Egypt: Barack Obama’s Lesson of Realism
Published in Les Echos
(France) on 15 February 2011
by Zaki Laïdi (link to original)
(France) on 15 February 2011
by Zaki Laïdi (link to original)
Translated from
by Mylène Perdreau.
Edited by Heidi Kaufmann.
The domino effect that is currently shaking the Arab world is proof of the political processes that are now underway in that region, where there was no other perspective than economic decline and political authoritarianism for a long time. The fact that these processes were initiated from the inside and not the outside, that they were led by social — not religious — demands for democracy and that they picked on the governments in power — not on the United States or Israel, which are the usual scapegoats in that area — give an undeniable originality to this political sequence of events. And this originality seems to be confirmed by the first sociological studies made on the Egyptian revolt.
In view of these unprecedented and unexpected events, Barack Obama not only showed his great political talent, but he also proved that as far as foreign affairs are concerned, realism did not mean lazily relying on the leaders in power nor overthrowing them by force. Rather, it meant politically supporting the forces of change — as long as they were compatible with American interests — without necessarily being accused of interference.
At the beginning of the crisis, Obama gave Mrs. Clinton — who has been very professional but has lacked vision since she took up her post — the freedom to act. During this crisis, she did not manage to find the right tone, probably because she was under the strong influence of Saudi Arabia and Israel, which are shy supporters of the status quo in Egypt.
Of course, as an experienced realist, Obama was probably trying to keep several irons hot while the crisis remained uncertain. Nevertheless, two facts stand out about his behavior during the crisis. He did everything he could to give a public character to his action by speaking on the issue more than three times in a week, which is very unusual. It was as if he wanted to show the protesters that the United States had decided to be on the right side of the story this time. As if he also wanted to tell Mr. Mubarak that he wanted to call the international public opinion to witness his commitment, for fear of not respecting them.
And indeed, he raised his voice when protesters started to become bolder. Therefore, the lesson he gave was clear: In today's world, being realistic does not merely mean siding with the governments in power but entering the game formed by all the social powers. He knows that it would be suicidal in the long run for the U.S. to ignore the Arab demands for democracy under the excuse that the only organized power groups are the Islamists or that the U.S.' Saudi and Israeli allies are reluctant for any change.
In view of this smart activism, the European Union confirmed its insignificance. But it would be too easy to condemn Mrs. Ashton. All of the state members fell over each other in order to take part in the watershed. They all competed against each other in order to call for an immediate political transition as soon as Obama called for it. Ignorance, fear or the usual political alignment? Probably a mix of all three.
Unfortunately, during this crisis, Nicolas Sarkozy did not draw any attention to himself by taking a sound or original position. In his defense, let's say that he was still absorbing the shock of the "touristic" event that took place during the crisis in Tunisia.
But there is a striking contrast between Barack Obama's public tribute to the Egyptian people after Mr. Mubarak's resignation and the terse statement released by the French government in which Mr. Mubarak's courage was underlined — an assessment that is surprising to say the least when we know that only the army's refusal to shoot at the crowd prevented a bloodbath and made Mr. Mubarak's position impossible to hold.
All of this confirms that there is something that is broken in the French foreign policy with the Arab countries — a policy that has tended to take more and more African traits, and in a bad way, in the last few decades: too much importance is given to interpersonal relations — with all the well-known excesses included; diplomacy's political horizons are reduced to immigration control and the fight against terrorism; huge commercial contracts are coveted in solvent countries; and the stunning indifference to democratic issues. Jacques Chirac managed to limit the damage of such a policy because of his compelling perception on some matters (the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
With objectivity, it is hard to find any trace of originality about Nicolas Sarkozy. The only interesting project (the Union for the Mediterranean) that he wanted to be the leader of failed, even though it was said to be a very easy matter. If French foreign policy's loopholes are not reviewed in a critical, clear and extensive way, it will be taking the risk of getting weaker once again — especially if the Egyptian syndrome were to spread.
In view of these unprecedented and unexpected events, Barack Obama not only showed his great political talent, but he also proved that as far as foreign affairs are concerned, realism did not mean lazily relying on the leaders in power nor overthrowing them by force. Rather, it meant politically supporting the forces of change — as long as they were compatible with American interests — without necessarily being accused of interference.
At the beginning of the crisis, Obama gave Mrs. Clinton — who has been very professional but has lacked vision since she took up her post — the freedom to act. During this crisis, she did not manage to find the right tone, probably because she was under the strong influence of Saudi Arabia and Israel, which are shy supporters of the status quo in Egypt.
Of course, as an experienced realist, Obama was probably trying to keep several irons hot while the crisis remained uncertain. Nevertheless, two facts stand out about his behavior during the crisis. He did everything he could to give a public character to his action by speaking on the issue more than three times in a week, which is very unusual. It was as if he wanted to show the protesters that the United States had decided to be on the right side of the story this time. As if he also wanted to tell Mr. Mubarak that he wanted to call the international public opinion to witness his commitment, for fear of not respecting them.
And indeed, he raised his voice when protesters started to become bolder. Therefore, the lesson he gave was clear: In today's world, being realistic does not merely mean siding with the governments in power but entering the game formed by all the social powers. He knows that it would be suicidal in the long run for the U.S. to ignore the Arab demands for democracy under the excuse that the only organized power groups are the Islamists or that the U.S.' Saudi and Israeli allies are reluctant for any change.
In view of this smart activism, the European Union confirmed its insignificance. But it would be too easy to condemn Mrs. Ashton. All of the state members fell over each other in order to take part in the watershed. They all competed against each other in order to call for an immediate political transition as soon as Obama called for it. Ignorance, fear or the usual political alignment? Probably a mix of all three.
Unfortunately, during this crisis, Nicolas Sarkozy did not draw any attention to himself by taking a sound or original position. In his defense, let's say that he was still absorbing the shock of the "touristic" event that took place during the crisis in Tunisia.
But there is a striking contrast between Barack Obama's public tribute to the Egyptian people after Mr. Mubarak's resignation and the terse statement released by the French government in which Mr. Mubarak's courage was underlined — an assessment that is surprising to say the least when we know that only the army's refusal to shoot at the crowd prevented a bloodbath and made Mr. Mubarak's position impossible to hold.
All of this confirms that there is something that is broken in the French foreign policy with the Arab countries — a policy that has tended to take more and more African traits, and in a bad way, in the last few decades: too much importance is given to interpersonal relations — with all the well-known excesses included; diplomacy's political horizons are reduced to immigration control and the fight against terrorism; huge commercial contracts are coveted in solvent countries; and the stunning indifference to democratic issues. Jacques Chirac managed to limit the damage of such a policy because of his compelling perception on some matters (the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
With objectivity, it is hard to find any trace of originality about Nicolas Sarkozy. The only interesting project (the Union for the Mediterranean) that he wanted to be the leader of failed, even though it was said to be a very easy matter. If French foreign policy's loopholes are not reviewed in a critical, clear and extensive way, it will be taking the risk of getting weaker once again — especially if the Egyptian syndrome were to spread.