The Diplomatic Implications of the Shalit Deal

From the moment we were informed of the deal surrounding the release of Gilad Shalit, domestic and foreign players alike began debating whether the deal will benefit or delay the diplomatic process between us and the Palestinians. And there were those who responded: It will neither delay nor hasten, because in any case there is not and will not be any diplomatic process, at least as long as Mahmoud Abbas holds to his contrarian stance. For Fatah’s leadership, there was at least one moment of glory (at least in the eyes of the Palestinian public), when Abbas submitted to the U.N. for recognition of a Palestinian nation. But that moment, much like many moments of glory, was fleeting when Palestinians in the territories and refugee camps came to the realization that an independent nation of their own remains elusive and distant.

Mahmoud Abbas’ appeal at the United Nations is also going nowhere at this stage. It is possible that the U.S. may not even find it necessary to block the measure with a veto. But what seems to have dimmed the Palestinian Authority’s outlook, even more than the aforementioned, is an impression acquired by the Palestinian masses, right or wrong, that the prisoner exchange is an accomplishment brought about by Hamas.

Hamas’ leadership presumes that its organization’s position has strengthened noticeably, and it is planning future political moves accordingly. First and foremost on its list, of course, is the immediate or gradual takeover of the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, Hamas expects an important gain by its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Egyptian elections — an event that will strengthen its position on the Palestinian streets. Indeed, the state of affairs in the Middle East is so fragile that it is impossible to predict what any one day will bring (there is not, for instance, any assurance that the military leadership in Egypt actually plans to step back and relinquish power), but if Hamas’ assessments turn out to be correct, the chances of a diplomatic arrangement of any sort between Israel and the Palestinians will remain doubtful.

The prospect of a Palestinian State under the sponsorship of the U.N. is becoming increasingly distant (and that, apparently, is also a conclusion reached by both Salam Fayyad and the Palestinian lobby in Washington — both opposed the U.N. stunt). And not only will the head of the Palestinian Authority hamper his relations with the U.S. government and Congress, but he also risks losing the Palestinian leadership to his sworn enemy, Hamas.

As a general rule, there are no zero-sum games in politics. With all the justified anger Israel has over Abbas’ behavior, we do not, of course, have a reason to rejoice in the gains made by Hamas, an anti-Semitic organization founded on the principle of our destruction as both a nation and a state. Accordingly, recent developments certainly warrant a diligent and fundamental inspection of all possible options: an effort, despite worsening conditions, to bring renewal to the diplomatic process; a return to the “status quo” (something that will be exceedingly difficult in the current climate); unilateral steps by us or approved intermediary arrangements. And, perhaps, others as well.

The Middle East Quartet recently turned to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in hopes of renewing talks. Israel responded positively. Mahmoud Abbas reiterated his mantra that talks may resume only if all construction beyond the green line is brought to a halt, Jerusalem included, and that the 1967 borders be recognized as the future borders of the Palestinian State.

This was before the Shalit deal. Will this new climate (temporary though it may be) bring the Palestinian Authority to the realization that its appeal to the U.N. and its refusal to engage in talks without preconditions are both mistakes? Rather, maybe they will again justify the popular adage by Abba Eban: “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”