks from both sides on civilian and energy infrastructure, not just each other’s, but also those of third-party countries. So far, there are no signs of any deescalation in the conflict.

So far, it is clear that President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have not achieved their initial war objectives. Chronologically speaking, after the U.S. and Israel initiated hostilities, Washington believed it could compel Iran to surrender within 48 hours. Having failed to do so, American leadership subsequently said it needed four days, four weeks, or four to six weeks of combat. In mid-March, the U.S. secretary of defense was even stating that the war had only just begun.

The U.S. and Israel Have Underestimated Iran’s Capacity to Resist

In terms of operational objectives, the U.S. and Israel stated on the very first day of the conflict that they intended to completely overthrow the current Iranian regime, believing that their outside military strikes would be matched by an imagined popular uprising of the Iranian people. After initial setbacks, Trump went on to say that Iran’s new leaders would need to gain his approval and that Iran needed to surrender unconditionally. Evidently, the U.S. and Israel underestimated Iran’s capacity for resistance and retaliation while overestimating the Iranian people’s determination to resist their leaders.

There are indeed many within Iran who are dissatisfied with the leadership. However, as one high-ranking official after another has resolutely remained in post or stepped into a leadership position — even at the risk of death — to fight back against the American and Israeli military strikes, many Iranians have, for now at least, changed their attitudes about their leaders. For a growing number of Iranians, defending their homeland has increasingly become the more pressing imperative.

For many years, Iran has pursued a “resistance economy” strategy centered on “import substitution,” which has allowed Iranians’ lives to remain broadly stable to this day. At the same time, it has long been committed to developing missiles and drones, giving it considerable external strike capabilities, including the ability to shoot down a U.S. Air Force F-35 stealth fighter. On the night of March 21, Iranian missiles directly struck Dimona, Israel’s nuclear hub, and Arad, where nuclear scientists and personnel reside, further demonstrating Iran’s capacity to carry out such strikes.

Additionally, the U.S. and Israel are fixated on “decapitation strikes” against senior enemy officials, believing that killing a group of high-ranking leaders will immediately plunge Iran into political chaos — a perception that is just as absurd as believing the Iranian people would cooperate with U.S.-Israeli military strikes against their own country. Iranian authorities made contingency plans to replace senior officials long before the outbreak of war; even in the event of an emergency involving the supreme leader, leadership could still transition in an orderly manner. Clearly, the U.S. and Israel have underestimated the robustness of Iran’s political system.

And now, the war has reached a stalemate. The U.S. is casting around for a suitable opportunity to declare victory and withdraw from the conflict; Iran is showcasing greater resistance capacity and strike capabilities to strengthen its bargaining position with the U.S.; and Israel continues to seek the overthrow of the current Iranian regime. Despite their coordinated military strikes against Iran, the divergent attitudes between the U.S. and Israel toward Iran remain evident.

Iran Is Not in a Position To Prolong the War

As the world’s premier superpower, the U.S. does not view its relationship with Iran as “life or death” as Israel does. Meanwhile, Iran is doing its utmost to secure an immediate halt to American and Israeli military operations, along with long-term security guarantees from the U.S. and the lifting of the sanctions that have been in place for many years. Of course, whether the U.S. will meet these demands depends on Iran’s own performance on the battlefield.

Objectively speaking, Iran is facing trouble both domestically and internationally. Should the war drag on, the Arab states already targeted by Iranian attacks, while displeased with the U.S. and Israel’s role in starting the war, will almost certainly resent Iran and may even directly intervene against it. In addition, countries suffering from disruptions to their oil supplies and soaring prices will likely take an increasingly negative stand against Iran.

There is certainly a lack of public appetite within Iran for an extended war. As the domestic unrest that erupted in Iran late last year demonstrated, something that the Iranian government reported as having led to over 3,000 deaths, Iran’s internal security challenges are no less serious than the threats posed by the U.S. and Israel. If Iran were to actively prolong the war while not at a disadvantage on the battlefield, domestic perceptions of the conflict would almost certainly shift, and a protracted war would further strain the local economy, heightening discontent toward the Iranian leadership.

More than causing increasing harm to the parties directly involved, the spreading war is having a catastrophic effect on the Gulf states and the global economy. There is a widespread call – and expectation – within the international community to bring the war to an end as soon as possible,, and anti-war sentiment is on the rise in both the U.S. and Israel. If Trump continues to be strung along by Netanyahu’s war machine against Iran in his futile attempt to bring about regime change there, a serious escalation of hostilities against Iran will be all but inevitable. The ultimate factor in deciding the course of this conflict will be whether Trump can rein in Netanyahu’s unrealistic ambitions against Iran.

The author is director of the China-Middle East Center at Shaoxing University, China.


