Iran Stands Its Ground: US and Israel Have Miscalculated
So far, it is clear that President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have not achieved their initial war objectives. Chronologically speaking, after the U.S. and Israel initiated hostilities, Washington believed it could compel Iran to surrender within 48 hours. Having failed to do so, American leadership subsequently said it needed four days, four weeks, or four to six weeks of combat. In mid-March, the U.S. secretary of defense was even stating that the war had only just begun.
The U.S. and Israel Have Underestimated Iran’s Capacity to Resist
In terms of operational objectives, the U.S. and Israel stated on the very first day of the conflict that they intended to completely overthrow the current Iranian regime, believing that their outside military strikes would be matched by an imagined popular uprising of the Iranian people. After initial setbacks, Trump went on to say that Iran’s new leaders would need to gain his approval and that Iran needed to surrender unconditionally. Evidently, the U.S. and Israel underestimated Iran’s capacity for resistance and retaliation while overestimating the Iranian people’s determination to resist their leaders.
There are indeed many within Iran who are dissatisfied with the leadership. However, as one high-ranking official after another has resolutely remained in post or stepped into a leadership position — even at the risk of death — to fight back against the American and Israeli military strikes, many Iranians have, for now at least, changed their attitudes about their leaders. For a growing number of Iranians, defending their homeland has increasingly become the more pressing imperative.
For many years, Iran has pursued a “resistance economy” strategy centered on “import substitution,” which has allowed Iranians’ lives to remain broadly stable to this day. At the same time, it has long been committed to developing missiles and drones, giving it considerable external strike capabilities, including the ability to shoot down a U.S. Air Force F-35 stealth fighter. On the night of March 21, Iranian missiles directly struck Dimona, Israel’s nuclear hub, and Arad, where nuclear scientists and personnel reside, further demonstrating Iran’s capacity to carry out such strikes.
Additionally, the U.S. and Israel are fixated on “decapitation strikes” against senior enemy officials, believing that killing a group of high-ranking leaders will immediately plunge Iran into political chaos — a perception that is just as absurd as believing the Iranian people would cooperate with U.S.-Israeli military strikes against their own country. Iranian authorities made contingency plans to replace senior officials long before the outbreak of war; even in the event of an emergency involving the supreme leader, leadership could still transition in an orderly manner. Clearly, the U.S. and Israel have underestimated the robustness of Iran’s political system.
And now, the war has reached a stalemate. The U.S. is casting around for a suitable opportunity to declare victory and withdraw from the conflict; Iran is showcasing greater resistance capacity and strike capabilities to strengthen its bargaining position with the U.S.; and Israel continues to seek the overthrow of the current Iranian regime. Despite their coordinated military strikes against Iran, the divergent attitudes between the U.S. and Israel toward Iran remain evident.
Iran Is Not in a Position To Prolong the War
As the world’s premier superpower, the U.S. does not view its relationship with Iran as “life or death” as Israel does. Meanwhile, Iran is doing its utmost to secure an immediate halt to American and Israeli military operations, along with long-term security guarantees from the U.S. and the lifting of the sanctions that have been in place for many years. Of course, whether the U.S. will meet these demands depends on Iran’s own performance on the battlefield.
Objectively speaking, Iran is facing trouble both domestically and internationally. Should the war drag on, the Arab states already targeted by Iranian attacks, while displeased with the U.S. and Israel’s role in starting the war, will almost certainly resent Iran and may even directly intervene against it. In addition, countries suffering from disruptions to their oil supplies and soaring prices will likely take an increasingly negative stand against Iran.
There is certainly a lack of public appetite within Iran for an extended war. As the domestic unrest that erupted in Iran late last year demonstrated, something that the Iranian government reported as having led to over 3,000 deaths, Iran’s internal security challenges are no less serious than the threats posed by the U.S. and Israel. If Iran were to actively prolong the war while not at a disadvantage on the battlefield, domestic perceptions of the conflict would almost certainly shift, and a protracted war would further strain the local economy, heightening discontent toward the Iranian leadership.
More than causing increasing harm to the parties directly involved, the spreading war is having a catastrophic effect on the Gulf states and the global economy. There is a widespread call – and expectation – within the international community to bring the war to an end as soon as possible,, and anti-war sentiment is on the rise in both the U.S. and Israel. If Trump continues to be strung along by Netanyahu’s war machine against Iran in his futile attempt to bring about regime change there, a serious escalation of hostilities against Iran will be all but inevitable. The ultimate factor in deciding the course of this conflict will be whether Trump can rein in Netanyahu’s unrealistic ambitions against Iran.
The author is director of the China-Middle East Center at Shaoxing University, China.


