How Ukraine Pushes Obama to Rethink His Diplomacy

On Wednesday, Barack Obama will go for the first time to the heart of the European institutions in Brussels, at a time when the situation in Ukraine forcefully appeals for transatlantic cooperation. If the American superpower is determined to take the lead, and to counter the extraterritorial ambitions of Vladimir Putin, it must do so in consultation and with the support of the European Union—an ally who is again finding its full place in American diplomacy. However, for a few months, the United States has been on delicate terms with the latter over the subject of the National Security Agency’s tapping and, moreover, is engaged in arduous commercial negotiations to abolish the trade barriers on each side of the Atlantic.

This trip to Europe, at the heart of the crisis, is therefore a unique opportunity for the American president to reaffirm his foreign policy not only with regard to Ukraine or Russia, but also with his European allies. “They need to restore a shared sense of confidence in transatlantic relations,” summarizes Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund. Concretely, that means showing all the interest of the United States for security in Europe—particularly via NATO—and the security of its energy supply. This also happens by tangible signs, aiming to facilitate trade between the two continents. As a direct consequence of the Snowden case, Europeans will also pay close attention to the guarantees on the protection of data and privacy, and will closely follow the progress made on this issue in the United States Congress.

The Reasons for America’s Firmness

Since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the United States has come back to the forefront—and wants to get tough. Firstly, because the Europeans, first in line, are divided on the sanctions to be imposed on Moscow and the consequences they may suffer in return. This has led to an initial series of very moderate measures. Secondly, because of the volatility of the situation in the region, as long as we are unsure of Vladimir Putin’s intentions. Russian troops continue to gather along the border with Ukraine, while the Ukrainian army has just withdrawn from Crimea. The Baltic states are very worried and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was dispatched last week to reassure Poles, Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians. Finally, because the dialogue between Russians and Americans has deteriorated over several months, and there is not much to lose by hardening the tone. Barack Obama has taken advantage of a summit on nuclear security at The Hague at the beginning of the week, to convene a G-7 which had been concluded by the provisional separation of Russia from the G-8, and the cancellation of the meeting of this group in Sochi, in June of next year. A sanction that seems largely symbolic. “… But symbols do matter,” assures Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow. “… A month ago we were exactly the opposite. We were in a different period where Putin wanted the world, including President Obama, to come to Sochi and to see the new Russia … So you don’t invest that kind of money to put on that kind of display for the world if you don’t care about what the outside world thinks … I think he’s torn between these two, that he wants respect, but he doesn’t want – you know, he wants to play by his own rules.”

The West cannot tolerate a redistribution of the borders at the mercy of the Russian president’s appetites, nor a flagrant violation of the rules of international law. Like the Europeans, the Americans have quickly—and more harshly—sanctioned Putin’s entourage, Rossiya, the oligarchs’ bank, and passed an executive order that allows them to consider economic sanctions in energy, mining or finance. “This is a godsend for Obama. He had a great need to show firmness, especially after Syria. This will help him when he goes before Congress about Iran. It is a golden opportunity to be firm without risk,” believes the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine.

Strategy for Isolating Russia

But beyond the motivations relevant to domestic policy, there is a real question mark among the Americans on this new phase of international relations. After the breakup of the Soviet empire—a geopolitical catastrophe, according to Vladimir Putin—the post-Cold War period has seen Russia gradually reintegrate the family of nations—entry in the World Trade Organization, the G-8, etc.—before the relationship degraded brutally these last few months with no agreement on nuclear disarmament, opposition on Syria, asylum granted to Snowden and Russian homophobic legislation.

Can the Americans, and the West in general, expect to go through this crisis and return to their previous state, or must they understand that we have entered a new era, an era where military aggression once again becomes possible in Europe. In doubt, the strategy is to isolate Russia and to support Ukraine, by helping economically—the U.S. Senate has just voted for $1 billion in aid—and rebuilding its democracy.

There have been, on similar occasions, some lessons to be learned from the Cold War, assures Michael McFaul. In his memoirs, the former Secretary of State for Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, had a chapter devoted to “engagement with the Soviets.” “It was necessary to avoid creating links between problems where they didn’t exist,” he explained.* Partition. But never break the dialogue.

*Editor’s Note: This quote, accurately translated, could not be verified.