Libya: a Big Mistake

The sum of errors that has led to the current situation in Libya makes for an anthology.

Moammar Gadhafi was wrong in underestimating the hypocrisy and deceitfulness of the Euro-Western oligarchies that he chose as travel partners. His successor, Sayf al-Islam Gadhafi erred when, in the first days of the crisis, he acted arrogantly and threatened a civil war. NATO and the United States failed by underestimating the determination of the Libyan ex-leader, who resisted far beyond what was expected, and not hitting the bull’s-eye with the Arabian League reactionaries.

One of the biggest mistakes of the Libyan cause was to bet on repression when the first insurgents, without NATO’s involvement, took over Bengasi. The High Military Command erred by not showing its face, thus complying with the no-fly zone, which has shown to be ineffective. Nobody’s seen a Libyan combat unit deployed; the air force, presumably loyal to Gadhafi, never launched or initiated a credible anti-air defense.

Anyhow, the United Nations — which stuck its foot in the matter by endorsing the aggressive interventionist attitude of the European politicians led by Sarkozy, Berlusconi, the British Prime Minister, the Spanish Prime Minister and others — added another ill-fated precedent to this erratic execution.

Hillary Clinton, who, due to her post as the chief American diplomat, was expected to show her expertise in dialogue and negotiations, did not exercise these skills — not because she lacked them but because she needed a “brief and splendid” little war and small-cost victory to complete her résumé.

We cannot hide the fact that they made a mistake, which was probably caused by the two votes of the Russians and the Chinese, who both claim to have believed NATO would keep itself within limits of the ambiguous intentional resolution made by the Security Council — which they could have vetoed — that led to the authorization of the no-fly zone and any means to “protect Libyan civilians.”

The one person who had a correct prediction was Robert Gates, previously the Secretary of Defense for Bush whom Obama delightfully retained, who opposed American intervention with the accurate argument that Libya was not a “vital U.S. interest” and that for the United States it was enough to have ongoing operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nor was Fidel Castro mistaken when, with anticipated lucidness, as if he was actually observing NATO’s plans, including the different modes of aggression, he predicted that there would be the installation of North American troops in northern Africa, which would in turn lead to the control of another petroleum enclave, provide advanced positions to African Commands and expedite entrance to the continent.

At the end of the Cold War, instead of promoting the awaited cooling period, the United States insisted in pursuing with war and aggression a leadership that could have been achieved with peace and cooperation. In the political aftermath caused by 9/11, Bush placed himself on the wrong side of history and with a determination worthy of a better cause; Barack Obama persists in this error. That’s their affair.