伊朗硬剛不屈 美以打錯算盤

2026-03-24 04:35:28

范鴻達 紹興大學中國—中東中心主任

2月28日,美國、以色列對伊朗發動戰爭以來,中東戰火已經進入第四周。除了伊朗遭遇嚴重打擊,以色列同樣受到破壞,包括特拉維夫、海法,甚至「核城」迪莫納等地,都受到伊朗導彈襲擊。此外,伊朗還攻擊了美國在中東的軍事基地。特別值得關注的是,交戰雙方亦頻頻襲擊對方及第三方的民用及能源設施。迄今中東戰火仍沒有呈現出降溫之勢。

時至今日,美國總統特朗普和以色列總理內塔尼亞胡顯然還沒有達到自己的初始作戰目標。從時間角度來看,美以開啟戰火後,美國曾認為在48小時內就可以迫使伊朗屈服投降。在不達目標後,美國領導者又提及需要作戰四天、四周、四至六周等,美國國防部長甚至在三月中旬表示戰爭才剛開始。

美以低估伊朗抵抗能力

從作戰目標來看,美以在開戰首日直言要徹底推翻伊朗現政權,認為外有美以的軍事打擊,內有想像中的伊朗人民揭竿而起。遭遇初期目標挫折後,特朗普又說伊朗新領導人需要獲得自己的認可、伊朗要全面投降。顯而易見,美以低估了伊朗的抵抗和反擊能力,並且高估了伊朗國內反抗領導層的決心。

伊朗內部的確存在大量對領導層不滿意的人,但是當伊朗一個又一個高級官員不懼死亡,毅然決然堅守或走上領導崗位誓死還擊美以的軍事打擊,不少伊朗人至少暫時改變了對領導層的態度。保家衛國已經成為愈來愈多伊朗人更為迫切的追求。

多年來伊朗一直執行以「進口替代」為核心的「抵抗經濟」戰略,這使伊朗人的生活迄今仍然保持基本正常。與此同時,伊朗長期堅持發展導彈和無人機,具備相當強的對外打擊能力,甚至擊中了一架美軍F-35型隱形戰鬥機。3月21日晚間,伊朗導彈直接命中以色列核力量集中之城迪莫納,以及核科學家及工作者的生活之地阿拉德,進一步顯示了伊朗的打擊能力。

除此之外,美以太沉迷於對敵方高級官員的「斬首行動」,認為把一群高級領導人殺死後,伊朗政局就立即陷入混亂。這樣的認知,與相信伊朗人民會配合美以軍事打擊自己國家一樣荒唐。早在開戰之前,伊朗官方就已經作了一系列高級官員替補安排,即使是最高領袖出現突發狀況,伊朗領導層也可有序接班。美以顯然低估了伊朗政治體系的韌性。

目前戰爭已經陷入僵持,美國正在努力尋找合適機會宣布勝利並退出戰爭;伊朗正在展示更大抵抗和打擊能力,以爭取與美國討價還價;以色列仍然在謀求推翻伊朗現政權。儘管是協同對伊朗發起軍事打擊,但是美以對伊朗的態度分歧,還是顯而易見的。

伊朗欠條件拖長戰爭

作為世界頭號強國,美國並不像以色列那樣,認為自己與伊朗是「你死我活」的關係,而伊朗也在極力爭取美以馬上停止軍事行動,並獲得美國長期的安全承諾,取消對伊朗實施多年的制裁。當然,這些訴求的取得,有賴於伊朗自身在戰場上的表現。

客觀而言,伊朗正在面臨國內外困難,戰爭一旦延長開來,已經遭受伊朗攻擊的一眾阿拉伯國家,儘管不滿意美以發動戰爭,但肯定會對伊朗產生怨恨,不排除會直接下場對抗伊朗。另外,深受石油供給和價格猛漲之苦的國家,對伊朗的態度也會越來越負面。

可以肯定的是,伊朗內部也缺乏支持國家長期作戰的民意。就如同去年底爆發且造成伊朗政府宣布有3,000多人死亡的國內動盪所顯示的那樣,伊朗的內部安全挑戰並不亞於美以威脅。如果伊朗在戰場上不處下風之時仍主動延長戰爭,基本可以斷定,伊朗內部對戰爭的認知會發生變化,而且長期作戰必然會為當地經濟帶來進一步壓力,這些都會提升伊朗內部對伊朗領導層的抱怨。

戰爭的蔓延不僅對交戰各方的傷害愈來愈嚴重,而且對中東海灣國家和世界經濟帶來災難性影響。盡快停止戰爭已經成為國際社會的普遍呼籲和期盼,不管是美國還是以色列,其內部的反戰之聲也日益強烈。如果特朗普繼續被內塔尼亞胡綁架在打擊伊朗的戰車上,妄圖實現推翻伊朗之目標,那麼對伊朗戰事的嚴重升級必不可免。特朗普能否制約內塔尼亞胡對伊朗戰爭不切實際的目標追求,將成為影響這場戰爭走勢的最終決定因素。
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