Washington: The Limits of a Military Option

Any new U.S. military campaign might achieve significant results on the ground, but it would not guarantee an end to the conflict on Washington's terms. Deciding to launch new operations therefore requires defined objectives, a realistic assessment of potential responses, and arrangements to prevent a resumption of fighting.

Washington is struggling to transform military pressure on Iran into a political agreement despite the damage inflicted on Tehran's capabilities during the war.

President Donald Trump's announcement that the U.S. will not launch any new attacks before the Nov. 3 midterm elections provides an opening to keep negotiating while military preparations continue. But delaying operations does not change the nature of the dispute between the two sides, and it forces the U.S. administration to determine what a new campaign could achieve and what regional escalation might follow.

U.S. forces are capable of inflicting further damage on Iran's military and nuclear facilities, and targeting could extend to energy and infrastructure sites. Broadening the scope of operations would mean moving from degrading Tehran's combat capabilities to draining its economic resources, with the goal of pushing it to make concessions. But mounting losses could drive the Iranian leadership to harden its position, fearing that backing down under bombardment would be seen inside Iran as yielding to Washington's terms.

The prospect of Iranian retaliation puts limits on Washington's calculations. Strikes on its vital facilities could drive Tehran to intensify attacks on ships and energy facilities in the Persian Gulf, burdening U.S. partners with additional costs that would extend to global oil prices. The success of upcoming operations would hinge on the ability of U.S. forces to contain the fallout from escalation, as well as on the scale of damage inflicted on targets inside Iran.

Washington wants to impose restrictions on Iran's nuclear program before easing sanctions, while Tehran is demanding the blockade be lifted first. Iran has deemed the U.S. response to its proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz insufficient, reflecting the continued dispute over the terms of deescalation. Mediators' efforts will remain limited as long as each side insists on receiving something in return before taking concrete steps, making it harder to reach a settlement that ends the confrontation.

The opaque distribution of power within Iran's leadership makes it difficult to gauge the prospects for a settlement. Multiple centers of political and military decision-making could restrict negotiators' authority and tie approval of any agreement to internal consensus among the factions holding power. Despite the military losses and the worsening economic crisis, sustained pressure on Tehran does not necessarily mean its leadership is ready to accept U.S. demands.

Oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz have eased some pressure on markets, but that does not mean maritime security has been fully restored. Security and logistical arrangements have contributed to improved Gulf export flows, even as attacks have resumed and insurance and shipping costs have risen. The Iranian threat remains, and trade could be disrupted again if the confrontation widens, despite the U.S. military presence in the region.

The decrease in China's imports of Iranian oil under the U.S. blockade is squeezing one of Tehran's most important economic outlets. In backing Iran, Beijing weighs its own broader interests in the Persian Gulf, including securing energy supplies and its trade relations with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It could continue its political and economic support, but that does not mean it is prepared to enter a military confrontation with Washington.

Escalating Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia could draw Washington into new military operations, despite Trump's decision to postpone his strikes on Iran. The president has announced that he is considering joining strikes against the Houthis after attacks that caused civilian casualties and targeted facilities in Saudi Arabia. The Yemen front could therefore broaden U.S. involvement before the negotiating track with Tehran is resolved.

Airstrikes against the Houthis may weaken their military capabilities, but they will not end the threat they pose to Saudi Arabia and Red Sea security on their own. The Iran-backed armed group retains broad areas of influence, which calls for a long-term strategy that includes strengthening the forces opposed to it and coordinating efforts on the ground and in politics. Without a comprehensive approach to the Yemeni crisis, north and south alike, changing the balance of power on the ground will remain extremely difficult.

Any new U.S. military campaign could achieve significant results on the battlefield, but it would not guarantee ending the confrontation on Washington's terms. Deciding to launch new operations therefore requires defined objectives, a realistic assessment of potential responses and arrangements to prevent a resumption of fighting. Leaving the future of the nuclear program, the security of sea lanes and the protection of the Persian Gulf hostage to successive rounds of bombing, however, could prolong the conflict no matter how heavy the losses Tehran sustains.