The Dragon Is Sharpening Its Claws

Published in Polityka
(Poland) on 3 August 2011
by Adam Krzemiński (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew Matyjek . Edited by Mark DeLucas.
Henry Kissinger wrote the book entitled “On China” in order to explain China's political culture to Americans. However, these lessons can be learned by the whole world, including Chinese.

The 21st century will be witness to a U.S.-China showdown, according to Colonel Liu Mingfu of the Chinese Military University, who wrote the book “The Chinese Dream.” Though the Chinese press was critical of the book, the idea that a peacefully developing China is a myth has become mainstream in Asia. Chinese culture alone cannot defeat the immoral West, and China needs to prepare itself for the possibility of war.

After 40 years of detente in the Pacific and even a Chinese-U.S. alliance of sorts, which helped bring down the Soviet Union and usher in an era of prosperity, is it really necessary for there to be a diplomatic ice age? The mood on both sides is not good. The Americans are irritated by the devaluation of the Chinese currency, which creates a massive trade imbalance. The Chinese are disenchanted with capitalism, which puts them at the mercy of the dollar. By hoarding massive amounts of U.S. Treasury notes, the Chinese are not just American debt holders, but also America’s hostage.

Kissinger, 88, who organized Nixon’s groundbreaking visit to China, has warned that U.S.-China relations greatly mirror U.K.-Germany relations during the start of the last century. United under Bismarck’s leadership, the new German state threatened British interests by building up its navy and pursuing an aggressive colonization policy. To counter German strength, the British organized an informal alliance with Russia and France in 1904, creating the possibility of a two-front war. In 1907, Eyre Crowe, an influential civil servant in the Foreign Office, wrote that a German attack is imminent. Seven years later, he was proven right.

According to Kissinger, if Beijing decides to push the United States away from the shores of the western Pacific, they will create the same situation as 100 years ago. However, Kissinger cautions against taking historical analogies too literally. History is not an almanac of self-fulfilling prophesies.

100 years ago, the victory of one side meant the defeat of the other side, with public opinion discouraging compromise. The situation today is different, as both the Americans and Chinese are aware that they can’t solve the world's problems alone. To prove this point, the Chinese foreign minister issued a statement saying that China plans to develop peacefully. Besides, the glittering coast of China is a facade. Over 150 million Chinese citizens survive on less than $1 a day. Even if China aims for world domination, they will surely incite a coalition against them, according to diplomat Dai Bingguo.

Kissinger tries to explain in his book China's political culture and strategy. In accordance with the work of Sun Tzu, China does not conquer its neighbors. Rather, it absorbs those who attack it and renders them ineffective with its culture and size. In Russian thinking, safe borders involve friendly satellite countries in the backyard with Russian soldiers stationed there. The Chinese, on the other hand, have always had defensive lines located within the country. Their expeditionary activities, such as the invasion of Korea in 1950, the conflict with India in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes in 1969 or activities in Vietnam in 1979 have always been short-term demonstrations of strength followed by retreat. China still regards the areas in question as theirs, but instead of a military presence, the Chinese absorb them using psychological and cultural means.

China has time on its side, and the Chinese are convinced of their exceptionalism in terms of culture and economy. In 1820, Chinese gross domestic product constituted 30 percent of the world’s production. The next 150 years of European and Japanese aggression was but an episode. The last 62 years of Chinese communism, with its cultural turmoil and Deng Xiaopong’s radical economic reforms, is just another dynasty. Communism itself is seen as a leap forward for the Chinese nation. While Gorbachev’s perestroika threw Soviet communism into the dustbin of history, Chinese communism is blossoming with its capitalist overtones. This is not the communism of Marx and Lenin, but of Mao and Confucius.

This confrontation is counterproductive for both nations. A Pacific alliance based on economic competition is necessary. Due to cultural differences, this alliance would be harder to keep when compared to groups such as NATO. America should refrain from criticizing China over human rights and remain focused on long-term developments. It might also be necessary for the West to rethink its conception of democracy. Chinese and American politicians will have the responsibility of creating a lasting peace based on mutual respect and understanding. If Kant and Confucius don’t reach an understanding, war might be the result.

