China-U.S.-Japan Love Triangle

A financial crisis out of the blue has brought the flaws of all the economic models embraced around the globe to light. At the same time, it has given a rude awakening to the governments worldwide on their abilities to protect and rescue themselves from the current storm. Even the almighty U.S. has seen its banking system yield to the crisis without a fight. The supremacy of its weapons and the omnipresence of its military allies and bases hardly even matter in the face of the crisis.

While the global situation looks safer currently in comparison to the Cold War period, it has become more complicated and less predictable. During the Cold War, the U.S. could keep the U.S.S.R under check and set the tone for the international order for a few decades simply with its superior military power and allies’ allegiance. Today, the U.S. faces burning issues ranging from the financial crisis to climate change, nuclear weapon proliferation and an energy shortage, none of which can be solved by military prowess or alliance.

New Age of U.S.-Japan Alliance

The U.S. is not alone. Under the new order, many countries are at the end of their tether in terms of political, military, economic and diplomatic resources. Cold War values, mentality and model are not only obsolescent and inoperable in the light of the new issues, but they also risk being a political baggage and diplomatic obstacle.

New relationships are evolving. While China and the U.S. are not traditional allies, they are committed to help each other out of the current financial difficulties. In this case, the two non-ally nations are working together like countries with an alliance. China is not likely to formalize such alliances with the U.S. because the relationship is hardly equal as it involves hierarchical order among ally members. This does not undermine the importance of Sino-U.S. cooperation relative to America’s collaboration with its allies during the Cold War. On the contrary, as the objective of Sino-U.S. economic cooperation is to pursue win-win situations, which put it on the moral high ground compared to America’s alliances in the Cold War, which were after “win-lose” outcomes.

Hence, other countries should view the growing affinity between China and the U.S. positively. American allies should not be jealous or feel apprehensive. As the world plunges into economic turmoil, Japan, being a close ally to America, the No. 2 creditor to the country and the No.2 economy in the world, should take a more active role [than China] in seeking collaboration with the U.S. Only in this way can Japan accentuate its functions and worth.

The reverse seems to have taken place in the country. Since Obama’s inauguration, Japan has kept itself occupied by concerns over whether the new administration would lean more towards China and whether it would continue to regard Japan as its most important strategic partner. As Japan is clinging so much to its relationship with the U.S. during the Cold War era, it becomes very sensitive and conscientious of U.S.-Sino affiliation. Japan felt dejected as the Sino-U.S. strategic economic dialogue mechanism has escalated to higher level.

Japan is so apprehensive that it becomes short-sighted and high strung in its dealing with the Americans. It is obsessed over diplomatic protocol and the face of its government. For example, it hoped that Hillary Clinton would visit Japan before other countries and hoped that its Prime Minister Taro Aso could be the first foreign leader to visit Obama and so forth. Aso got his invitation and the privilege of being the first foreign visitor to the White House under the new administration. On the surface, Aso appeared to be happy but in reality, his trip was not as fruitful as he had hoped.

Aso’s trip to Washington was followed back-to-back by Clinton’s trip to Asia when important bilateral issues were being discussed. There was little significance or necessity for Aso’s state visit. Moreover, Obama has been in office for barely a month and he has loads of complex domestic issues and devastating economic problems to deal with. Aso’s visit was ill timed. The Obama Administration is unlikely to put his visit on high priority. As a result, Aso’s call on Obama was drowned out among the overwhelming publicity and commentaries on Obama’s congress speech.

Cold War Bedfellow Could Not Help Each Other Anymore

Aso did offer something tangible during his colloquy with the American president. First of all, Aso promised Obama that Japan would pay 80,000 Afghanistan policemen their remunerations for six months. Japan also decided to send a special envoy to Afghanistan to better co-ordinate with the U.S. However, these offers are trivial relative to the financial cross that Obama has to bear. While it is the thought that counts, Aso’s visit also revealed the limitations of U.S.-Japan cooperation. When America needs the most help, Aso could do nothing to heighten Obama’s adrenalin except to reiterate Japan’s commitment not to recourse to protectionism.

In contrast to the U.S. and Japan, China and America are neither foes nor friends and are likely to remain so into the future. Such association helps to avoid the complexities of a typical ally relationship. Should the U.S. take China as its foe, then China would be its most formidable adversary; should the U.S. take China as its friend, then China would be a reliable ally. If the Sino-U.S. relationship is viewed under the Cold War mentality, there will be no positive conclusion and no optimism in its future.

The cold war has long been gone. Foreign policies and objectives based on ‘friend or foe’ are outmoded. Such views would bind vision, impoverish imagination and restrict ways and means in interest seeking. In its most extreme form, a country would develop a crutch mentality on its allies that it will dig its own grave.

The Obama administration has implemented its Chinese policy with mannerisms and language bereft of any trace of the Cold War. Clinton urged the U.S. and China to work with each other like passengers of the same boat by using a Chinese proverb. Call it a temporary measure, a can’t-help-it posture or a long-term consideration, the fact that the Americans spoke to the Chinese in the latter terminology reflects the flexibility of the U.S. policy towards China as well as its changing opinion of the Chinese, which is catalyzed by the crisis. Going forward, as long as the relationship brings about a win-win outcome, the Sino-U.S. bond will be shaped by reality.

Japan still formulates its China policy using the American stand as its basis. This has been a logical move for Japan during the past decades because the country would be assured of economic development and progression as long as it is in sync with the U.S. Now, as the U.S. is linking its future with China, how should Japan treat its Chinese neighbor?

Or from another perspective, as China moves hand-in-hand with the faraway U.S., how should it view its immediate neighbor, Japan?