On the Threshold of Global Transition (Part Two)

The impression is that political power in Russia varies between the project of integration into the Western world with a partial, selective adoption of some of its rules and retaining national sovereignty. At that, radical and ideological rejection of Global Transition is out of the question. The Kremlin (especially recently) tends to distance from those countries that express their negative attitude toward this system (Iran, Libya).

The set of issues can be divided into two constituents: an objective condition of public opinion of broad Russian masses and effectiveness of political management, i.e. achievement of goals set by the power itself (reality check of political course).

In this case, public opinion of broad Russian masses constitutes a significant issue. In general, this opinion (pure subconscious comprehension) is directed against Global Transition and explicitly gravitates toward sovereignty, autarchy and even nostalgia toward the Soviet past. Power places the emphasis on freedom, democracy and development. The masses would rather prefer nationalism, socialism and conservatism. A cognitive dissonance is evident.

In situation like this, a political management could, in theory, agree to unpopular measures and carry on with the course of integration with the West. To do so, the proof of effectiveness, efficiency and noticeable results of this course must be demonstrated in practice. In other words, everything must be going swimmingly in the Russian state: Political projects must be implemented, democratic procedures must work, relationship with the West must yield noticeable dividends and visible proof of the fruits of modernization must be provided. Only then will the unhappy accept the suggested course — however unpopular it is. But in Russia there are issues with this as well.

These issues are related to the diversity of American global strategy for many reasons, in particular, the ambiguous attitude of Washington to Moscow. According to Obama’s formula (multilateral partnership of the U.S. with its “junior” allies), democratization of Russia could provide it with membership in the Western club (only if Russia follows a number of structural recommendations and on modest terms). But for the neo-conservatives and Republican supporters of the “American Empire” project, Russia, on the contrary, must be swung and weakened to the limit or divided. The project of “democracy intensification” is directed to a political explosion from the inside and preparation for the color revolution. In that way, pro-Western Russians would find themselves in a delicate situation. In the U.S., Obama’s sympathies face a completely different understanding of Russian-American relations. The Russian presidential elections of 2012 will be held against this background. To a considerable degree, [the elections] will depend on how clear the vision of a future president is regarding the global position of Russia in the world and the way it will have to follow, and not on the selection of the Putin-Medvedev tandem (although it is certainly paramount).

Explaining electorate intricacies of balancing between the Western system integration and retaining sovereignty is going to be a complicated task, for it is a matter of nuances and details. Moreover, election campaigns are about short and clear slogans (not long speeches). That’s why presidential candidates will have to simplify and roughen their speeches. This very simplification is going to be the core issue. Neither of the two candidates who are most likely to win will be able to demonstrate vividly the effectiveness of the state functioning and its foreign and home policies. Not the less obvious reason is Mr. Obama who, even in theory, Despite his “russophilia” [sic], has failed (in theory and in practice) to influence the West to make political steps toward Russia. Obama might have said something or made positive gestures, but they are so insignificant that the Russians haven’t appreciated them.

Certainly, presidential candidates have also reserved a strategic stock of ideological anti-Westernism (let’s relatively say the stock of “eurasianism” or “nationalism”). It is going to work out for internal political situation (it always did). However, it will create problems with the magnetic field of Global Transition and may provoke a network blow from the kernel of the West-centred system. Authorities have taken great pains to avoid the latter before.

Such a scenario has obviously been kept as a very last resort. We will soon see what happens. It’s just a matter of several months.