North Korea: A Test for China and the United States
Published in El País
(Spain) on 29 April 2013
by Javier Solana (link to original)
(Spain) on 29 April 2013
by Javier Solana (link to original)
Translated from
by Esther French.
Edited by Mary Young.
The Korean Peninsula has become one of the principal focal points of international tension owing to repeated threats from the Pyongyang regime. In spite of what’s worrying about the situation, it’s also an opportunity to increase the strategic trust between China and the United States, the two fundamental actors who can resolve these tensions. If the two geopolitical giants collaborate in a constructive way to establish a peace acceptable to all, not only the Korean Peninsula but also the region and the world will be safer for it.
It has been 10 years since North Korea abandoned the Treaty of Non-Proliferation; it is suspected that North Korea already has nuclear weapons, although not the necessary ballistic technology for the missiles to have a transoceanic reach. The capacity to reduce the size of the explosive is critical for the deployment of ballistic missiles. On Feb. 12 of this year, Pyongyang carried out a nuclear test, the third since 2006, and analysts pointed out that the size of the explosive would have to be reduced. After the test and the consequent sanctions — imposed by the U.N. and agreed to by the United States and China — the North Korean regime began to elevate the tone of its threats. This was followed by the announcement of yearly joint maneuvers between South Korea and the United States scheduled for April — with B-52 and B-2 bombers with nuclear capacity — increasing tensions with the North.
No one these days wants a war in the Korean Peninsula. For the regime in the North it would mean suicide. For South Korea — with its vibrant economy, multiple free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, and the possibility of incorporating itself into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (the large free trade zone that the United States projects in the Pacific) — it would mean thousands of unnecessary deaths precisely in a moment of great economic opportunity. For China it would mean compromising conditions of regional stability in order to continue with its economic and social takeoff. And for the United States, the consequent increase in military spending — in a time when it’s pulling out of Iraq and Afghanistan — would be an unexpected setback, just when its economy is beginning to put itself back together. The United States, in a full turn toward the Pacific, would prefer to exploit Asia’s economic opportunities rather than see itself embroiled in a conflict of unforeseeable consequences.
The key geostrategic actor in the resolution of the crisis is China. North Korea imports 90 percent of its energy, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 40 percent of its food from China; however, it is not very clear to what extent the Beijing government can influence that of Pyongyang. Relations with China have been seriously scarred since 1991, when China recognized South Korea without insisting that the United States recognize North Korea. The North Korean regime interpreted this as China sacrificing North Korea for its own commercial interests; this continues to be an obstacle in bilateral relations.
Independent of the regime that governs it, North Korea is today a valuable strategic asset for China. It serves as a buffer state to assure China that U.S. troops will not be on its border, which historically has served as a point of entry for invading troops. For China, therefore, it would be best to maintain the status quo combined with a progressive opening of its Korean neighbor. In this way, the North would change little by little, and any traumatic steps, such as conflicts or the implosion of the regime, would be avoided. Either of these two scenarios would have disastrous consequences, regional as well as global. In the first place, the collapse of the Pyongyang regime would provoke an avalanche of millions of refugees, with an enormous social and economic cost. In addition, given the security conditions in Asia, a continent characterized by balances of power, border conflicts and historic mistrust — all this marked by the absence of multilateral structures for regional security — any spark could light a fuse that would be difficult to stop.
The rise of China as a regional hegemonic power has awoken much distrust in East Asia, which is why it is vital that stability and peace in that zone be maintained. The Asian giant should participate in the construction of a regional peace of Asian origins, where all the actors can feel comfortable. It is the only way of supplying international legitimacy and, in this way, avoiding future conflicts.
That’s why it’s fundamental that China and the United States involve themselves in resolving the crisis together. The United States should leave it clear that not one change in the Korean Peninsula will be a strategic loss for China, and China should join in the efforts of the international community to stop the North Korean nuclear program and apply pressure for the regime to open. It is the only guarantee to avoid the tension repeating itself periodically, with the resulting risk of one day finally exploding.
The Korean crisis is, then, a golden opportunity to measure the combined capacity of China and the United States in the management of global issues. Or, as in this case, regional issues with global implications. During U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to China this month, it has remained clear that both countries pursue common objectives: a peninsula free of nuclear arms and a way of guaranteeing a stable peace. It is a good starting point. The Chinese-U.S. cooperation in this matter could be a giant step in the construction of the necessary strategic trust that should rule all bilateral relations between them. It will not be easy, as China and the United States differ in their political genetic makeup: While the United States separates out problems in order to find solutions in a limited time period, China considers problems as an extended process, applying a much wider and more relative perspective.
