Good Intentions, Wrong Approach

You can’t accuse Barack Obama of going easy on himself with a war that could easily become the most significant military engagement of his presidency. In March, he announced a comprehensive plan intended to stabilize Afghanistan. Lots of clever ideas on paper, but it is now apparent that Washington still sees the struggle for the Hindu Kush as little more than a purely military campaign.

Obama is sending another 21,000 soldiers, their main mission ostensibly to provide security for civilian reconstruction projects. The United States no longer intends to gain victory in Afghanistan with bombs and grenades, but with water wells and schools, with civil developmental aid and diplomacy. Success no longer will be measured by the number of enemy killed, but by how many Afghans turn against the Taliban.

As valid as this approach may appear, the larger grows the chasm between American objectives and the realities on the ground in the region, where the war creates ever-increasing crises. Obama’s plan might have been better suited to years past in Afghanistan. But now that hostilities have spilled over into Pakistan, the U.S. again stands clueless before a problem that seems to grow ever larger and more complicated.

Thus, the recent meeting between Obama, Afghanistan’s President Karzai and Pakistan’s President Zardari was a further sign of good will – and of helplessness. Obama invited the men, still mistrustful of one another, to Washington in an attempt to forge a united front against the Taliban. In keeping with the U.S. government’s new policies, the discussion wasn’t limited to just military matters.

They discussed civilian assistance, agricultural modernization, strengthening government institutions and instituting an independent justice system. Obama even wrested a promise from them to form trade agreements. It was necessary, warned the President, to have positive programs in place to oppose extremist threats.

Right on all counts. But reality in the combat zone appears quite different. How can Afghan-Pakistan trade flourish when the Taliban controls the border regions? And how can the people trust foreign occupiers when the U.S., in its quest for victory, continues to bombard women and children? Even America’s own military remains a loose cannon in trying to implement Obama’s strategy, as was so tragically shown by the bloody U.S. air attack in Afghanistan’s Farah province. The generals around David Petraeus want to try winning hearts and minds, but the fog of war in Afghanistan’s mountains and valleys often results in shooting first and asking questions later.

In addition, no one is thrilled about Obama’s partners in Kabul and Islamabad, either. Deep distrust of Afghanistan’s President Karzai is spreading throughout Washington. No one expects him to govern the nation effectively even if he’s reelected this coming August. Despite that, the U.S. seemed resigned to another term in office for Karzai. Obama’s reconstruction plans could already founder just because of widespread corruption and the power of the Afghan warlords.

Neither has anyone in Washington any illusions about developments in Pakistan. In America’s view, the unpopular Zardari government there is engaged, primarily, in trying to stay in power, and the Pakistani military is preoccupied with its arch-enemy, India. The greater the worries are in Washington about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the fewer courses of action there seem to be. The U.S. can do virtually nothing militarily in a nation of 150 million. As soon as America escalated the air strikes against the Taliban in the border regions, they quickly faded into the country’s interior. Strategically, that has backfired.

The greatest danger for the president who showed up claiming he would do everything more wisely, is now apparent: If Obama doesn’t take care, he may quickly find himself involved in a much larger war.