In the minds of many, the world order has already changed. According to the newest poll from the Pew Research Center, there is a worldwide notion that China is outpacing the United States. Even 52 percent of Americans believe this, even though the U.S.'s GDP is still three times higher than China's GDP. Though many of the nationalities taking part in the poll (excluding Europeans) are positively oriented toward Chinese economic growth, the only nations happy about a militarily strong China are Pakistan, Palestine and Jordan. New generations of Chinese politicians, such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jaibao have often repeated of their desire for harmony, not hegemony. There exists, however, an entire generation of Chinese citizens who do not remember the Cultural Revolution or the upheaval of 1989. This generation is proud to be Chinese and thinks that their country is already a superpower.

It is easy to see why Kissinger likes to reminisce about his legendary talks with Zhou Enlai and Mao from the 1970s. His analysis of the Korean War, Vietnam War or China-U.S.S.R. relations are groundbreaking and influential. His description of the U.S.-China talks in which he played an integral part are fascinating. These stories have their Polish flavor as well. Warsaw was the place where many of the U.S.-China negotiations took place in the 1960s. After the 1969 border clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese, Moscow began to gauge U.S. support for an attack on Chinese nuclear installations. Nixon decided to switch sides. At a fashion convention held in Warsaw, U.S. diplomats attempted to approach the Chinese delegation, who promptly fled the scene. The Americans chased after them, yelling in Polish, “We want to talk to your ambassador! President Nixon wants to talk!” Two weeks later, the Chinese agreed. The negotiations were promptly moved to Pakistan, however.

American critics received Kissinger’s book with mixed feelings. The former editor of The New York Times criticized the former secretary of state for sacrificing human rights on the altar of realpolitik. Max Frenkel alleges that Kissinger was always eager to make deals with dictators in exchange in the pursuit of national interests. Kissinger, while acknowledging the responsibility of the Chinese communist regime for the deaths of millions, is still fascinated by Mao, the “philosopher king,” and by Deng, the “modernizer of China.” He still thinks that the war in Vietnam was lost because of American pacifists, whom Mao saw as foot soldiers in his extended worldwide revolution. He admits that the Khmer Rouge regime, while brutal, was useful in preventing Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina.

Today, China and Russia vote lockstep regarding to Libya and Syria. When it comes to international politics, everything is relative. Frenkel alleges that Kissinger always thought of democracy as an impediment to ruling effectively.

The Western debate over the approach to China continues. Stefan Halper theorizes that China will soon create a system with one party and a free market, a kind of combination of Lenin and Hayek. Charles Kupchan adds that along with China, other countries such as Brazil, India and Turkey will open up their markets. The Chinese market, however, will continue to be the most attractive. Due to the lack of democracy, China will be able to make quicker decisions in times of crisis. Iskander Rehman is of the opposite view. In his mind, India is the model for the future, especially because of its democratic government.

Henry Kissinger is very influential in this debate, and as expected, his book vaulted onto the bestseller lists in many countries. “On China” will certainly become required reading for anyone who wants to understand contemporary politics. Also, it will be interesting to see what lessons the Chinese take from reading the book.