Before the threat of an impoverished, isolated and nuclearized state, it is only fitting to fortify cooperation through mutual strategic trust between the only two powers that have a large part of the solution in their hands. China and the United States are facing an occasion that is as much a challenge as it is an opportunity.
It has been 10 years since North Korea abandoned the Treaty of Non-Proliferation; it is suspected that North Korea already has nuclear weapons, although not the necessary ballistic technology for the missiles to have a transoceanic reach. The capacity to reduce the size of the explosive is critical for the deployment of ballistic missiles. On Feb. 12 of this year, Pyongyang carried out a nuclear test, the third since 2006, and analysts pointed out that the size of the explosive would have to be reduced. After the test and the consequent sanctions — imposed by the U.N. and agreed to by the United States and China — the North Korean regime began to elevate the tone of its threats. This was followed by the announcement of yearly joint maneuvers between South Korea and the United States scheduled for April — with B-52 and B-2 bombers with nuclear capacity — increasing tensions with the North.
No one these days wants a war in the Korean Peninsula. For the regime in the North it would mean suicide. For South Korea — with its vibrant economy, multiple free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, and the possibility of incorporating itself into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (the large free trade zone that the United States projects in the Pacific) — it would mean thousands of unnecessary deaths precisely in a moment of great economic opportunity. For China it would mean compromising conditions of regional stability in order to continue with its economic and social takeoff. And for the United States, the consequent increase in military spending — in a time when it’s pulling out of Iraq and Afghanistan — would be an unexpected setback, just when its economy is beginning to put itself back together. The United States, in a full turn toward the Pacific, would prefer to exploit Asia’s economic opportunities rather than see itself embroiled in a conflict of unforeseeable consequences.
The key geostrategic actor in the resolution of the crisis is China. North Korea imports 90 percent of its energy, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 40 percent of its food from China; however, it is not very clear to what extent the Beijing government can influence that of Pyongyang. Relations with China have been seriously scarred since 1991, when China recognized South Korea without insisting that the United States recognize North Korea. The North Korean regime interpreted this as China sacrificing North Korea for its own commercial interests; this continues to be an obstacle in bilateral relations.
Independent of the regime that governs it, North Korea is today a valuable strategic asset for China. It serves as a buffer state to assure China that U.S. troops will not be on its border, which historically has served as a point of entry for invading troops. For China, therefore, it would be best to maintain the status quo combined with a progressive opening of its Korean neighbor. In this way, the North would change little by little, and any traumatic steps, such as conflicts or the implosion of the regime, would be avoided. Either of these two scenarios would have disastrous consequences, regional as well as global. In the first place, the collapse of the Pyongyang regime would provoke an avalanche of millions of refugees, with an enormous social and economic cost. In addition, given the security conditions in Asia, a continent characterized by balances of power, border conflicts and historic mistrust — all this marked by the absence of multilateral structures for regional security — any spark could light a fuse that would be difficult to stop.
The rise of China as a regional hegemonic power has awoken much distrust in East Asia, which is why it is vital that stability and peace in that zone be maintained. The Asian giant should participate in the construction of a regional peace of Asian origins, where all the actors can feel comfortable. It is the only way of supplying international legitimacy and, in this way, avoiding future conflicts.
That’s why it’s fundamental that China and the United States involve themselves in resolving the crisis together. The United States should leave it clear that not one change in the Korean Peninsula will be a strategic loss for China, and China should join in the efforts of the international community to stop the North Korean nuclear program and apply pressure for the regime to open. It is the only guarantee to avoid the tension repeating itself periodically, with the resulting risk of one day finally exploding.
The Korean crisis is, then, a golden opportunity to measure the combined capacity of China and the United States in the management of global issues. Or, as in this case, regional issues with global implications. During U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to China this month, it has remained clear that both countries pursue common objectives: a peninsula free of nuclear arms and a way of guaranteeing a stable peace. It is a good starting point. The Chinese-U.S. cooperation in this matter could be a giant step in the construction of the necessary strategic trust that should rule all bilateral relations between them. It will not be easy, as China and the United States differ in their political genetic makeup: While the United States separates out problems in order to find solutions in a limited time period, China considers problems as an extended process, applying a much wider and more relative perspective.
Before the threat of an impoverished, isolated and nuclearized state, it is only fitting to fortify cooperation through mutual strategic trust between the only two powers that have a large part of the solution in their hands. China and the United States are facing an occasion that is as much a challenge as it is an opportunity.