Economic Sanctions Between U.S. and China Are Meaningless

Chinese Lunar New Year, the year of the tiger, is approaching; yet Sino-U.S. relations are trapped in a state of “winter.” The Google disturbance came first, arms sales to Taiwan happened in between, and finally a meeting with the Dalai Lama. China has responded with a tough stance to the unprecedented wave after wave of Obama’s “revolt.” Sino-U.S. relations are clearly not a “short, temporary freeze before the coming thaw” but entering a cyclical low point. Surrounding the sudden change in Sino-U.S. relations, various kinds of “soft” and “hard” rhetoric are running rampant. In the end the question is: who is “flexible,” who is “firm?” — one cannot decide which is accurate.

With Obama’s first visit to China in November of last year, there was no lack of ridicule from the foreign media for his soft stance toward China: “Kowtowing to China,” “Looking to China for Help,” “Worship of China at the Great Wall and the Forbidden City”; these types of headlines could be seen all over the English media*. On the other side, the Chinese media were joyous, “The United States and China to Join Hands,” “Together, Care for the World.” Now, despite Chinese protests, Obama has adhered to the large-scale arms sales to Taiwan and meeting with the Dalai Lama, and the English language media immediately state that Obama has taken a “hard-line” stance. The Chinese media, naturally unhappy, scold Obama as “ungrateful,” stating emotionally that “Deception Has Occurred” and support, even more resoundingly, China’s calls for sanctions to be put in place against the United States.

In the end, is Obama “first soft, then hard” or “moving freely between styles?” China has the power to punish the United States, but is reckless punishment in the highest national interests? These issues require urgent solutions.

In fact, Obama has never actually been “soft” on China nor has he taken a hard-line stance. Congress set the conditions for arms sales to Taiwan and Obama was unable to cancel them; the content of the arms sales was decided under the Bush administration, not to mention the F16s and submarines not yet included in this deal. As for meeting with the Dalai Lama, which was originally scheduled for October of last year, it was postponed to February of this year because of Obama’s visit to China and is therefore difficult to label as deliberate provocation. Simply bad timing for the already strained Sino-U.S. relations, these events have “added fuel to the fire.”

Along the same lines, although Deng Xiaoping [former leader of the Chinese Communist Party] formulated the “keeping a low profile” policy toward the U.S., China has neither true soft-stance experience toward the U.S., nor any experience taking a hard-line stance to speak of. Whether on the North Korean nuclear issue or Iranian nuclear crisis, the Chinese have never given in to the United States. In regard to the appreciation of the yuan and trade protection, when was China ever soft toward the United States? Speaking of soft and hard, it is the media that creates stories involving issues of national images and reputation, exaggerating the severity of the real situation.

Were economic sanctions effective? The answer is not valid, especially in the era of globalization. You are part of me and I am part of you; all sanctions are a double-edged sword, injuring others, but also injuring oneself. The United States and Western countries placed sanctions on China after the “June Fourth Incident” [Tiananmen Square massacre] — were they effective? Were U.S. sanctions on North Korea, Iran, Burma and Cuba effective? Similarly, China’s current sanctions on Boeing are also futile, because if China does not buy Boeing planes, it has to buy from Airbus, allowing Airbus to “do whatever they please.” Visiting China again in 2010, if French President Sarkozy upsets Chinese leaders, whom will China place sanctions against? The only solution is that the Chinese do not need to buy someone else’s planes, which today they still cannot do. As for the U.S.-China economic sanctions against each other, injuries are suffered, in the end, by both the United States and China.

Of course, this does not mean that, in the name of diplomacy, we must “attempt nothing and accomplish nothing.” A hard-line stance will always be necessary; recalling the [Chinese] ambassador is one way of showing a hard-line stance. But all of these diplomatic acts must be based on an accurate calculation of national interests. For example, in the short term, it is in China’s best interest is to prevent the appreciation of the yuan. Then, in reaction to arms sales to Taiwan and meeting with the Dalai Lama, China should delay a re-evaluation of the yuan. Stopping Sino-U.S. military exchanges is not at all advantageous to the Chinese, because it would raise doubts for the rest of the world whether China’s military is under a “black box” operation. It has been suggested that China cancel President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in June. This is a bad idea entirely, because the more that conflict exists, the more we need high-level dialogue; this is the demeanor of world leaders.

Tough diplomacy means the objectives must be clear and reasonable. Through wave after wave of strong responses, if Beijing’s goal is to get Obama to cancel arms sales to Taiwan and cancel his meeting with the Dalai Lama, then it is wrong. Not only will the Chinese government fail to achieve their objectives, but they will ultimately “bring disgrace upon themselves.” Because with the United States’ refusal to acknowledge you, what is your next step? U.S. examples are ready-made teaching materials: In response to North Korea’s nuclear test, Washington responded, threatening that if Kim Jong-il dared to conduct the nuclear test, it would backfire on him. Results? Kim Jong-il still continued the nuclear test and the United States had to find their own next steps.

Therefore, Beijing should be flexible, in these tough times of protest, setting reasonable goals and conducting behind the scenes negotiations with the United States. For example, China could increase orders from Boeing, but ask that the United States not sell Taiwan high-end F16 fighter jets for more than a decade; also for example, China can request that Obama not meet with the Dalai Lama in the White House, but in a California university, and so on.

Chinese media report that regarding the U.S.-China conflict, Obama’s change in policy toward China has a blind spot. Considering that how Obama acts results just from his thinking in that moment, however, is not true. The personal likes and dislikes of a politician are certainly factors, but Obama’s support for Google depends more on three factors: national interests, interest groups, and the voters’ vote. Chinese media must not forget that Western politicians are dealing with an unemployment crisis. If Obama did not meet with the Dalai Lama, he would potentially lose a large number of votes, so no matter how much China protested, he held the meeting, because he wants to stay in office.

Regarding China’s economic sanctions, they are effective only if they are large enough to influence other countries’ economic development and therefore eventually affect the results of a country’s general election. The problem is that China still does not have that kind of power. In the final analysis, regarding the two countries’ economies and markets, who, in the end, is more dependent on whom? No one can answer this clearly. Thus, Sino-U.S. economic sanctions are meaningless.

*Editor’s Note: Not all English language headlines could be verified.