WikiLeaks and Mexico-USA
The media interest around WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, is still in vogue, and it's no wonder. It's not only because WikiLeaks gave the media an early Christmas present, since (at least in Mexico and as editors are aware of), news coverage loses steam in December. It is also because the mistaken decision to detain Assange in London has, rather than weaken, strengthened him.
Today Assange is no longer a mere messenger, he is a martyr of transparency.
Much has been speculated about if the WikiLeaks cables, which nobody has read in their entirety, will have implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and bilateral relations with its strategic partners, in particular the European Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Mexico. Regarding Mexico, it is worth noting a few things.
This past 13th of December, the Trilateral Meeting of North American Foreign Ministers was held in Wakefield, Canada, with the participation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa and Canadian Minister Lawrence Cannon. This meeting came two weeks before the WikiLeaks cables emerged and unveiled information regarding Mexico and the U.S. While diplomacy is used to masquerade balls, it is true that a trilateral agenda was discussed at that meeting and WikiLeaks could not demonstrate whether or not there was a loss of trust between those involved in the diplomacy of North America.
In other words, the WikiLeaks cables seem not to have had any effect on the relationship between Mexico and the U.S. This may be due to two main reasons: first, that nothing in the cables that have been released so far is of such importance as to affect a relationship as important as that of Mexico with the United States; the other option is the governments of both countries have been extremely adept at sending a joint message of "nothing is happening here." The second speaks to diplomatic professionalism and is a reason for celebration.
However, this does not mean that WikiLeaks has not had any effect on the politics of Mexico and the U.S. The immediate impact of WikiLeaks, which we have already begun to see, was to resonate a national sounding board on both sides of the border, but particularly on the Mexican side. The information that, for the Department of State, the government of Mexico does not control part of its territory (according to the cables this was even corroborated by a Mexican undersecretary), is not really new information — and even less so for the people who live in areas where the narcotraffickers control local Mexican authorities.
The information that the Mexican army did not trust U.S. intelligence about the location of Beltran Leyva, and led to the fact that it was the Mexican Marines who arrested the trafficker in Cuernavaca, only confirms how the Mexican Marines have traditionally had a much more internationalist character than the Mexican army. This also reveals that there is binational intelligence cooperation regarding the war on drugs, which is good news.
In Mexico, these cables have caused much media attention, as well as the cable that revealed that the secretary of defense suggested invoking Article 29 of the Constitution, declaring a state of emergency to allow the army to do its work "without hindrance." While this cable is perhaps the one that commands the most media attention and could have the most political implications, nobody has mentioned yet that, according to the very same cable, the then interior minister, Fernando Gomez Mont contradicted the secretary of defense and expressed his refusal to implement this measure. In addition, the possible application of Article 29 of the Constitution can not be carried out by presidential decree and requires the approval of Congress.
Finally, the cables concerning Mexico have not had much response in the U.S., which is more occupied demonizing Assange and preparing for the transition in Congress, which will be held by the Republicans in January. Therefore, despite the excitement that WikiLeaks can bring, so far their impact on this bilateral relationship has been null, but its impact on Mexican citizens' perception of the bilateral relationship and the echo in the media is another story.
Today Assange is no longer a mere messenger, he is a martyr of transparency.
Much has been speculated about if the WikiLeaks cables, which nobody has read in their entirety, will have implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and bilateral relations with its strategic partners, in particular the European Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Mexico. Regarding Mexico, it is worth noting a few things.
This past 13th of December, the Trilateral Meeting of North American Foreign Ministers was held in Wakefield, Canada, with the participation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa and Canadian Minister Lawrence Cannon. This meeting came two weeks before the WikiLeaks cables emerged and unveiled information regarding Mexico and the U.S. While diplomacy is used to masquerade balls, it is true that a trilateral agenda was discussed at that meeting and WikiLeaks could not demonstrate whether or not there was a loss of trust between those involved in the diplomacy of North America.
In other words, the WikiLeaks cables seem not to have had any effect on the relationship between Mexico and the U.S. This may be due to two main reasons: first, that nothing in the cables that have been released so far is of such importance as to affect a relationship as important as that of Mexico with the United States; the other option is the governments of both countries have been extremely adept at sending a joint message of "nothing is happening here." The second speaks to diplomatic professionalism and is a reason for celebration.
However, this does not mean that WikiLeaks has not had any effect on the politics of Mexico and the U.S. The immediate impact of WikiLeaks, which we have already begun to see, was to resonate a national sounding board on both sides of the border, but particularly on the Mexican side. The information that, for the Department of State, the government of Mexico does not control part of its territory (according to the cables this was even corroborated by a Mexican undersecretary), is not really new information — and even less so for the people who live in areas where the narcotraffickers control local Mexican authorities.
The information that the Mexican army did not trust U.S. intelligence about the location of Beltran Leyva, and led to the fact that it was the Mexican Marines who arrested the trafficker in Cuernavaca, only confirms how the Mexican Marines have traditionally had a much more internationalist character than the Mexican army. This also reveals that there is binational intelligence cooperation regarding the war on drugs, which is good news.
In Mexico, these cables have caused much media attention, as well as the cable that revealed that the secretary of defense suggested invoking Article 29 of the Constitution, declaring a state of emergency to allow the army to do its work "without hindrance." While this cable is perhaps the one that commands the most media attention and could have the most political implications, nobody has mentioned yet that, according to the very same cable, the then interior minister, Fernando Gomez Mont contradicted the secretary of defense and expressed his refusal to implement this measure. In addition, the possible application of Article 29 of the Constitution can not be carried out by presidential decree and requires the approval of Congress.
Finally, the cables concerning Mexico have not had much response in the U.S., which is more occupied demonizing Assange and preparing for the transition in Congress, which will be held by the Republicans in January. Therefore, despite the excitement that WikiLeaks can bring, so far their impact on this bilateral relationship has been null, but its impact on Mexican citizens' perception of the bilateral relationship and the echo in the media is another story.