Haggling Over Assad's Head: One Reason for the Delay in Resolving the Syrian Crisis

Even after abandoning its previous position and announcing that it will support the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition by supplying the weapons they desire, the United States clearly still has not settled on its position on circumstances in Syria. It is still hesitant, politically and militarily. This is causing even its friends to wonder what the Obama administration wants — what thing the Americans are waiting for that is causing them to take this incomprehensible and unjustifiable stance. If Washington had not kept hiding behind this [hesitant] stance, the crisis, which has been of a regional and international character for more than two years, would never have gone on for so long. Bashar al-Assad and his regime would not have lasted this long. There would be no al-Nusra and no al-Qaida. All the complications that we see now would never have developed; the slaughter and destruction would not have reached the same terrifying level.

The decision to arm the Free Syrian Army and the opposition came after a lengthy period of hesitation and lurking behind unconvincing and unacceptable excuses, such as the fear that American “qualitative” weapons would reach the extremist and terrorist organizations, as happened in Afghanistan. It came as a surprise and stirred many questions that are still being asked at the moment. However, it remains clear that the impetus behind this dramatic step that the Obama administration has taken — after much hesitation and reluctance — is [the desire to put] pressure on the Russians, as part of the duel, in which the two sides are biting the ends of each other’s fingers.* The Obama administration wants to make Russia meet its perspective at some reasonable point, so that the Geneva 2 conference can be convened as soon as possible and a solution can be agreed upon — a solution that could put an end to a terrible conflict that has taken the form of a destructive war, threatening the entire Middle East, just as Assad has said it would, time and time again since it first ignited.

Perhaps this perspective is strengthened by the goal of the step of the Obama administration being not to secure the Free Syrian Army’s victory, nor to change the balance of military power between Assad’s regime and the Syrian opposition. Rather, it is to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin and the figures in his government into allowing the settlement, still surrounded by obscurity. Some of the international circles working on this issue believe that the settlement hangs on the share that the Russians want in a future Syria, the price the Americans can accept in giving Moscow what it wants and whether it entails just the Syrian president’s departure or the departure of his regime too.

It is well-known that Syria constituted a living space for the former Soviet Union, not since Hafiz al-Assad isolated power [for himself] after his corrective movement in 1970; nor since the left wing, led by Gen. Salah Jadid, took control of the Baath Party regime after the February 1966 movement (whose leaders also included former president Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, former Prime Minister Yusuf Zain and Foreign Minister at the time Ibrahim Makhus), nor since the Baath coup on the separation government in 1964; nor since the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958. Rather, Syria constituted a living space for the Soviets since 1949, when Khalid al-Uthm became prime minister in a stage following the military coups of what was called “the conflict over Syria,” which brought this central Arab country to where it is now.

According to international parties interested in the issue, the Russians insist on having Syria remain as a living space — militarily and politically for them and their influence in the Middle East — just as it had been in the era of the Soviet Union, from the end of the 1940s until now [sic]. In return, the Americans want Putin to consent to all their living spaces that appeared after the earthquake of the early 1990s in Eastern Europe, the Caspian Sea region and some of what are referred to as the “Islamic Republics” that were a part of the Soviet era [i.e. part of the Soviet Union]. The Americans want a new Yalta, not the Yalta of World War II, in which the victors divided up most parts of the globe into areas of influence.

International parties interested in the issue are also saying that the problem in the furious haggling going on between the Russians and Americans at the moment is that the Obama administration wants to reach solution for Syria at Geneva 2, based on ridding Assad of all of his powers in the transitional period under discussion. It wants to entrust all responsibilities of state — including the armed forces, security apparatuses and central bank — to the transitional government. The transitional government will supposedly be one of national unity, in which the Syrian opposition, not the current regime, will have the biggest share (which suggests that the regime may continue after its president is stripped of all his presidential, military and civil powers, in all areas and on all levels).

What is certain is that the Russians, as part of this finger-biting duel, are the ones who, in recent times, pushed for all of the military escalation that this regime has resorted to with the help of Hezbollah, Iran and armed sectarian groups called in from Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. They did this to tip the balance of military power in Assad’s favor, which would enable them to impose their perspective upon the Americans, who, for their part, have resorted to arming the Free Syrian Army for the same reason.

But despite the Obama administration’s dramatic decision to arm the Free Syrian Army and the opposition, it is clear that the Americans have not severed their tenuous relationship with the Russians and that they are still betting on Geneva 2, not on a military victory by the opposition. Thus, the Syrian National Coalition delegation led by this young Ahmad Nasir al-Jarba (who proved from the beginning that he is worthy of this position and greater) has been confronted in both Paris and New York by the idea that there is no military solution to the conflict, and that it must deal with and prepare to attend and participate in Geneva 2 on the foundations decided in Geneva 1. Here, it is known that the Russians have backslid on the decisions made at Geneva 1, having renounced the agreement that Assad will not have any role in the transitional period that was decided upon, despite his superficial continuation as president until July 2014.

In any case, there are many observations that we must take into account when discussing the furious haggling between the Russians and Americans that is keeping the Syrian crisis at a political and military standstill. They are:

-The Americans refused to receive the Syrian opposition’s delegation in Washington, insisting on receiving it New York [instead], where the United Nations headquarters is located.

-The U.S. Department of State has insisted that Gen. Salim Idris, chief of staff of the Free Syrian Army, does not take part in the delegation. The Americans do not want it to have any military characteristics.

-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon refused to receive this delegation. After Arab pressure, he agreed to meet its deputy, not in the building of the international body but in one of the neighboring hotels.

In the end, we must point out that Iran, which has become one of the main numbers in this difficult equation, cannot permit any abdication of Assad — whether real or superficial — as long as it believes that losing Syria will mean losing Iraq and Lebanon, a moral blow to its expansionist plan in the Middle East and the entire Arab region.

*Translator’s Note: The author has used an idiom that evokes an image of two people reaching out into each other’s space, biting each other’s fingers and trying not to budge before the other.