Wiek XXI będzie sceną chińsko-amerykańskiego pojedynku stulecia, twierdzi profesor chińskiej akademii sztabu generalnego, pułkownik Liu Mingfu w „Chińskim marzeniu”, od roku szeroko dyskutowanym po obu stronach Pacyfiku. Prasa chińska co prawda książkę skrytykowała, ale słowa padły: wyłącznie pokojowy wzrost Chin to mrzonka. Wobec niemoralnego Zachodu Chiny nie mogą opierać się jedynie na swych tradycyjnych cnotach. Muszą być zdolne podjąć i wygrać wojnę z Zachodem.
Zatem po 40 latach odwilży na Pacyfiku, a nawet sojuszu chińsko-amerykańskiego, który walnie przyczynił się do upadku ZSRR i niewyobrażalnego rozwoju gospodarczego Chin, nowa epoka lodowa? Nastroje nie są najlepsze. Amerykanów irytuje zaniżony kurs chińskiej waluty, który powoduje gigantyczne nadwyżki w handlu z USA. A Chińczyków rozczarowuje amerykański kapitalizm, który wpycha Chiny w dolarową pułapkę. Skupując amerykańskie obligacje, Chińczycy stali się nie tylko wierzycielami, ale i zakładnikami Ameryki.
88-letni Henry Kissinger, który w 1971 r. przygotował sensacyjną wizytę prezydenta Nixona w Pekinie, przestrzega, że dzisiejsze stosunki chińsko-amerykańskie przypominają konflikt niemiecko-brytyjski sprzed stu lat. Zjednoczone przez Bismarcka prężne i butne Cesarstwo Niemieckie ambitnym programem rozbudowy floty wojennej i swą arogancką polityką kolonialną zagroziło brytyjskim szlakom komunikacyjnym. Reakcją był nieformalny sojusz brytyjsko-francusko-rosyjski z 1904 r. i niemiecki kompleks okrążenia. W 1907 r. wysoki urzędnik brytyjskiego ministerstwa spraw zagranicznych Eyre Crowe sporządził raport o nieuchronności niemieckiego ataku. Siedem lat później jego analizy się sprawdziły.
Jeśli Pekin zechce odpychać USA od zachodnich wybrzeży Pacyfiku, sytuacja będzie prawie taka jak sto lat temu w Europie, twierdzi Kissinger w najnowszej książce „O Chinach”. Ale – dodaje – ostrożnie z historycznymi analogiami. Wszyscy wiedzą, że tamta wojna była katastrofą dla wygranych i przegranych. Historia nie jest almanachem samospełniających się proroctw.
Sto lat temu wygrana jednej strony była przegraną drugiej, a rozhuśtane opinie publiczne uniemożliwiały kompromis. Dziś jest inaczej. Również Chińczycy wiedzą, że globalne wyzwania wymagają współpracy. Dowodem: zapewnienia chińskiego sekretarza stanu, że pokojowy rozwój Chin to żaden podstęp, bo Chiny nawet nie mogą być aroganckie. Bogate wybrzeże Pacyfiku to nie całe Chiny. Na 1,3 mld Chińczyków – 150 mln żyje w skrajnej nędzy, zarabiając 1 dol. dziennie. Nawet gdyby Chiny chciały sięgnąć po hegemonię nad światem, świat skutecznie by się im przeciwstawił, konkluduje w polemice z wojowniczym pułkownikiem Liu Mingfu wysoko postawiony dyplomata z kręgów prezydenckich Dai Bingguo.
Kissinger w swojej książce tłumaczy chińską kulturę polityczną i chińską strategię. Zgodnie ze spisaną 2,5 tys. lat temu „Sztuką wojenną” Mistrza Sun, Państwo Środka nie podbija sąsiadów. Wchłania najeźdźców, po czym rozbraja ich swą kulturą i masą. W rosyjskim myśleniu bezpieczne granice to te, po obu stronach których – a więc również na przedpolach, jakimi były dla ZSRR demoludy – stacjonują rosyjscy żołnierze. Chińczycy natomiast bronią się na liniach wewnętrznych. Ich działania zaczepne – jak w Korei (w 1950 r.), w konflikcie z Indiami (1962 r.), nad Ussuri (1969 r.), w wojnie z Wietnamem (1979 r.) czy w konfliktach tajwańskich – są krótkotrwałymi demonstracjami siły, po których następuje wycofanie poza tereny sporne. Chiny nadal uważają je za swoje, ale wcale ich nie muszą zajmować, ponieważ stan zawieszenia otwiera możliwości psychologicznych, politycznych i militarnych kombinacji.
Chiny mają czas. Mają też pewność swej wyjątkowości. Siły swej kultury i gospodarki. Jeszcze w 1820 r. chiński PKB stanowił 30 proc. globalnej produkcji. Późniejsze 150 lat chińskiej smuty – europejskich i japońskich interwencji, których symbolem jest splądrowanie i spalenie przez Anglików w czasie wojen opiumowych (1860 r.) pałacu cesarskiego w Pekinie – to tylko epizod. 62 lata chińskiego komunizmu, którego symbolem jest brutalna rewolucja kulturalna Mao w latach 60. i radykalne reformy gospodarcze Deng Xiaopinga, to jedynie rządy nowej dynastii w długich dziejach Chin. I rzeczywisty Wielki Skok.
Podczas gdy gorbaczowowska pierestrojka wyrzuciła radziecki socjalizm i sam ZSRR na śmietnik historii, chiński komunizm kwitnie – w kapitalistycznej oprawie. Tyle że to już nie komunizm Marksa i Lenina, lecz Mao i Konfucjusza.


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