America’s Solitude

Exactly one year ago, the world started observing (first with amazement, then with fear) the events that took place in the United States. On September 7th, the nationalization of the mortgage company giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as Lehman Brother's collapse three days later, marked the beginning of the global financial crisis. During subsequent months, talk about the failure of the neo-liberal capitalism model, as well as the immanent changes in the way the world operates, became commonplace. Twelve months later, the emotions have somewhat subsided.

The economic crisis has not turned international relations upside down. The shocking events served as a catalyst to the process that started much earlier, and will continue for an indefinite length of time, changing world dynamics. The predominant outcome of this process is the relative weakening of the U.S. as the world's dominant power. The U.S. remains, and will continue to be in the foreseeable future, a superpower, which, by its cumulative potential, highly exceeds any other country, or even several counties combined. However, its degree of dependence on other participants in international relations is increasing. The fact that the U.S. cannot single-handedly achieve its goals became apparent even during the first five years of this decade, when it failed in its attempt to reorganize the Middle East.

The economic crisis caused a change in Washington's leadership, and a change in the U.S. tactics in world affairs. Last year's predictions that the crisis had undermined other countries' confidence in the American economic model have been exaggerated. The world still looks to America as the source of all economic and political change and innovation. This reflects the United States' objective power as well as its connection with Barack Obama's personal popularity. For a period of time, President Obama earned most of mankind's trust. America has tools (unmatched by other countries) to influence international affairs. But last year's events have made clear, as strange as it sounds, America's solitude.

Despite numerous formal allies around the world, Washington can't seriously count on practically anyone. For example, looking at the larger Middle East region (which, to a large degree, determines overall world politics), countries that were traditionally America's strong allies (e.g. Pakistan, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia) are now more likely to be the source of additional U.S. policy problems, than partners who help to solve them. In each of the above examples, the scale and character of the problems is different. But the listed countries expect to get more from Washington than they're willing to give.

America's relations with Europe are a separate phenomenon. The crisis has exacerbated the transatlantic tensions. Discrepancy between the two sides of the Atlantic with respect to strategic development goals had started to emerge long before the economic crisis. The Old World, with the exception of the U.K., is not prepared to take risks in order to help America strengthen its global position. Also, based on Afghanistan, it's unlikely that the U.S. will be able to reequip NATO for America's global needs. Another conceptual gap that has emerged is how to overcome economic problems. America's approach is to stimulate demand, while Europe seeks to tighten regulation of financial markets, and control executives' incomes.

Mutual protectionist trends have noticeably increased. The drawn-out sale of Opel is an indicative example of this trend. Besides General Motors' reluctance to allow Russian co-ownership, there's also another underlying rationale: the American side is unhappy that the German government is too autonomous. There's also tension regarding reform of the global financial institutions. Large developing countries, especially China and India, demand a redistribution of control in the IMF and the World Bank. The United States, seeking to establish relations with the Asian giants, would like to meet those demands. But it would like to do so primarily by changing the European countries' quotas, whose economic weight does not correspond with the current power balance.

As the focus of world strategic interest shifts to the Asian-Pacific region, the United States is faced with a question of how to behave towards Europe. Among other things, the Obama administration has not yet determined how to deal with Central and Eastern European countries, which have traditionally acted as agents of American influence in the Old World. This region's priority has declined, partly due to the influence of stiff Russian opposition, and partly due to the abundance of problems associated with the post-communist world.

The main challenge in U.S. policy is how to develop relations with China. Although China has also been affected by the economic crisis, it will continue to be the fastest growing country. The world recession has demonstrated the degree of mutual dependence between the United States and China. But this dependence is more negative than positive in nature, and both sides would prefer to get rid of it, rather than make it stronger. In any case, the talk about G2, which was a major topic in U.S.-Chinese relations throughout the year, showed the short-lived nature of such ideas. Of course, the prospects of China joining an anti-American alliance are just as illusory. China has its own complex relations with America.

Overall, global political trends that started taking shape in the early 21st century, and were stimulated by the crisis, were not favorable to Washington. They forced Washington to intensively search for new approaches. Relations with Russia should also be viewed in this context. The global recession has demonstrated the Russian economy's extreme vulnerability to outside influences. Contrary to expectations, the recession did not particularly influence foreign policy. Moscow is active and aggressive, due to a sense of general confusion, and the desire to seize the moment to strengthen its position. Russia's peculiar competitive advantage is its socio-political system. In other countries, the presence of full democratic control would hardly allow the government to spend money to support geo-political initiatives during a deep recession. But an authoritarian government can afford to do so, to a certain extent, with available state reserves being the only limiting factor.

Under the circumstances described above (Washington's crisis with respect to its allies), it is important for Washington to understand the extent to which Moscow could be used as support for solving a number of important problems. Despite the numerous weaknesses that threaten the country's future development, Russia is one of the few remaining countries that possess strategic thinking, potential, and the ability to apply force. Europe has lost these qualities, while China is focused on self-development, at least for now. This makes Moscow a potential opponent for Washington, and also a possible important partner. However, to become partners, both sides must move beyond the ideological notions established during earlier eras. This has not happened yet. But being aware of the "two solitudes" (Russia's solitude is so obvious, there's no need to talk about it) could influence strategic thinking.