Obama Not Following Through with Logic of War

Barack Obama made the most difficult decision of his first year in the White House, and maybe of his presidency: to send more U.S. soldiers to fight in Afghanistan, in order to defend “national interests” and U.S. “security .” Upon giving his speech at West Point, the opponent to the war in Iraq became a war leader.

In Mr. Obama’s vision of the war, there are two significant differences from George Bush: the first being his clear wish to withdraw the U.S. Army from Afghanistan as soon as possible, which can help to challenge the widespread sentiment in the Arab world that the U.S. seeks to occupy foreign countries. The second is his clear statement that the Afghan problem is, in reality, an Afghan-Pakistani problem, a fact that, thus far, has often been left unmentioned.

Mr. Obama, appearing quite somber at West Point, gave the impression of being unconvinced of the appropriateness of his strategy. He hesitated to convey a plan for many months. Obviously, he has become a war leader with reluctance. The U.S. president has, in fact, not followed through completely with the plan he clearly defended during his campaign: withdraw the U.S. Army from Iraq and concentrate on the fight against al-Qaida. Had he done so, he would have come to a double conclusion: first, that no trace of al-Qaida has been found in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001; second, that it is not with an army of 100,000 men that one fights al-Qaida.

What is al-Qaida? It is 200 to 500 men hidden in Pakistan and several other outposts spread across the planet, from Yemen to Algeria and Somalia. How does one fight al-Qaida? Through intelligence and police operations, and when absolutely necessary, as Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama have done somewhat successfully since mid-2008, through precise military operations in the Pakistani “tribal zones”, using the drones of the secret service.

The Initial Error

Not only did Barack Obama fail to follow through completely with his strategy of limiting U.S. combat to fight al-Qaida, but neither he nor his allies dared to question what was undoubtedly the initial error in Afghanistan: NATO military deployment.

After the terrorist acts of 9/11, the international community came to an agreement with a clear objective: expel the Taliban from power because they were granting asylum to al-Qaida and track down jihadists worldwide. The first step was accomplished in a few weeks, without the deployment of foreign troops. The Afghan mujahedeen are the ones who defeated the Taliban, with the support of a few Special Forces units and U.S. bombardiers. By the end of 2001, there was neither a Taliban nor an al-Qaida presence left in Afghanistan.

The deployment of foreign armies brought the hostility of the population on themselves and contributed to creating new enemies. They served as magnets, just like the Russian army in its time, for volunteers wishing to join the jihad. By not questioning the initial legitimacy of the foreign military presence in Iraq, Mr. Obama does not completely break free from the Bush era.

It is not to say that his Afghan strategy is necessarily doomed to fail. Perhaps the military reinforcements will allow the U.S. to regain some terrain lost to the Taliban over the last three years. What is essential is not so much the number of soldiers as the missions to which they are assigned. The counter-insurgency strategy of Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal might begin to bear its fruit as well. Maybe the Afghan forces will soon be ready to fight the Taliban on their own. However, it’s also possible that the prolongation of an erroneous strategy will lead to disaster.

There remains the heart and sinew of the war: Pakistan. This is where the fight against al-Qaida will be played out, regardless of Washington’s Afghan approach. To his credit, Mr. Obama did underline this. Over the course of a year, the situation in Pakistan has developed favorably. The army has finally attacked Taliban sanctuaries and jihadists. The U.S. seems to have intensified its secret operations in the area as well. This war requires neither long political debates nor additional troops, and doesn’t make the first page of the papers. It is, nonetheless, precisely in Pakistan that the true enemies of the U.S. and the international community, the jihadists of al-Qaida, will or will not be vanquished.