Meanwhile in the Pacific, the String Could Snap

The crisis in Europe is dramatic (although there’s at least a sigh of relief from Silvio Berlusconi’s party and the choice of technocratic governments in Italy and Greece): There is suspense as to whether Israel (and perhaps America) will launch an attack against Iranian nuclear installations, anxiety about the disengagement of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and uncertainty on the horizon over the Arab Spring. And where is Barack Obama? The American president is to be found in the Asia-Pacific region in the middle of a nine-day trip, attending bilateral leadership meetings that started in Hawaii and will extend to Indonesia and Australia with an economic, military and, in a word, strategic agenda.

Obviously, this is not intended to alienate old Europe or simply abandon the Middle East or South Asia, with its thorny and seemingly insolvable problems. But American interest seems directed more and more toward the Asia-Pacific region, the most powerful engine in the global economy. This is not only due to the interests and needs of the current Democratic administration, which is anxious for trade agreements and more open markets. Last Saturday, in the first Republican debate exclusively devoted to foreign policy, the candidates spent the end of the discussion on the question of the relationship between China and the U.S. (it is true that international issues seem to be secondary in the Republican campaign).

During last Saturday’s debate the tone was somewhat bellicose (an attitude typical of the campaign), particularly when Republican favorite Mitt Romney promised to cast China, in his words, as a “cheater” with regards to their currency and market policies.* He has a point, but, should he come to power, Romney, like other American presidents, will be constrained by a complex equation of economic interdependence and strategic competition. In Hawaii, where he had a bilateral meeting with President Hu Jintao, Obama also put in his jab, although a bit more lightly, saying that China must “play according to the rules” and that the majority of economists believe that the Chinese currency is undervalued.

China is in an unusual situation: It is already a global power, albeit without military tentacles commensurate to the scope of its economic influence, but the slightest projection of Chinese power (with its growing military investments and naval muscle) is enough to disturb the neighborhood. Many countries in the Pacific region have profound differences amongst themselves, but what they have in common is a desire to reinforce a system of alliances (and protection) with the United States. The U.S., despite the economic decline and hardships of the moment, is and will be for decades the one global superpower.

There are, however, pressures to cut the military budget, even though (with the exception of the incisive, isolated isolationist, Ron Paul) the Republican hopefuls prefer to promise nothing but the best in funding for the Pentagon. In a recent report entitled “Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity,” the Center for a New American Security, a study group close to the apparatus of Obama’s National Security Council, stressed that the U.S. Military should focus “on the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and broaden engagements along the Pacific rim,” while pursuing a “defensive strategy” in the Middle East. In contrast, the report argues that Europe is a “tertiary priority” and that Africa and Latin America deserve “the lowest priority.”

Along this line, in a recent article in the magazine Foreign Policy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote that one of the most important tasks of American statecraft in the coming decade would be to “lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic and strategic, and otherwise … in the Asia-Pacific region”. In a recent visit to the region, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta emphasized the need for America to maintain or even increase its military presence in those regions to counterbalance the growing Chinese power. Of course, a tone of urgency is the Pentagon’s raison d’être for maintaining capital within the Washington power structure and justifying investments in new defense systems. In other words, there are military priorities that make for difficult choices about whether to drop the ball in other regions of the world (remembering that crises don’t always have defined scripts and can explode where a strategist would not like), or simply letting the American economy bleed even more. This last point will be ironic should a Republican president take power in the face of their candidates’ insistence on fiscal adjustments.

Yes, the choices are difficult. An even larger question is if the U.S., as a superpower experiencing difficult times (in spite of the Republican’s insistence on the exceptional character of the country), would accept the idea of less confrontation and more power-sharing with the Chinese in the Asia-Pacific region. This would also be a worthwhile question for the Chinese leadership, at the moment more absorbed with domestic challenges, but who are taking an increasingly assertive posture in the international scene.

The more objective reality is that there is a fundamental contradiction, and it is clear not only in the complex relationship of interdependence between the U.S.A. and China, but in the posture of the American allies in the Asia-Pacific region. While they want to reinforce economic ties with the Chinese (which are more important in the face of American and European weakness), at the same time they wish to tie the knot tighter with a military alliance with Washington, because they fear the strategic power of Beijing. In the long term, the string could snap as a result of these tensions and contradictions.

* Editor’s note: The use of this word in the debate cannot be verified; however, it has been used by Romney in reference to Chinese currency policy in other situations.